

SUPERIOR COURT

CANADA
PROVINCE OF QUEBEC
DISTRICT OF MONTREAL

No.: 500-17-048861-093

DATE : August 3, 2015

PRESIDING: THE HONOURABLE CHANTAL MASSE, J.S.C.

STÉPHANE DESCHENEAUX

and

SUSAN YANTHA

and

TAMMY YANTHA

Plaintiffs

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

Defendant

and

CHEF RICK O'BOMSAWIN, NICOLE O'BOMSAWIN, CLÉMENT SADOQUES, ALAIN O'BOMSAWIN AND JACQUES THÉRIAULT WATSO, on their own behalf and in their capacity as elected council representing the ABENAKI OF ODANAK

and

CHEF RAYMOND BERNARD, CHRISTIAN TROTTIER, KEVEN BERNARD, LUCIEN MILLETTE AND NAYAN BERNARD, on their own behalf and in their capacity as elected council representing the ABENAKI OF WÔLINAK

Interveners

JUDGMENT

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INTRODUCTION

[1] Is the discrimination on the basis of sex suffered by Indian women and their descendants in the past with respect to their right to be entered in the Indian Register (“the Register”) still present today? If so, has it been shown to be justified in a free and democratic society? Is the Court bound by the judgment of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia (“BCCA”) in *Mclvor v. Canada (Registrar of Indian and Northern Affairs)*¹ (“*Mclvor*”) or are there grounds to set it aside in whole or in part? These are, in a few words, the basic issues that must be resolved here.

[2] Regarding the right to equality at issue in this case, Parliament has performed its task well in terms of the new regime established in the *Act to amend the Indian Act*² in 1985 and remedied from that point on the discrimination based on sex that had existed under the 1951 Act, which had created the Register and determined the conditions for being recognized as an Indian that may register.

[3] Nevertheless, the treatment of persons to whom both regimes were applicable did not perfectly meet the demands of this fundamental right. And indeed, the judgment of the BCCA in *Mclvor*, which the Supreme Court of Canada refused to hear in appeal, gave rise to a legislative amendment in 2010. The purpose of the 2010 Act was to respond to that judgment by correcting sex discrimination arising from certain transitional provisions of the 1985 Act.

[4] In that case, the BCCA found that the discriminatory treatment was justified because it existed to preserve rights that were vested under the former legislation.

¹ 2009 BCCA 153.

² S.C. 1985, c. 27. For ease of comprehension, this judgment will refer to this statute as the “1985 Act”. Similarly, the *Indian Act*, R.S.C. 1927, c. 98, will be referred to as the “1927 Act”; the *Indian Act*, S.C. 1951, c. 29, as the “1951 Act”; The *Act to promote gender equity in Indian registration by responding to the Court of Appeal for British Columbia decision in Mclvor v. Canada (Registrar of Indian and Northern Affairs)*, S.C. 2010, c. 18, as the “2010 Act”; *Indian Act*, R.S.C. (1985), c. I-5, which is the version of the statute currently in force, as the *Indian Act*.

[5] The unjustified discrimination identified by the BCCA in *Mclvor* arose from an additional benefit conferred by the 1985 Act on a particular group, not from a vested right. Parliament could have chosen to identify the persons suffering from discrimination on the basis of a prohibited ground in comparison to this advantaged group and try to remedy this discrimination. Instead, however, it chose to restrict the remedy solely to the parties to the dispute and persons in situations strictly identical to theirs.

[6] Both the plaintiffs and the Attorney General of Canada ("the AGC") argue that the Court must depart from the judgment in *Mclvor* in part, and both ask that the Court apply only the portions that benefit them. For the reasons explained below, it is not appropriate to rule in favour of one party or the other on this issue, at least with respect to the essential and determinative reasons for that judgment.

[7] Taking into account the precedent established in *Mclvor*, the Court must decide in this case whether the plaintiffs have demonstrated that they are victims of the unjustified discrimination identified in the BCCA judgment that the 2010 Act failed to remedy, or whether they are victims of discrimination that was not identified in that case but which is also unjustified.

[8] All three of the plaintiffs have met their burdens and proved discriminatory infringement of their equality rights. The discriminatory treatment they have suffered is clear from a comparison with a sub-group that is part of the advantaged group identified by the BCCA in *Mclvor*. As in that case, the AGC has failed to demonstrate that these infringements arising from sex discrimination can be justified in a free and democratic society.

[9] Thus, discrimination of the same nature as that which historically prevailed against Indian women and their descendants with respect to their being entered in the Register still exists today, despite Parliament's attempts to eradicate it in 1985 and 2010. In fact, by benefiting a group that was already advantaged under the former statute, the 1985 Act exacerbated the discriminatory treatment of certain persons, including the plaintiffs and other persons in their situation. The 2010 Act did not remedy the situation, at the very least, not fully.

[10] Sex discrimination, though more subtle than before, persists.

[11] This description represents, in a nutshell, the results of a deeper and sometimes quite technical analysis, which is outlined after the background provided directly below.

I- **BACKGROUND**

[12] The elements required to understand the background to this case and the stakes involved will be addressed under the following headings: the main legislative provisions at issue; the legislative history before the 1985 Act, the 1985 Act, the *Mclvor* judgment and the 2010 Act, the plaintiffs and the discrimination they allege, and finally, the conclusions sought by the plaintiffs and the positions of the other parties to the dispute.

1. **The main legislative provisions at issue**

[13] The legislative provision at the heart of this debate is section 6 of the Act, including the 2010 amendment, which added paragraph 6(1)(c.1). It reads as follows:

6. (1) Subject to section 7, a person is entitled to be registered if

(a) that person was registered or entitled to be registered immediately prior to April 17, 1985;

(b) that person is a member of a body of persons that has been declared by the Governor in Council on or after April 17, 1985 to be a band for the purposes of this Act;

(c) the name of that person was omitted or deleted from the Indian Register, or from a band list prior to September 4, 1951, under subparagraph 12(1)(a)(iv), paragraph 12(1)(b) or subsection 12(2) or under subparagraph 12(1)(a)(iii) pursuant to an order made under subsection 109(2), as each provision read immediately prior to April 17, 1985, or under any former provision of this Act relating to the same subject-matter as any of those provisions;

(c.1) that person

(i) is a person whose mother's name was, as a result of the mother's marriage, omitted or deleted from the Indian Register, or from a band list prior to September 4, 1951, under paragraph 12(1)(b) or under subparagraph 12(1)(a)(iii) pursuant to an order made under subsection 109(2), as each provision read immediately prior to April 17, 1985, or under any former provision of this Act relating to the same subject-matter as any of those provisions,

(ii) is a person whose other parent is not entitled to be registered or, if no longer living, was not at the time of death entitled to be registered or was not an Indian at that time if the death occurred prior to September 4, 1951,

(ii) is a person whose other parent is not entitled to be registered or, if no longer living, was not at the time of death entitled to be registered or was not an Indian at that time if the death occurred prior to September 4, 1951,

(iii) was born on or after the day on which the marriage referred to in subparagraph (i) occurred and, unless the person's parents married each other prior to April 17, 1985, was born prior to that date, and

(iv) had or adopted a child, on or after September 4, 1951, with a person who was not entitled to be registered on the day on which the child was born or adopted;

(d) the name of that person was omitted or deleted from the Indian Register, or from a band list prior to September 4, 1951, under subparagraph 12(1)(a)(iii) pursuant to an order made under subsection 109(1), as each provision read immediately prior to April 17, 1985, or under any former provision of this Act relating to the same subject-matter as any of those provisions;

(e) the name of that person was omitted or deleted from the Indian Register, or from a band list prior to September 4, 1951,

(i) under section 13, as it read immediately prior to September 4, 1951, or under any former provision of this Act relating to the same subject-matter as that section, or

(ii) under section 111, as it read immediately prior to July 1, 1920, or under any former provision of this Act relating to the same subject-matter as that section; or

(f) that person is a person both of whose parents are or, if no longer living, were at the time of death entitled to be registered under this section.

(2) Subject to section 7, a person is entitled to be registered if that person is a person one of whose parents is or, if no longer living, was at the time of death entitled to be registered under subsection (1).

(3) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(f) and subsection (2),

(a) a person who was no longer living immediately prior to April 17, 1985 but who was at the time of death entitled to be registered shall be deemed to be entitled to be registered under paragraph (1)(a);

(b) a person described in paragraph (1)(c), (d), (e) or (f) or subsection (2) and who was no longer living on April 17, 1985 shall be deemed to be entitled to be registered under that provision; and

(c) a person described in paragraph (1)(c.1) and who was no longer living on the day on which that paragraph comes into force is deemed to be entitled to be registered under that paragraph.

[14] The problems are caused by the effect of this provision on the persons to whom the so-called Double Mother Rule applied until it came into force.

[15] The Double Mother Rule was set out in sub-paragraph 12(1)(a)(iv) of the 1951 Act. Sections 10 to 12 of that Act are instructive with respect to the discriminatory regime that applied until the enactment of the *Canadian Charter*.

10. Where the name of a male person is included in, omitted from, added to or deleted from a Band List or a General List, the names of his wife and his minor children shall also be included, omitted, added or deleted, as the case may be.

11. Subject to section twelve, a person is entitled to be registered if that person

(a) on the twenty-sixth day of May, eighteen hundred and seventy-four, was, for the purposes of An Act providing for the organization of the Department of the Secretary of State of Canada, and for the management of Indian and Ordnance Lands, chapter forty-two of the statutes of 1868, as amended by section six of chapter six of the statutes of 1869, and section eight of chapter twenty-one of the statutes of 1874, considered to be entitled to hold, use or enjoy the lands and other immovable property belonging to or appropriated to the use of the various tribes, bands or bodies of Indians in Canada,

(b) is a member of a band

(i) for whose use and benefit, in common, lands have been set apart or since the twenty-sixth day of May, eighteen hundred and seventy-four have been agreed by treaty to be set apart, or

(ii) that has been declared by the Governor in Council to be a band for the purposes of this Act,

(c) is a male person who is a direct descendant in the male line of a male person described in paragraph (a) or (b),

(d) is the legitimate child of

(i) a male person described in paragraph (a) or (b),

or

(ii) a person described in paragraph (c),

(e) is the illegitimate child of a female person described in paragraph (a), (b) or (d), unless the Registrar is satisfied that the father of the child was not an Indian and the Registrar has declared that the child is not entitled to be registered, or

(f) is the wife or widow of a person who is entitled to be registered by virtue of paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d) or (e).

12. (1) The following persons are not entitled to be registered, namely,
- (a) a person who
 - (i) has received or has been allotted half-breed lands or money scrip,
 - (ii) is a descendant of a person described in sub-paragraph (i),
 - (iii) is enfranchised, or
 - (iv) is a person born of a marriage entered into after the coming into force of this Act and has attained the age of twenty-one years, whose mother and whose father's mother are not persons described in paragraph (a), (b), (d), or entitled to be registered by virtue of paragraph (e) of section eleven, unless, being a woman, that person is the wife or widow of a person described in section eleven, and
 - (b) a woman who is married to a person who is not an Indian.
- (2) the Minister may issue to any Indian to whom this Act ceases to apply, a certificate to that effect.

[16] These provisions remained in effect in this form until 1985, save for an amendment in 1956, which has no bearing on this case.

[17] In the context of the discrimination alleged by Susan and Tammy Yantha, paragraph 2(e) of the 1927 Act is of particular relevance:

2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,
- ...
- (d) "Indian" means
 - (i) any male person of Indian blood reputed to belong to a particular band,
 - (ii) any child of such person,
 - (iii) any woman who is or was lawfully married to such person;

[18] These provisions, along with the other most relevant legislative provisions, are reproduced in English and French in a schedule to this judgment.

2. Legislative history before the 1985 Act

[19] Several judgments provide detailed descriptions of the sex discrimination that Indian women have historically suffered since the late 19th century in connection with

their status and that of their descendants. This direct, patent discrimination, set out in black and white in multiple statutes through the years, persisted until the coming into force of the 1985 Act on April 17, 1985, which coincided with the enactment of section 15 of the *Canadian Charter*.

[20] In Canada, an Indian woman lost her status as soon as she married a non-Indian man. This was true even before the 1951 Act. In contrast, their male counterparts who married non-Indian women not only preserved their Indian status, but also conferred this status on the person they legally married. Thus, before 1985, persons whose Indian fathers had married women who were non-Indian (before the marriage) were considered Indian, subject to the Double Mother Rule, while children of Indian women who had lost their status through marriage to a non-Indian man were not considered Indian.

[21] The BCCA provides a good summary of the evolution of the legislative regime over time, including the Double Mother Rule, with one minor caveat. Here is what it said:

[14] Historically, members of First Nations in Canada were subject to special disqualifications as well as special entitlements. Not surprisingly, it became necessary, even prior to Confederation, to enact legislation setting out who was and who was not considered to be an Indian. In 1868, the first post-confederation statute establishing entitlement to Indian status was enacted. Section 15 of *An Act providing for the organisation of the Department of the Secretary of State of Canada, and for the management of Indian and Ordnance Lands*, S.C. 1868, c. 42 (31 Vict.) provided as follows:

15. For the purpose of determining what persons are entitled to hold, use or enjoy the lands and other immoveable property belonging to or appropriated to the use of the various tribes, bands or bodies of Indians in Canada, the following persons and classes of persons, and none other, shall be considered as Indians belonging to the tribe, band or body of Indians interested in any such lands or immoveable property:

Firstly. All persons of Indian blood, reputed to belong to the particular tribe, band or body of Indians interested in such lands or immoveable property, and their descendants;

Secondly. All persons residing among such Indians, whose parents were or are, or either of them was or is, descended on either side from Indians or an Indian reputed to belong to the particular tribe, band or body of Indians interested in such lands or immoveable property, and the descendants of all such persons;
And

Thirdly. All women lawfully married to any of the persons included in the several classes hereinbefore designated; the children issue of such marriages, and their descendants.

[15] This early legislation, then, treated Indian men and women differently, in that an Indian man could confer status on his non-Indian wife through marriage, while an Indian woman could not confer status on her non-Indian husband. It appears that one rationale for this distinction was a fear that non-Indian men might marry Indian women with a view to insinuating themselves into Indian bands and acquiring property reserved for Indians.

[16] In 1869, the first legislation that deprived Indian women of their status upon marriage to non-Indians was passed. Section 6 of *An Act for the gradual enfranchisement of Indians, the better management of Indian affairs, and to extend the provisions of the Act 31st Victoria, Chapter 42*, S.C. 1869, c. 6 (32-33 Vict.) amended s. 15 of the 1868 statute by adding the following proviso:

Provided always that any Indian woman marrying any other than an Indian shall cease to be an Indian within the meaning of this Act, nor shall the children issue of such marriage be considered as Indians within the meaning of this Act; Provided also, that any Indian woman marrying an Indian of any other tribe, band or body shall cease to be a member of the tribe, band or body to which she formerly belonged, and become a member of the tribe, band or body of which her husband is a member, and the children, issue of this marriage, shall belong to their father's tribe only.

[17] The traditions of First Nations in Canada varied greatly, and this new legislation did not reflect the aboriginal traditions of all First Nations. To some extent, it may be the product of the Victorian mores of Europe as transplanted to Canada. The legislation largely parallels contemporary views of the legal status of women in both English common law and French civil law. The status of a woman depended on the status of her husband; upon marriage, she ceased, in many respects for legal purposes, to be a separate person in her own right.

[18] The general structure of 1869 legislation was preserved in the first enactment of the *Indian Act*, as S.C. 1876, c. 18 (39 Vict.). This statute added further bases for the loss of Indian status, including provisions whereby an illegitimate child of an Indian could be excluded by the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs.

[19] Substantial changes in the regime were introduced in the *Indian Act*, S.C. 1951, c. 29 (15 Geo. VI). The statute created an "Indian Register". Sections 10-12 of the *Act* defined entitlement to registration as an Indian:

[The text of the legislative provisions cited in full in the judgment is omitted here.]

[20] Apart from one amendment in 1956, this legislation survived intact until the 1985 legislation. The 1956 amendment made a change in the manner in

which the registration of an illegitimate child could be nullified. It allowed the council of the band to which a child was registered, or any ten electors of the band, to file a written protest against the registration of the child on the ground that the child's father was not an Indian. The Registrar was then required to investigate the situation, and to exclude the child if the child's father was determined to be a non-Indian.

[21] For the purposes of this litigation, then, there were three significant features of the legislation that immediately pre-dated the coming into force of s. 15 of the *Charter*: First, a woman lost her status as an Indian if she married a non-Indian. On the other hand, an Indian man retained his status if he married a non-Indian, and his wife also became entitled to status.

[22] Second, a child born of a marriage between an Indian and a non-Indian was an Indian only if his or her father was an Indian. The rules for illegitimate children were more complex – if both parents were Indians, the child was an Indian. If only the father was an Indian, the child was non-Indian, and if only the mother was an Indian, the child was an Indian, but subject to being excluded if a protest was made.

[23] Finally, from 1951 onward, where an Indian man married a non-Indian woman, any child that they had was an Indian. If, however, the Indian man's mother was also non-Indian prior to marriage, the child would cease to have Indian status upon attaining the age of 21 under the Double Mother Rule.³

[22] The only qualification the Court would bring to this description, one which had no impact in the case before the BCCA but which has given rise to arguments in this case, results from the joint effect of the wording of paragraph 11(c) – which became 11(1)(c) in 1956 – and that of sub-paragraph 12(1)(a)(iv) of the 1951 Act, as well as the regime applicable to illegitimate male children of Indians.

[23] Subparagraph 12(1)(a)(iv), which set out the Double Mother Rule, specified that it applied only to children of a marriage that occurred after its coming into force, namely, September 4, 1951. The provision, however, did not refer to any requirement that the Indian father be born of a marriage for the Double Mother Rule to apply. Under the regime applicable before 1951, the term "Indian" was defined as including, *inter alia*, any child of a male Indian, without regard to whether the child was legitimate and or to the sex of the child.⁴

³ *McIvor v. Canada (Registrar of Indian and Northern Affairs)*, *supra* note 1 at paras. 14–23.

⁴ 1927 Act, paragraph 2(d) in the English version reproduced above, and paragraph 2(e) in the French version. The child could be excluded from the Band, however, under section 12, unless he or she has shared in the distribution moneys of such band for a period exceeding two years.

[24] As of September 4, 1951, illegitimate male children of an Indian man could be registered under paragraph 11(c) – which became 11(1)(c) with the 1956 amendments - but an illegitimate female child could not.⁵

[25] The result of these provisions is that, for the purposes of the Double Mother Rule, applicable to children born of marriages that occurred between September 4, 1951, and April 16, 1985, inclusively, it was not necessary for the Indian grandfather and non-Indian grandmother to have been married. In other words, it did not matter if the Indian father was illegitimate.

[26] Thus, under the Double Mother Rule, if the Indian father married a non-Indian woman after 1951 and was himself the child of an Indian man and a non-Indian woman, married or not, the children of this marriage would be entitled to preserve their Registered Indian status only until the age of 21.

[27] It should be noted, however, that the evidence reveals that numerous exceptions to the Double Mother Rule were granted at the request of certain Bands. Because the rule did not apply to members of these Bands, male Indian members could have children with non-Indian women over several generations without any consequences on the status of their descendants, unless they were illegitimate girls. Moreover, the Double Mother Rule was not uniformly applied in practice, as children who should have been deleted from the Register at 21 sometimes remained on it their whole lives.

[28] Finally, starting with the 1951 Act, the illegitimate children of an Indian woman remained on the Register unless the Registrar considered that their father was not Indian. Subsequently, as stated by the BCCA, the 1951 Act, as amended in 1956, provided that if such children were born after the coming into force of this amendment, they would be registered unless a protest made within 12 months of their addition to the Register gave rise to a decision that the child was not entitled to be registered because his or her father was not Indian.

3. The 1985 Act

[29] The situation described above changed on April 17, 1985, the date the 1985 Act came into force. Although it did not correct all of the inequalities of the past, it recognized the status of persons in the Register and the right of those who could have been registered under the rules applicable to them immediately before the coming into force of the 1985 Act. This is the effect of paragraph 6(1)(a) of the Act, which stipulates that, subject to section 7, which is not relevant to the case before us, a person who was registered or entitled to be registered immediately prior to April 17, 1985, is entitled to be registered.

⁵ This is Supreme Court's interpretation of paragraph 11(1)(c) in the nearly evenly split decision rendered in *Martin v. Chapman*, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 365.

[30] It is worth pointing out that before this, section 7 of the 1951 Act permitted, among other things, the Registrar to delete the name of any person not entitled to be registered from the lists making up the Register.

[31] As a result of the 1985 Act, the names of persons in the Register immediately prior to the coming into force of the Act could not in principle be deleted without regard for the actual rights of these persons under the law applicable at that time. This is the interpretation that was accepted by the BCCA in *Marchand v. Canada (Registrar, Indian and Northern Affairs)*,⁶ although it refrained from deciding whether persons who were fraudulently registered could benefit from Indian status.⁷

[32] To correct certain past situations, Parliament decided to confer the right to register to Indian women who were excluded as a result of their marriage to a non-Indian, to victims of the Double Mother Rule, to illegitimate female Indian children excluded after a protest, and to persons excluded on certain other grounds.

[33] The newly instituted neutral rule is referred to as the “second generation cut-off”. Under this rule, children with two parents who were living or dead after the coming into force of the 1985 Act and who were entitled to be registered under section 6 have the right to be registered under 6(1). If only one parent is entitled to be registered under this provision, however, the child is registered under section 6(2). In such cases, the next generation cannot be registered unless the 6(2) parent has a child with a person entitled to be registered under 6(1) or 6(2). Thus, the established rule seeks to eradicate discrimination on the basis of sex that was systemic under the former system.

[34] It is obvious that if this rule had been applicable at all times, no sex discrimination would have taken place. The difficulty, rather, resides in the effect of other provisions recognizing certain rights for Indians who were registered before the coming into force of the 1985 Act, as well as for other persons. The transition between these two regimes is what was problematic, as the BCCA noted in *Mclvor*.

[35] An observation: this new rule means that Indian women and their descendants were never treated as favourably as Indian men and their descendants under the pre-1985 Acts.

4. Mclvor and the 2010 Act

[36] The 2010 Act had the less ambitious objective of responding to the judgment of the BCCA in *Mclvor*, which found that the 1985 Act had created a new, unjustified type of discrimination. Sharon Mclvor, her son Jacob Grismer, and Jacob Grismer’s children were members of a group suffering from this type of discrimination.

⁶ 2000 BCCA 642 at paras. 38–43.

⁷ *Ibid.* at para. 44.

[37] In their actions, Mclvor and Grismer challenged the constitutional validity of subsections 6(1) and 6(2) of the 1985 Act. They alleged that the historical discrimination against Indian women persisted because of the vested rights recognized in paragraph 6(1)(a). They argued that the 1985 Act had the effect of maintaining discrimination between the descendants of Indian men and those of Indian women.

[38] The judgment of the Supreme Court of British Columbia (BCSC), the counterpart of the Superior Court of Quebec, ruled in their favour, finding that there was discrimination on the basis of sex and marital status.⁸ The trial judge also decided which remedy should be awarded, the purpose of which was to allow the registration of persons who could trace their forebears back to a woman who lost her Indian status because of her marriage to a non-Indian man.⁹

[39] On appeal, the BCCA restricted the scope of the judgment to the specific complaints of the plaintiffs themselves. Refusing to find discrimination on a matrilineal basis as alleged, the Court found that the discrimination that Mclvor and Grismer were suffering resulted from sex discrimination against Mclvor, as she had lost her status through her marriage to a non-Indian.

[40] Following the coming into force of the 1985 Act, Grismer's mother had regained her status under paragraph 6(1)(c), and he was therefore entitled to 6(2) status, while in the group to which he compared himself – i.e., children of Indian fathers who married women who were not Indian (before their marriage) were given 6(1) status. Thus, while Grismer himself had Indian status, his children with a non-Indian woman would not, whereas the children of men belonging to the comparator group who married non-Indian women after 1985, as he did, would be able to benefit from 6(2) status.

[41] According to the BCCA, this discriminatory situation was justified insofar as it existed to preserve the rights of the persons in the comparator group that were vested under the legislation in force before April 17, 1985.

[42] By recognizing that children of Indian fathers and non-Indian mothers who were targeted by the Double Mother rule could remain status Indians beyond the age of 21, however, the 1985 Act improved the status of an already advantaged group. This discrimination amplified the differential treatment between this group and that of the children of Indian mothers who lost their status as a result of marrying non-Indians. The additional discrimination created by the 1985 Act was found not to be a minimal infringement of the right to equality and to be unjustifiable under section 1 of the *Canadian Charter*. Here is the crux of, the conclusions of the BCCA in *Mclvor*:

⁸ *Mclvor v. The Registrar, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada*, 2007 BCSC 827; additional reasons on the remedy published in 2007 BCSC 1732.

⁹ That at least is the BCCA's interpretation of the remedy awarded by the trial judge in paragraphs 152 and 153 of her judgment in *Mclvor*. The Court has a few reservations regarding this characterization, but this issue has no impact here.

[93] In any event, it seems to me that the inherently multi-generational nature of legislation of the sort involved in this case and in *Benner* requires a court to take a broad, “purposive approach” to determining issues of discrimination and of standing. The determination of Indian status under the Indian Act requires an examination of three generations (here, Ms. McIvor, Mr. Grismer, and his children); it would not be in keeping with the purpose of s. 15 of the Charter to hold that sex discrimination directed at one of those three generations was inconsequential so long as the disadvantageous treatment accrued only to another of them.

...

[111] The impugned legislation in this case is, in my opinion, discriminatory as that concept is used in s. 15 of the *Charter*. The historical reliance on patrilineal descent to determine Indian status was based on stereotypical views of the role of a woman within a family. It had (in the words of Law) “the effect of perpetuating or promoting the view that [women were] ... less ... worthy of recognition or value as a human being[s] or as a member[s] of Canadian society, equally deserving of concern, respect, and consideration”. The impugned legislation in this case is the echo of historic discrimination. As such, it serves to perpetuate, at least in a small way, the discriminatory attitudes of the past.

[112] The limited disadvantages that women face under the legislation are not preserved in order to, in some way, ameliorate their position, or to assist more disadvantaged groups. None of the distinctions is designed to take into account actual differences in culture, ability, or merit.

...

[122] The discrimination in this case is the result of under-inclusive legislation. The combination of s. 6(1)(a) and 6(2) of the *Indian Act* results in a situation in which people in Mr. Grismer's position are unable to transmit Indian status to their children only because their mothers, rather than their fathers, are entitled to status as Indians. This discrimination applies only to a group caught in the transition between the old regime and the new one.

...

[151] I find that the infringement of the plaintiffs' s. 15 rights is not saved by s. 1 of the *Charter*. In according members of the comparator group additional rights beyond those that they possessed prior to April 17, 1985, the 1985 legislation did not minimally impair the equality rights of the plaintiffs. However, the legislation does pass all other aspects of the s. 1 test.

...

[154] The *Charter* violation that I find to be made out is a much narrower one than was found by the trial judge. The 1985 legislation violates the *Charter* by according Indian status to children

- (i) who have only one parent who is Indian (other than by reason of having married an Indian).
- (ii) where that parent was born prior to April 17, 1985, and
- (iii) where that parent in turn only had one parent who was Indian (other than by reason of having married an Indian).

If their Indian grand-parent is a man, but not if their Indian grandparent is a woman.

[155] The legislation would have been constitutional if it had preserved only the status that such children had before 1985. By according them enhanced status, it created new inequalities, and violated the *Charter*.

[156] There are two obvious ways in which the violation of s. 15 might have been avoided. The 1985 legislation could have given status under an equivalent of s. 6(1) to people in Mr. Grismer's situation. Equally, it could have preserved only the existing rights of those in the comparator group. While these are the obvious ways of avoiding a violation of s. 15, other, more complicated, solutions might also have been found.

...

[161] Sections 6(1)(a) and 6(1)(c) of the *Indian Act* violate the *Charter* to the extent that they grant individuals to whom the Double Mother Rule applied greater rights than they would have had under s. 12(1)(a)(iv) of the former legislation. Accordingly, I would declare ss. 6(1)(a) and 6(1)(c) to be of no force and effect, pursuant to s. 52 of the *Constitution Act, 1982*. I would suspend the declaration for a period of 1 year, to allow Parliament time to amend the legislation to make it constitutional.

...

[165] ... In particular, I find that the infringement of s. 15 would be saved by s.1 but for the advantageous treatment that the 1985 legislation accorded those to whom the Double Mother Rule under previous legislation applied.

[166] I would allow the appeal, and substitute for the order of the trial judge and order declaring ss. 6(1)(a) and 6(1)(c) of the *Indian Act* to be of no force and effect. I would suspend the declaration for a period of 1 year.¹⁰

[43] The application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court presented by the plaintiffs in that case was dismissed. The AGC did not present such an application but had indicated that it wished to proceed by way of incidental appeal if the Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's application.

¹⁰ *Mclvor v. Canada (Registrar of Indian and Northern Affairs)*, supra note 1 at paras. 93, 122, 151, 154–156, 161 and 165.

[44] Two judgments prolonged the duration of the suspension. In the first, the BCCA had to decide an application requesting that Grismer's children be granted status immediately as a condition for prolonging the suspension, which it refused to do. On that occasion, with a draft bill in hand, it expressed itself as follows, stating in passing that Grismer's children belonged to a group of persons who were victims of discrimination and that solutions other than the ones considered in their judgment were available to Parliament:

[14] We do not think it is accurate to describe our reasons as affirming the rights of Mr. Grismer's children to registration under the *Indian Act*. Rather, we found that aspects of the current regime put them in a manner within a class of persons who had been treated less favourably than others under the *Act*, that infringed their equality rights. We recognized that an obvious option open to the government to redress the inequality was to extend the right to Indian status to persons in the positions of Mr. Grismer's children. We also recognized, however, that other methods of eliminating the inequality might also be available to government, and left it to Parliament to formulate an appropriate response.¹¹

[45] In the judgment prolonging the suspension a second time, the BCCA stated the following:

[6] There were, we are advised, inter-party discussions on the bill between May 25 and June 17, 2010. We have been provided with some material that indicates that the bill's passage through the House of Commons has been slowed down because some members of the House wish to broaden the bill to deal with issues beyond those specifically raised by this Court's decision of April 6, 2009.

...

[8] Parliament, of course, is the master of its own procedure, and we do not in any way wish to interfere with its processes. The Court recognizes that there are many issues that must be dealt with in Parliament. We would remind the Attorney General, however that a final determination by the courts that provisions of the *Indian Act* violate constitutional rights is a serious matter that must be dealt with expeditiously. We would also observe that while efforts of Members of Parliament to improve provisions of the *Indian Act* not touched by our decision are laudable, those efforts should not be allowed to unduly delay the passage of legislation that deals with the specific issues that this Court has identified as violating the *Charter*.¹²

[46] It should be noted that the comments of the BCCA certainly do not exempt Parliament from continuing its efforts to enact a statute free of unjustified discrimination, as it is constitutionally bound to do. On the contrary, the BCCA recognized that many issues required the attention of Parliament.

¹¹ *Mclvor v. Canada (Registrar of Indian and Northern Affairs)*, 2010 BCCA 168 at para. 14.

¹² *Mclvor v. Canada (Registrar of Indian and Northern Affairs)*, 2010 BCCA 338 at paras.6 and 8.

[47] The 2010 Act, however, did not seek to remedy all potential discrimination arising from the advantageous treatment under the 1985 Act of persons to whom the Double Mother Rule applied before that Act came into force. Instead, Parliament chose measures that applied only to persons who were in situations strictly identical to Grismer's.

[48] The legislative choice resulted in the four conditions set out in paragraph 6(1)(c.1), which determine which new persons can register after the judgment in *McIvor* and the coming into force of the 2010 Act.

- The person's mother's name was, as a result of the mother's marriage, omitted or deleted from the Indian Register, or from a band list prior to 1951.
- The person's other parent is not entitled to be registered or, if no longer living, was not at the time of death entitled to be registered or was not an Indian at the at time if the death occurred prior to September 4, 1951.
- The person was born on or after the day on which the marriage giving rise to the mother's exclusion and, unless the person's parents married each other prior to April 17, 1985, was born prior to that date.
- The person had or adopted a child on or after September 4, 1951, with a person who was not entitled to be registered.

[49] In the event of a failure to meet each of these conditions, a person not entitled to register under 6(1) before the amendments still could not obtain status afterward.

[50] Furthermore, the effect of the 2010 Act is to confer 6(2) status on Grismer's children only indirectly, given the 6(1) status granted their father. The specific factual situation of Grismer, who got married after 1985, was surely not unknown to Parliament when it made this decision, as the BCCA had observed that the children of persons belonging to the selected comparator group who were married after that date to non-Indians did obtain status.

[51] Only Indian women who lost status as a result of marriage needed to have gotten married at a specific time, i.e. before April 17, 1985, because their loss of status could not have taken place after this date. Their descendants did not need to have gotten married at the same time as the members of the comparator group or even to be married at all; their situation in terms of their Indian forebears simply needed to be identical to that of the members of the comparator group.

[52] The effect of the judgment of the BCCA is that the characteristic relevant to the capacity to transmit Indian status to a child is the necessary Indian forebears, which do not include non-Indian women who acquired status through marriage.

[53] All of these issues shall be dealt with in greater detail below. It is useful, however, to point out immediately that there was nothing to prevent the comparison of persons to whom the Double Mother rule applied before 1985 and who got married before 1985 – a group that received even better treatment under the 1985 Act. The children of these persons obtained 6(1) status for life, not 6(2) status for life.

[54] Thus, indirectly conferring 6(2) status on Grismer's children, as the BCCA suggested and as Parliament in fact did, did not fully correct the discrimination against them. It should be added, however, that such a comparison was not argued in *McIvor*. Descheneaux is one of the victims of this situation. We will return to this subject also.

5. The plaintiffs and the discrimination they allege

[55] Plaintiff Stéphane Descheneaux has children born between 2002 and 2007, who cannot be registered because he married a non-Indian and has only 6(2) status. He maintains that he is deprived of 6(1) status because of sex discrimination.

[56] His grandmother, Clémentine O'Bomsawin, lost her status in 1935 after marrying a non-Indian. His mother, Hélène Durand, had no status at birth and married a non-Indian. Stéphane Descheneaux was born without status in 1968, long before the 1985 Act. His grandmother regained Indian status under 6(1)(c) of the 1985 Act, and his mother obtained 6(2) status at the same time. Stéphane Descheneaux still did not have status.

[57] After the 2010 Act, Stéphane Descheneaux's mother obtained status under 6(1)(c.1) because she met each of the four conditions provided. Stéphane Descheneaux, however, did not directly benefit from this provision because his mother's name was not omitted or deleted from the Register because of her marriage, since she had not been entitled to register either at birth or before her marriage. The provision did have the indirect effect, however, of granting Stéphane Descheneaux status under 6(2).

[58] The nature of the discrimination Stéphane Descheneaux alleges is explained in the declaratory conclusion sought regarding section 6 of the *Indian Act*.

[TRANSLATION]

B - **DECLARE** that section 6 of the *Indian Act* violates the equality guarantee set out in subsection 15(1) of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* in that it creates discriminatory differential treatment:

- 1- Between:
 - a. on the one hand, the grandchildren of an Indian woman who married a non-Indian man, who were, like plaintiff Stéphane Descheneaux, born of a marriage that occurred between September 4, 1951, and April 16, 1985, or born out of wedlock between the same dates; and

- b. on the other hand, the grandchildren of an Indian man who married a non-Indian woman born of a marriage that occurred between September 4, 1951 and April 16, 1985, or born out of wedlock between the same dates;

with regard to their respective capacities to pass on to their children the right to be registered in the Indian Register;

...¹³

[59] The plaintiff Descheneaux argues, *inter alia*, that this distinction based on the sex of the Indian grandparent is discriminatory in that it perpetuates a stereotype whereby the Indian identity of women and their descendants are less worthy of consideration or have less value than that of Indian men and their descendants, and by having the effect that Stéphane Descheneaux's children cannot have Indian status passed down to them or enjoy certain attendant benefits, including those relating to their postsecondary education, which has also had an impact on him. He also argues that his dignity suffers from his inequality in status with persons in the group to which he compares himself.

[60] Finally, he alleges that section 6 of the Act is interpreted and applied so as to perpetuate such discriminatory treatment, which is contrary to the *Canadian Charter*.

[61] Plaintiffs Susan Yantha and Tammy Yantha have a slightly different story.

[62] Susan Yantha is the illegitimate daughter of an Indian man and a non-Indian woman. She was born in 1954 and did not have status at birth. For the first years of her life, she did not even know that her biological father was Indian. In her late adolescence, she learned who her father was and made her first attempt to contact him, to no avail. Later, in 1972, she had a child, the plaintiff Tammy Yantha, with a non-Indian man. Her marriage was dissolved by ecclesiastical tribunal in February of 1976.¹⁴ No divorce judgment was filed in the record. She remarried in November of 1976 and had a second child, Dennis, in 1983. Susan re-established contact with her Indian father and put Tammy in touch with him as well. Susan's Indian biological father adopted her after her adoptive parents died. After the 1985 Act came into force, Susan obtained Indian status under section 6(2).

[63] Susan and Tammy Yantha allege the following discrimination, which is described in the conclusions to the motion to institute proceedings.

[TRANSLATION]

¹³ Eighth amended motion to institute proceedings, February 6, 2015, at 28. The Court notes in passing that the AGC objected to the amendments made at the hearing and that they were nevertheless allowed, while reserving the right of the AGC to make an application seeking additional evidence in their respect. The AGC chose not to make such an application.

¹⁴ Exhibit P-59; this judgment explicitly states that it has no impact on her status under the civil law.

B - **DECLARE** that section 6 of the *Indian Act* violates the equality guarantees set out in subsection 15(1) of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, in that it creates discriminatory differential treatment:

...

2- Between:

- a. on the one hand, women, like the plaintiff Susan Yantha, born between September 4, 1951, and April 16, 1985, out of wedlock of the union of an Indian man and non-Indian woman; and
- b. men born of out of wedlock of the union of an Indian man and a non-Indian woman, during the same period.

with regard to their right to be entered in the Indian Register and their capacity to pass on this right to their children and grandchildren;

3- Between:

- a. on the one hand, children, like plaintiff Tammy Yantha, born between September 4, 1951, and April 16, 1985, of a woman born out of wedlock of the union of an Indian man and a non-Indian woman; and
- b. children born during the same period from a man born of a similar union;

with regard to their respective right to be entered in the Indian Register and their capacity to pass on this right to their children;¹⁵

[64] It should be noted here that the discrimination that Tammy Yantha alleges does not necessarily mean that she was born of a marriage.¹⁶

[65] Susan and Tammy Yantha argue, *inter alia*, that the distinctions in terms of registration based on Susan's sex are discriminatory because they perpetuate a stereotype whereby the Indian identity of women and their descendants does not have the same value or importance as that of Indian men and their descendants.

[66] Susan maintains that she experiences feelings of injustice and humiliation because she is unable to pass on full Indian identity and the attendant benefits of that status to her children and grandchildren, while the persons to whom she compares herself can. She believes that she was deprived in a discriminatory manner of benefits

¹⁵ Eighth amended motion to institute proceedings, February 6, 2015, at 28–29.

¹⁶ Whether or not Susan Yantha's marriage is valid is of no import in this respect. The Court will return to the issue of the validity of the marriage raised in defence further on when discussing the discrimination against Susan and Tammy Yantha.

for her children, particularly by having to pay post-secondary tuition for them herself, whereas the parents belonging to the comparator group did not have to.

[67] Tammy makes the same allegations and submissions with regard to the passing on of Indian identity and other benefits flowing from Indian status to her daughter Julia Louise.

[68] Susan and Tammy Yantha also allege that their dignity is affected by the inequality in status with persons belonging to the group with which they compare themselves.

[69] In concluding on this issue, it should be pointed out that the plaintiffs have not taken up the general argument raised at trial and dismissed in appeal in *Mclvor* whereby they are victims of more general matrilineal discrimination to which a systemic remedy must be applied by reinterpreting history. Although they referred to such discrimination in their motion to institute proceedings, they based their arguments instead on the facts affecting them directly but that nevertheless concern more than one generation, which the BCCA accepted in *Mclvor*.

6. Conclusions sought by the plaintiffs and the positions of the other parties

[70] In addition to the conclusions quoted above seeking to have section 6 of the Act declared discriminatory and constitutionally invalid, the plaintiffs ask the Court to broaden the application of section 6(1) of the Act so that it applies to them, in particular so that they, like those to whom they compare themselves, may see their children benefit from Indian status, which they do not now. In their motion, they suggest the precise wording of the new legislative provisions.

[71] The three plaintiffs also ask for a conclusion declaring that they are entitled to be registered with the status they seek and request that the Court render any other order it deems just.

[72] The interveners support the plaintiffs.

[73] The AGC argues that none of the plaintiffs have the standing to challenge the constitutional validity of section 6 in its application to persons born after April 16, 1985.¹⁷ It denies the discrimination and argues in addition that if such discrimination did exist, it would be justified under section 1 of the *Canadian Charter*. It claims that the comparators selected by the plaintiffs are inappropriate, particularly because they enjoy vested rights, and argues that the plaintiffs are asking for section 15 of the *Canadian Charter* to be applied to a time prior to its coming into force.

[74] Finally, according to the AGC, the conclusions seeking a broad interpretation of the Act and a declaration of the rights of the plaintiffs to register would, in the first case,

¹⁷ Para. 303 of the AGC's reamended defence.

be inconsistent with the role of the courts and, in the second, not fall within the jurisdiction of the Court. The only possible remedy if the Court declares section 6 to be constitutionally invalid in whole or in part would be to suspend the effect of such remedy so that Parliament may consider the appropriate options.

II- ANALYSIS

[75] The Court will first determine to what measure it is bound by the judgment of the BCCA in *Mclvor*. It will then decide the preliminary issues raised by the AGC in connection with the plaintiffs' standing and the retroactive application of the *Canadian Charter*, which it argues are involved in the present action. The next issue discussed will be the highly disputed question as to whether the provisions concerning registration that have been applicable since 1985 are a source of sex discrimination against each of the plaintiffs and, because such discrimination is in fact identified, whether the AGC has demonstrated that it can be justified in a free and democratic society. Finally, the appropriate remedy shall be discussed.

1. To what extent does the judgment in *Mclvor* bind the Court?

[76] The BCCA judgment in *Mclvor* concerns section 6 of the 1985 Act, a federal statute applicable all over the country, and its constitutional validity in light of section 15 of the *Canadian Charter*. The Court has before it the same issue, although it must take into account the amendments in the 2010 Act and factual situations that differ somewhat but contain several commonalities with the situation in *Mclvor*.

[77] Under the doctrine of *stare decisis*, litigants whose situations in fact and in law are the same as one already decided in a judgment by a higher court will be treated by the courts in a manner consistent with the findings in the prior judgment.¹⁸

[78] The application of constitutional law across Canada must be consistent, starting at first instance. There is no reason for the final judgments of appellate courts in such matters not to be binding authority in their respective provinces, or at least before the trial courts. It should be noted that binding authority is distinct from the enforceability of a judgment, as the recognition of a foreign judgment in Quebec for the purpose of enforcement is governed by the provisions of the *Civil Code of Québec*.

[79] Save in the case of contradictory appellate judgments, which is not the case here, the Court considers itself in principle to be bound by the decision of an appellate court in a constitutional case, even if the judgment is from another province.

[80] In *Carter v. Canada (Attorney General)*,¹⁹ the Supreme Court discussed the fundamental importance of the principle of *stare decisis*, stating that courts may

¹⁸ *Hall v. Hébert*, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 159 at 202.

¹⁹ 2015 SCC 5 at para. 44.

disregard it only where a new legal issue is raised or where there is a change in circumstances or evidence that “fundamentally shifts the parameters of the debate”:

The doctrine that lower courts must follow the decisions of higher courts is fundamental to our legal system. It provides certainty while permitting the orderly development of the law in incremental steps. However, *stare decisis* is not a straitjacket that condemns the law to stasis. Trial courts may reconsider settled rulings of higher courts in two situations: (1) where a new legal issue is raised; and (2) where there is a change in the circumstances or evidence that “fundamentally shifts the parameters of the debate” (*Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford*, 2013 SCC 72, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101, at para. 42

[81] In that case, the Supreme Court found that the trial judge was correct to reconsider the judgment in *Rodrigues v. British Columbia*²⁰ because the evidence adduced justified doing so and the applicable legal framework under section 7 of the *Canadian Charter* had evolved significantly since that judgment, which was rendered in 1993.

[82] The Supreme Court, however, did not agree with the trial judge on the development of the law on the justification of an infringement of section 15 of the *Canadian Charter*, the provision invoked here, as sufficient to justify setting aside the judgment that had been rendered. This is what the Supreme Court said:

[48] While we do not agree with the trial judge that the comments in *Hutterian Brethren* on the s. 1 proportionality doctrine suffice to justify reconsideration of the s. 15 equality claim, we conclude it was open to the trial judge to reconsider the s. 15 claim as well, given the fundamental change in the facts.²¹

[83] In this case, the parties agree that the test applied in *Withler v. Canada (Attorney General)*²² should be applied here to determine whether there has been a violation of section 15 of the *Canadian Charter*. This two-stage test is nothing more than a reformulation of the three-stage test²³ set out in *Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)*,²⁴ on which the BCCA relied in *Mclvor*.

[84] There has, however, been a certain evolution in the approach to determining the comparator group, which is now more clearly focused on substantive equality than on the comparison of groups that are identical in all respects. The Court must take this into account, particularly since it is relevant to the consideration of an issue that was not submitted before the BCCA but is before us in this case.

²⁰ [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519.

²¹ *Carter v. Canada (Attorney General)*, *supra* note 19 at para. 48.

²² [2011] 1 S.C.R. 396.

²³ *R. v. Kapp*, [2008] 2 R.C.S. 483 at para. 17. See also the opinion of Abella J., for the majority concerning s. 15 in *Québec (A.G.) v. A.*, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 61 at paras. 323–330.

²⁴ [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497.

[85] That said, the legal framework for section 1 of the *Canadian Charter* has not significantly evolved since *Mclvor*. Indeed, the remarks of the Supreme Court in *Carter*, *supra*, mean that it would be difficult to conclude otherwise.

[86] In *Mclvor*, the AGC challenged the plaintiffs' standing, which is also the case before us and for nearly identical reasons. The AGC also argued that the plaintiffs' submissions involved a retroactive application of the *Canadian Charter*. The AGC's argument was rejected by the BCCA. The AGC's oral arguments in this case asked the Court to reject the reasoning accepted by the BCCA on these issues in favour of the AGC's arguments, which were rejected by the BCCA. Its oral argument did not, however, point to any development in the law with respect to these issues.

[87] It can only be concluded that, aside from issues relating to the determination of the comparator group, there has been no evolution of the law justifying a reconsideration of *Mclvor*. The 2010 Act, which is at issue before us, clearly is not the subject of the judgment of the BCCA, which was rendered before that statute was enacted. Insofar as that statute has not entirely resolved the discrimination arising from the 1985 Act that was identified in *Mclvor*, however – and this is one of the plaintiffs' arguments – the Court remains in principle bound by that judgment on the questions of law it decided.

[88] The plaintiffs also submit that the facts in evidence before the Court are sufficiently distinct from those established in *Mclvor* to justify a reconsideration, particularly with regard to the scope of the discrimination they suffer.

[89] In the plaintiff Stéphane Descheneaux's case, the nature of the discrimination he alleges is nearly identical to that identified by the BCCA in the case of the plaintiffs *Mclvor* and Grismer, despite certain differences between Descheneaux and Grismer's situations. In Grismer's case, the discrimination he suffered was related to his mother's loss of status, and in Descheneaux's case, the discrimination he suffers today in terms of his registration is related to his grandmother's loss of status. In its decision, the BCCA also dealt with discrimination against *Mclvor*'s grandchildren, particularly in comparison to the more favourable treatment given under the 1985 Act to persons to whom the Double Mother Rule applied before the 1985 Act.

[90] On issues relating to discrimination with multigenerational aspects before and after the coming into force of the *Canadian Charter*, the Court is most certainly bound by *Mclvor*. The fact situation in Descheneaux's case, however, sheds new light on the scope of the preferential treatment given certain persons to whom the Double Mother Rule applied, since his mother – unlike Grismer's – got married before 1985. On this issue, which was raised because of the different factual background in evidence in this case, on which *Mclvor* did not rule, the Court is not bound by that earlier judgment.

[91] The discrimination alleged by the plaintiffs Susan and Tammy Yantha takes place in a slightly different context from that described in *Mclvor*.

[92] Before 1985, Susan Yantha, the illegitimate daughter of an Indian man and a non-Indian woman, never had Indian status, whereas any illegitimate son of an Indian man and a non-Indian woman born during the same period did. After 1985 she obtained 6(2) status because she had only one Indian parent, while illegitimate male children born during the same time period as her obtained 6(1) status because they were already registered or were entitled to be on April 16, 1985. Although the fact situation is different, the nature of the discrimination is identical: it flows from the historically lower value placed by Parliament on a woman's Indian identity. The current discriminatory treatment of Susan and Tammy Yantha with regard to their registration, which occurs under the 1985 Act, also results – as it did in *Mclvor* – from rights recognized in 6(1)(a) and benefits conferred on victims of the Double Mother Rule beyond the preservation of vested rights.

[93] The trial judgment in *Mclvor* provides a thorough description of the considerable impact of recognition under 6(1)(a).²⁵ Nevertheless, the BCCA found that such discrimination was justified by the objective of preserving rights vested under the former statute, while also stating that the same was not true with respect to discrimination resulting from benefits conferred on victims of the Double Mother Rule that go beyond the preservation of such vested rights.

[94] The fact situation before the Tribunal cannot be characterized as “fundamentally shifting the parameters of the debate” and therefore does not allow it to reconsider the precedent established in *Mclvor* on the issues of discrimination and its justification that were considered by the BCCA.

[95] Even if the Court were to ignore the weight of the precedent of *Mclvor*, it would still be entirely in agreement with all of the conclusions set out in that judgment, except for one. Later on the Court will express its reservations as to the conclusion that the discriminatory treatment arising from the vested rights was justified. Despite the Court's reservations on this one issue, however, because of the importance of the rule of *stare decisis*, even in constitutional matters, the principles set out in *Mclvor* on the issues before the BCCA will all be applied. The Court agrees with all the other conclusions and will add its own reasons to those of the BCCA on all of the other issues.

[96] Moreover, it is worth noting that if the Court had the latitude not to consider itself bound by *Mclvor* on the issue of the justification of discrimination flowing from the preservation of vested rights and chose to depart from that ruling, the remedy granted the parties to this case would not have been any different or more extensive.

[97] Thus, the Court considers itself bound by the precedent established by the BCCA in *Mclvor* to the following extent:

²⁵ See, for example, paragraphs 199 to 220 of the judgment of the BCSC trial judgment in *Mclvor v. The Registrar, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada*, *supra* note 8.

- *Mclvor* binds the Court on all issues relating to the interest and standing to act, as well as the retroactive application of the *Canadian Charter*, since issues similar to those before the BCCA in this respect have been raised in this case;

the Court may not diverge from the conclusions of the BCCA that situations analogous to that in *Mclvor* are discriminatory and, if it finds that Stéphane Descheneaux is the victim of such discrimination and the 2010 Act enacted after *Mclvor* did not fully remedy the situation, it will also be bound by the conclusions of the BCCA whereby discriminatory effects resulting from the preservation of vested rights are justified and those resulting from additional benefits conferred by the 1985 Act on persons to whom the Double Mother Rule applied prior to that Act are unjustified;

- if the Court finds that the situation alleged by Susan and Tammy Yantha also constitutes discrimination, it will also not be possible to depart from the BCCA's opinion whereby the discrimination resulting from the preservation of vested right is justified, or from that whereby the discrimination arising from benefits beyond the preservation of vested rights conferred on victims of the Double Mother Rule is not justified;

provided that the facts relating to the justification are not radically different, which is not the case, as explained below.

[98] Moreover, and this must be reiterated, this Court is not bound by BCCA's judgment on the issue of the appropriateness of an even more advantaged comparator group because that issue was not submitted before the BCCA.

[99] Finally, it goes without saying that the Court is not bound by the *obiter* of the BCCA on how to remedy the discrimination that is found to exist. The BCCA issued its opinion in this respect incidentally, preferring to let Parliament determine the appropriate remedy. As a result, if Parliament was not bound by the suggestions of the BCCA in this respect, the Court is not either.

2. Do the plaintiffs have standing to act?

[100] At the hearing, the AGC argued that the plaintiffs do not have standing or sufficient interest.

[101] With respect to the plaintiff Stéphane Descheneaux, the reamended defence states on a few occasions that the [TRANSLATION] "true plaintiffs" are his children. Tammy Yantha, Susan's daughter, is one of the parties to the case and does not have status. It is therefore not surprising that there is no similar reference made concerning her mother Susan. In paragraph 173 of the AGC's notes and authorities, the AGC seems in fact to acknowledge Tammy Yantha's standing, at least with regard to the benefit of which she personally is deprived.

[102] The reamended defence also generally alleges, however, that the Act does not confer a right on parents to pass on their status to their children. It must therefore be understood that the interest or standing of Stéphane Descheneaux and Susan Yantha, who both have 6(2) status, is therefore still disputed. They both have Indian status themselves, but are unable to pass it on to their children because their spouses are not Indian. The same is true with regard to Tammy Yantha's standing because, according to the AGC, she has interest only in respect of herself, since her children must become plaintiffs themselves to be able to benefit from this decision.

[103] From the Court's perspective, this issue is among those settled in *McIvor*. The following excerpts from judgments rendered at first instance and in appeal in that case testify to this fact:

- **BCSC judgment:**

[176] The plaintiffs submit that they seek a right to equal registration status and that each of registration status and the ability to transmit status to one's children is a benefit of the law to which s. 15 of the *Charter* applies. The plaintiffs submit that the challenged registration provisions governing registration constitute a benefit of the law, for both progenitors through whom the children derive status, and those upon whom the status is conferred.

[177] The defendants submit that there is no denial of a benefit of law at issue in these proceedings. First, the benefits associated with registration are the same for all individuals, whether registered pursuant to s. 6(1)(a) as the plaintiffs seek, 6(1)(c) such as Sharon McIvor is, or 6(2) such as Jacob Grismer is. Thus, the difference in registration classification does not result in a denial of any benefit.

[178] The defendants submit further that there is no right to transmit status. Rather, the entitlement to registration is conferred on a person by statute, and is contingent on the entitlement to registration of his or her parents. Registration or status as an Indian is not a right or entitlement which resides in the parent and which can be transmitted to a child. Accordingly, since regardless of registration status the plaintiffs have no ability to transmit status, they suffer from no denial of a benefit of the law. There is therefore, they submit, no violation of their equality rights.

[179] It is correct that, with exception of the question of the status of one's children, entitlement to the tangible benefits associated with registration is the same for all persons registered whether under s. 6(1)(a), 6(1)(c), 6(2), or any of the other provisions in s. 6 of the **1985 Act**. However, a person in Jacob Grismer's circumstances, married to a person who is not entitled to be registered, and therefore with children who are not entitled to be registered, will not have access to the tangible benefits available to children who are entitled to registration, such as extended health benefits, financial assistance with post secondary education and extracurricular programs. Since parents are responsible for the support of their children, such programs can, it seems to me, be benefits for both parent and child.

[180] The question of transmission of status as a benefit of the law in which both the parent and the child have an interest has arisen in a number of decisions. In *Benner*, the plaintiff was the child. The respondent had argued that the child lacked standing because the discrimination was really imposed on his mother and not upon him. The court rejected this submission, concluding that the impugned provisions of the *Citizenship Act* are aimed at the applicant in that they determine the citizenship rights of the children, not of the parent. The *Charter* was engaged because the extent of the child's rights was dependent upon the gender of his Canadian parent. In *Benner* at para. 397 Iacobucci J. cited with approval an observation of Linden J.A., in dissent, suggesting that the mother was also discriminated against: "in this situation, the discrimination against the mother is unfairly visited upon the child."

[181] In *Canada (Attorney General) v. McKenna*, 1998 CanLII 9098 (FCA), [1999] 1 F.C. 401 (F.C.A.), the issue was the provisions of the *Citizenship Act* pertaining to adopted children. Although the appeal was dismissed on other grounds, the court concluded that the *Citizenship Act* *prima facie* discriminates against children born abroad and adopted by Canadian citizens in comparison to children born abroad of Canadian citizens. The court also concluded that the adoptive mother could be considered to be a victim within the meaning of the *Canadian Human Rights Act*, R.S.C. 1995, c. H-6.

[182] In *Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney General)*, 2003 SCC 34 (CanLII), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 835, the provisions at issue were those of the *Vital Statistics Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 479* that permitted the arbitrary exclusion of a father's particulars from his children's birth registration and of his participation from the choice of the child's surname. The court concluded that the arbitrary exclusion of the father from such participation negatively affects an interest that is significant to a father and did so in a way that the reasonable claimant would perceive as harmful to his dignity.

[183] The issue of the transmission of status from parent to child has been the subject of comment in international tribunals. Sources from international human rights law provide support for the view that the s. 15 right to equality encompasses the right to be free from discrimination in respect of the transmission of status. The plaintiffs relied on the following authorities:

1. Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Algeria (January 27, 1999) at para. 83;
2. Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Kuwait (October 26, 1998) at para. 20;
3. Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Iraq (June 14, 2000) at para. 187;

4. Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Jordan (January 27, 2000) at para. 172; and

5. Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Morocco (August 12, 1997) at para. 64.

[184] In *U.S.A. v. Burns*, 2001 SCC 7 (CanLII), [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, the court acknowledged sources of international human rights law as including declarations, covenants, conventions, judicial and quasi-judicial decisions of international tribunals, and customary norms. Such sources were acknowledged to constitute persuasive sources for the interpretation of the content of the rights guaranteed by the *Charter* in *Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson*, 1989 CanLII 92 (SCC), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038..

[185] The question of transmission of status must be considered in light of the substance of the concept that is at issue. This touches upon the intangible implications of the concept of Indian discussed earlier in these reasons. The government created the concept of Indian, and in so doing, superimposed this concept upon the First Nations' own definitions of cultural identity. It is clear, as discussed earlier, that this concept of Indian has come to form an important aspect of cultural identity.

[186] It seems to me that it is one of our most basic expectations that we will acquire the cultural identity of our parents; and that as parents, we will transmit our cultural identity to our children. It is, therefore, not surprising to see this basic expectation reflected in the evidence, not only of Sharon *McIvor* and Jacob Grismer, but also of many of the witnesses who testified before the Standing Committee. It is also not surprising that one of the most frequent criticisms of the registration scheme is that it denies Indian women the ability to pass Indian status to their children. For example, "... we are unable to pass our Indian-ness and the Indian culture that is engendered by a woman in her children ..." Standing Committee, September 13, 1982, testimony of Mary Two-Axe Earley, President, Quebec Equal Rights for Indian Women at p. 4:46.

[187] Numerous publications that emanate from government ministries make use of the language of transmission of status in discussions of registration provisions under the **1985 Act** and its previous versions. For example, the publication of the Ministry of Indian and Northern Affairs entitled *Impacts of the 1985 Amendments to the Indian Act (Bill C-31)* (Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Summary Report, 1990) reflects this understanding and uses the language of transmission of status. At p. ii the study notes that most **Bill C-31** registrants sought status for reasons of cultural belonging, personal identity and correction of injustice. At p. iv, in a discussion of concerns, the authors note:

Some gender discrimination remains because in certain family situations, women who lost status through marriage prior to 1985 cannot automatically pass on

status to their children as can their brothers who married prior to 1985 (emphasis added).

[188] Similar language was adopted by the Royal Commission on the Status of Women, cited earlier in these reasons, in the recommendation that the *Indian Act* be amended, *inter alia* to allow an Indian woman upon marriage to a non-Indian to “transmit her Indian status to her children”. The Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba, Vol. 1, *The Justice System and Aboriginal People; A Public Inquiry in to the Administration of Justice and Aboriginal People* (Manitoba, 1991), also incorporates the language of the transmission of status as follows at ch. 13, p. 479:

While Bill C-31 (1985) addressed many of these problems, it created new ones in terms of the differential treatment of male and female children of Aboriginal people. Under the new Act, anomalies can develop where the children of a status Indian woman can pass on status to their children only if they marry registered Indians, whereas the grandchildren of a status male will have full status, despite the fact that one of their parents does not have status.

[189] The *Royal Commission Report* quoted at para. 22 of these reasons in describing the discriminatory aspects of the registration system stated ... they lost Indian status, membership in their home community and the right to transmit Indian status to the children of that marriage at p. 28.

[190] Jill Wherrett, “Indian Status and Band Membership Issues”, Political and Social Affairs Division, Research Branch, Feb. 1996, is another example of such an official publication referring to the transmission of status. In a section entitled “*Continuing Inequities in Legislation*”, the author states at pp. 9-10:

Despite efforts to eliminate inequities through the amendments, the effects of past discrimination remain and new forms of discrimination have been created. The amendments resulted in a complicated array of categories of Indians and restrictions on status, which have been significant sources of grievance. The most important target of criticism is the “second generation cut-off rule,” which results in the loss of Indian status after two successive generations of parenting by non-Indians. People registered under [section 6\(2\)](#) have fewer rights than do those registered under [section 6\(1\)](#), as they cannot pass on status to their child unless the child’s other parent is also a registered Indian. One criticism comes from women who, prior to 1985, lost status because of marriages to non-Indian men. These women are able to regain status under [section 6\(1\)](#); however, their children are entitled to registration only under [section 6\(2\)](#). In contrast, the children of Indian men who married non-Indian women, whose registration before 1985 was continued under [section 6\(1\)](#), are able to pass on status if they marry non-Indians.

[191] This use of language is consistent with the basic notion that one acquires one's cultural identity from one's parents and that a parent transmits such status to his or her child.

[192] In my view, status under the *Indian Act* is a concept that is closely akin to the concepts of nationality and citizenship. Status under the *Indian Act*, like citizenship, is governed by statute. The eligibility of a child in both cases is related to the circumstances of his or her parents. In my view, the eligibility of the child to registration as an Indian based upon the circumstances of the parent, is a benefit of the law in which both the parent and the child have a legitimate interest.

[193] It is my view that the defendants' submission is a strained and unnatural construct that ignores the significance of the concept of Indian as an aspect of cultural identity. The defendants' approach would treat status as an Indian as if it were simply a statutory definition pertaining to eligibility for some program or benefit. However, having created and then imposed this identity upon First Nations peoples, with the result that it has become a central aspect of identity, the government cannot now treat it in that way, ignoring the true pith and substance or significance of the concept.²⁶

- **BCCA judgment:**

[70] This case is concerned with entitlement to Indian status. The plaintiffs have adduced significant evidence demonstrating that Indian status is a benefit. Under the terms of the Indian Act and other legislation, persons who have Indian status are entitled to tangible benefits beyond those that accrue to other Canadians. These include extended health benefits, financial assistance with post-secondary education and extracurricular programs, and exemption from certain taxes. The trial judge also accepted that certain intangible benefits arise from Indian status, in that it results in acceptance within the aboriginal community. While some of the evidence of such acceptance may be overstated, in that it fails to distinguish between Indian status and membership in a band, I am of the view that the trial judge was correct in accepting that intangible benefits do flow from the right to Indian status.

[71] The plaintiffs assert that the right to transmit Indian status to one's child should also be recognized as a benefit. I agree with that submission. Parents are responsible for their children's upbringing, and financial benefits that an Indian child receives will, accordingly, alleviate burdens that would otherwise fall on the parent. Quite apart from such benefits, though, it seems to me that the ability to transmit Indian status to one's offspring can be of significant spiritual and cultural value. I accept that the ability to pass on Indian status to a child can be a matter of comfort and pride for a parent, even leaving aside the financial benefits that accrue to the family.

²⁶ *Mclvor v. The Registrar, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada*, supra note 8 at paras. 176–193.

[72] It is evident to me, therefore, that there is merit in Mr. Grismer's claim that the ability to transmit status to his children is a benefit of the law to which s. 15 applies. Ms. *McIvor*'s claim is a more remote one. She does not, as a grandparent, have the same legal obligations to support and nurture her grandchildren that a parent has to his or her children.

[73] Given that Mr. Grismer is a plaintiff in this matter, and given that any practical remedy that might be granted could be based on the claim by Mr. Grismer rather than that of Ms. *McIvor*, it is, strictly speaking, unnecessary to determine whether the ability to confer Indian status on a grandchild is a "benefit of the law" to which s. 15 of the Charter applies. In view of the cultural importance of being recognized as an Indian and the requirement to give s. 15 a broad, purposive interpretation, however, I would be inclined to the view that the ability to transmit Indian status to a grandchild is a sufficient "benefit of the law" to come within s. 15 of the Charter.

[74] In the analysis that follows, I will concentrate on Mr. Grismer's claim, since it is, in some ways, more straightforward and simpler to describe than that of Ms. *McIvor*. Except as I will indicate, however, the analysis of Ms. *McIvor*'s claim would be similar. In my view, the claims stand or fall together.

...

[91] I am unable to accept this argument. As I have already indicated, I am of the view that the ability to transmit Indian status to his children is a benefit to Mr. Grismer himself, and not solely a benefit to his children. He is, therefore, in a situation analogous to that of Mr. Benner.

[92] Similarly, I am of the view that the ability to transmit Indian status to her grandchildren through Mr. Grismer is a benefit to Ms. *McIvor*. I am, therefore, of the view that she can also demonstrate that the legislation accords her disadvantageous treatment on the basis of sex.

[93] In any event, it seems to me that the inherently multi-generational nature of legislation of the sort involved in this case and in *Benner* requires a court to take a broad, "purposive approach" to determining issues of discrimination and of standing. The determination of Indian status under the *Indian Act* requires an examination of three generations (here, Ms. *McIvor*, Mr. Grismer, and his children); it would not be in keeping with the purpose of s. 15 of the *Charter* to hold that sex discrimination directed at one of those three generations was inconsequential so long as the disadvantageous treatment accrued only to another of them.

[94] This is not to say that the Court should adopt a broad "discrimination by association" doctrine. The extent to which a person can raise a *Charter* claim based on discrimination directed primarily against a person's ancestors or

descendants must depend on the context of the legislation in question and its effects on the claimant.²⁷

[104] The Court considers itself bound by the judgment of the BCCA and, moreover, agrees with the reasoning expressed by all of the British Columbia judges on this issue.

[105] What is more, in addition to the remarks of the government cited by Ross J. in first instance, Parliament agreed with this perspective by creating the condition of having a child to obtain status under 6(1)(c.1) under the 2010 Act.

[106] This condition implies that persons whose status is recognized under 6(2) are not victims of discrimination if they do not have at least one child, as it is only then that their status effectively limits their right to transmit it. Thus, by limiting the corrective brought by the 2010 Act to persons with at least one child, Parliament implicitly recognized the interest of those seeking to pass on their status.

[107] From all of the foregoing, it must be concluded that the three plaintiffs have sufficient interest in this action, within the meaning of section 55 C.C.P. Their interest is direct and personal, even when it concerns their ability to transmit Indian status to their children and grandchildren.

3. Does the action instituted require the retroactive application of the Canadian Charter?

[108] The AGC reiterated the argument made and rejected in *Mclvor* whereby, in actual fact, the action undertaken seeks the retroactive application of the *Canadian Charter*. Not only is the Court bound by the judgment in *Mclvor*, but it is in full agreement with the reasons set out on this issue, both in first instance and appeal. Essentially, the continuous nature of status means that the conditions whereby this status may or may not be obtained may be considered under the *Canadian Charter* as long as it involves the application of the Charter to the current conditions for obtaining or refusing status rather than an event that took place before it came into force:

- **BCSC judgment:**

[144] The defendants submit that the plaintiffs' claim constitutes an impermissible attempt to apply the *Charter* in a retroactive or retrospective fashion. They submit that the real essence of the plaintiffs' claim is a challenge of the repealed provisions of the 1951 and 1970 versions of the *Indian Act*. The plaintiffs, however, submit that their challenge seeks neither a retroactive nor a retrospective application of the *Charter*. It is common ground that the *Charter* cannot be invoked to apply to repealed legislation or to attach future consequences to distinctions made in repealed legislation.

²⁷ *Mclvor v. Canada (Registrar of Indian and Northern Affairs)*, *supra* note 1 at paras. 70–74 and 91–94.

[145] The leading case with respect to the issues of retroactivity and retrospectivity in the context of [Charter](#) litigation is *Benner v. Canada (Secretary of State)*, 1997 CanLII 376 (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358 [Benner]. The issue in *Benner* was the constitutionality of certain provisions of the [Citizenship Act](#), S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 108 [[Citizenship Act](#)], which provided for different treatment of persons born before February 14, 1977, wishing to become Canadian citizens who had Canadian mothers when compared with those who had Canadian fathers. Prior to the enactment of the provisions at issue, children born abroad of Canadian fathers were entitled to claim Canadian citizenship on registration of their birth, but there were no such provisions for the children of Canadian mothers. Parliament then enacted new remedial legislation. The remedial legislation however continued to preserve different treatment for children born abroad of Canadian mothers prior to February 14, 1977. The legislation at issue created three classes of applicants for Canadian citizenship based on parental lineage:

1. Children born abroad after February 14, 1977. These children will be citizens at birth if either of their parents is Canadian: ss. 3(1)(b);
2. Children born abroad before February 15, 1977, of a Canadian father or out of wedlock of a Canadian mother. These children are automatically entitled to Canadian citizenship upon registration of their birth within two years of that birth or within an extended period authorized by the Minister: ss. 3(1)(e) (continuing ss. 5(1)(b) of the old [Citizenship Act](#)).
3. Children born abroad before February 15, 1977, in wedlock of a Canadian mother. These children must apply to become citizens and are required to swear an oath and pass a security check in order to qualify for citizenship: ss. 5(2)(b), 3(1)(c), 12(2), (3), 22(2) and (3).

[146] Mr. Benner was born in 1962 in the United States to a Canadian mother in wedlock. His father was not a Canadian. He applied for citizenship after he moved to Canada in 1986 under s. 5(2)(b) of the [Citizenship Act](#). The Registrar refused his application because Mr. Benner did not pass the security check as a result of outstanding criminal charges against him.

[147] The court held that providing for differential treatment of persons wishing to become Canadian citizens who had Canadian mothers as opposed to those with Canadian fathers violated s. 15 of the [Charter](#) and could not be justified under s. 1. The offending provisions were, to the extent of the unconstitutionality, declared to be of no force and effect.

[148] One aspect of the decision was an analysis of the concepts of retroactivity and retrospectivity as they apply in the context of [Charter](#) litigation. Mr. Justice Iacobucci, speaking for the court, adopted the following definition of the concepts at para. 39:

E.A. Driedger, in “Statutes: Retroactive Retrospective Reflections” (1978), 56 Can. Bar Rev. 264 at pp. 268-69, has offered these concise definitions which I find helpful:

A retroactive statute is one that operates as of a time prior to its enactment. A retrospective statute is one that operates for the future only. It is prospective, but it imposes new results in respect of a past event. A retroactive statute operates backwards. A retrospective statute operates forwards, but it looks backwards in that it attaches new consequences for the future to an event that took place before the statute was enacted. A retroactive statute changes the law from what it was; a retrospective statute changes the law from what it otherwise would be with respect to a prior event. [Emphasis in original.]

[149] The following principles emerge from *Benner* with respect to the analysis of these concepts in the context of a claim under the [Charter](#):

- (a) the [Charter](#) has neither retroactive nor retrospective application;
- (b) there is no rigid test for determining when an application is retrospective;
- (c) the court must consider the factual and legal context and the nature of the right at issue;
- (d) when considering the application of the [Charter](#) in relation to facts which took place before it came into force, the court must consider whether the facts constitute a discrete event or an ongoing status or characteristic;
- (e) the [Charter](#) cannot be evoked to attack a discrete event which took place before the [Charter](#) came into force such as a pre-[Charter](#) conviction;
- (f) the [Charter](#) can be invoked where the effect of a law is to impose an ongoing discriminatory status or disability on an individual; and
- (g) in applying the [Charter](#) to questions of status, the time to consider is not when the individual acquired the status but when the status was held against him or disentitled him to a benefit.

(*Benner* at paras. 39-59).

[150] In *Benner*, the court concluded that the application of the [Charter](#) was not retrospective because:

- (a) the appellant's position was a status or on-going condition, being a child born outside Canada prior to February 15, 1977, to a Canadian mother and a non-Canadian father in wedlock; and
- (b) the discrimination took place when the state denied the appellant's application for citizenship on the basis of criteria which he alleged violated s. 15 of the Charter. This occurred after s. 15 of the Charter came into effect.

[151] In the instant case, the plaintiffs submit that the challenge is neither retroactive nor retrospective because the plaintiffs are not seeking to change the law in the past or to change the current legal consequences of a distinct event in the past, but rather to apply the Charter to current legislation. The case, they submit, concerns the application of the Charter to the legal effect of an ongoing state of affairs. They submit that the eligibility requirements for Indian status violate s. 15 of the Charter because the test for Indian ancestry continues to discriminate on grounds of sex, marital status, and legitimacy. The requirements of the current statute, the 1985 Act, continue to discriminate against descendants who trace their ancestry along the maternal line.

[152] Finally, the plaintiffs submit that the current challenge is not retrospective because, as in Benner, Ms. *McIvor* did not apply for registration for herself and her children until after s. 15 of the Charter came into effect. The discrimination did not take place until the state actually responded to the applications. This was after s. 15 came into effect and accordingly the denial is open to scrutiny under the Charter.

[153] The defendants submitted that, in seeking to be registered under s. 6(1)(a), the plaintiffs are asking to apply the Charter retroactively since the only way to achieve this remedy would be to retroactively amend the 1951 Act and the 1970 Act so that they "were registered or entitled to be registered immediately before April 17, 1985". The plaintiffs, they submit, are seeking to redress the historical discrimination of those repealed provisions, all of which pre-date the coming into force of s. 15 of the Charter. In addition, the defendants submit that the distinction in treatment about which the plaintiffs complain arises from the discrete event of Ms. *McIvor's* marriage in 1970 to a person who was not entitled to be registered. It was, the defendants contend, the single discrete event of that marriage which raised the distinction. Ms. *McIvor* was, to use the language of Benner, confronted with the law as of the date of her marriage. In Mr. Grismer's case, his entitlement to registration crystallized at birth and not upon application for registration. Finally, the defendants submit that the relief the plaintiffs seek would amount to a finding of discrimination by association and that the Supreme Court of Canada in Benner cautioned against such findings.

[154] In my view, the analysis of whether the claim is retrospective or retroactive must focus not on the particular remedies sought on the substance or essence of the complaint. In the case at bar, the substance or essence of the plaintiffs' complaint is that the eligibility criteria found in s. 6 of the 1985 Act discriminate contrary to s. 15 of the Charter. This is a claim that addresses the

present criteria for registration and not the criteria from previous versions of the [Indian Act](#). I agree with the submission of the plaintiffs that the eligibility provisions of prior versions of Indian Acts are engaged only because and to the extent that these provisions have been continued in the 1985 Act. The fact that such criteria have been incorporated in the 1985 Act does not however make the application of those criteria to present eligibility for registration a retrospective exercise.

[155] In my view, the defendants' submission that the only way in which the plaintiffs can succeed is if the court were to amend repealed legislation is incorrect. I agree that such an exercise would be an inappropriate attempt to apply the [Charter](#) to repealed legislation. Further, it is the case that given the current legislation as drafted, the plaintiffs could only be entitled to registration under [s. 6\(1\)\(a\)](#) by amending repealed legislation. That is in fact, a reflection of the very distinction in treatment about which the plaintiffs complain in this litigation. However, the plaintiffs as part of their relief seek registration pursuant to [s. 6\(1\)\(a\)](#) as they propose it should be amended by this court. Thus, the relief sought in fact would not amend repealed legislation, but only the current legislation.

[156] Turning to the other factors identified in *Benner*, the plaintiffs' claim engages [s. 15](#) of the [Charter](#). The right to equality is, as Madam Justice Wilson noted in *R. v. Gamble*, [1988 CanLII 15 \(SCC\)](#), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 595 at para. 40, a right whose purpose is to protect against an on going condition or state of affairs. Such rights are susceptible of current application even where such application takes cognizance of pre-[Charter](#) events; See *Benner* para. 43-44.

[157] In my view, with respect to each plaintiff, it is an ongoing status that is at issue and not a discrete event. I agree with the plaintiffs' submission that Ms. *McIvor* did not become disentitled to registration because of the discrete act of marriage, but because she was a woman. Marriage was not, and is not, an event that results in the loss of status. Indian men and women could marry each other without effect on their status. Indian men could marry women without effect on their status. Marriage was a bar to status only when an Indian woman married a non-Indian man. The relevant factor, therefore, is not marriage, which typically did not result in a loss of entitlement to registration, but being a woman who married a non-Indian man. It was, therefore, Sharon *McIvor's* sex and not the event of marriage, which was the primary cause of the loss of her entitlement to registration. Mr. Grismer's case, like that of Mr. *Benner*, involved the status of being the child of an Indian mother who married a non-Indian.

[158] The plaintiffs' challenge is directed to the present legislation and not to past repealed versions of the legislation. Finally, the state became engaged with each plaintiff when application was made for registration and the Registrar responded to the applications. That event occurred after [s. 15](#) of the [Charter](#)

came into force. Accordingly, I conclude that this case does not involve either a retroactive or a retrospective application of the [Charter](#).²⁸

- **BCCA judgment:**

[47] It is evident from the history of the [Charter](#) that it was not intended to apply retroactively. This is particularly clear in respect of [s. 15](#) of the [Charter](#), which, pursuant to [s. 32\(2\)](#) of the [Charter](#) did not take effect until 3 years after the rest of the [Charter](#) came into force. The delay in bringing [s. 15](#) into effect was a recognition of the fact that considerable legislative amendment might be necessary in order to bring the laws of Canada into compliance with its dictates. It is now well-settled that the [Charter](#) applies only prospectively from the date it was brought into effect. [Section 15](#), therefore, cannot be used to question the validity of governmental action that pre-dated its coming into force.

[48] On the other hand, continuing governmental action may violate the [Charter](#) even if it began prior to the coming into force of the [Charter](#). Violations of [s. 15](#) cannot be countenanced simply because discrimination began before April 17, 1985:

[Section 15](#) cannot be used to attack a discrete act which took place before the [Charter](#) came into effect. It cannot, for example, be invoked to challenge a pre-[Charter](#) conviction: *R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd.*, [1986 CanLII 12 \(SCC\)](#), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713; *R. v. Gamble*, [1988 CanLII 15 \(SCC\)](#), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 595. Where the effect of a law is simply to impose an on-going discriminatory status or disability on an individual, however, then it will not be insulated from [Charter](#) review simply because it happened to be passed before April 17, 1985. If it continues to impose its effects on new applicants today, then it is susceptible to [Charter](#) scrutiny today: *Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia*, [1989 CanLII 2 \(SCC\)](#), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143.

The question, then, is one of characterization: is the situation really one of going back to redress an old event which took place before the [Charter](#) created the right sought to be vindicated, or is it simply one of assessing the contemporary application of a law which happened to be passed before the [Charter](#) came into effect?

Benner v. Canada (Secretary of State), [1997 CanLII 376 \(SCC\)](#), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358 at paras. 44-45

[49] Unfortunately, differentiating between ongoing discrimination and mere effects of concluded pre-[Charter](#) discrimination is not always a simple matter. In *Benner*, at para. 46, the Supreme Court of Canada adopted a flexible and nuanced approach to the issue:

²⁸ *Mclvor v. The Registrar, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada*, *supra* note 8 at paras. 144–158.

[M]any situations may be reasonably seen to involve both past discrete events and on-going conditions. A status or on-going condition will often, for example, stem from some past discrete event. A criminal conviction is a single discrete event, but it gives rise to the on-going condition of being detained, the status of “detainee”. Similar observations could be made about a marriage or divorce. Successfully determining whether a particular case involves applying the [Charter](#) to a past event or simply to a current condition or status will involve determining whether, in all the circumstances, the most significant or relevant feature of the case is the past event or the current condition resulting from it. This is, as I already stated, a question of characterization, and will vary with the circumstances. Making this determination will depend on the facts of the case, on the law in question, and on the [Charter](#) right which the applicant seeks to apply.

[50] The Benner case is instructive. In 1962, Mr. Benner was born abroad to a mother who was a Canadian citizen and a father who was not. At the time of his birth, the Canadian Citizenship Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 33, provided that a child born abroad was entitled to Canadian citizenship if the child’s father was a citizen. A legitimate child born abroad whose only Canadian parent was his or her mother was not entitled to citizenship. Mr. Benner, therefore, had no right to Canadian citizenship at the time of his birth.

[51] A new [Citizenship Act](#) (S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 108) came into force in 1977. For the first time, it allowed persons in Mr. Benner’s position to apply for Canadian citizenship. Still, it differentiated between people born abroad whose fathers were Canadian and those whose mothers (but not fathers) were Canadian. If only the mother was a citizen, the child was required to meet requirements with respect to criminal records and national security; people whose fathers were Canadian did not have to satisfy those requirements. The difference was of significance to Mr. Benner, because he was, when his application was before the Registrar in 1989, facing serious criminal charges that prevented him from gaining citizenship.

[52] Canada argued that Mr. Benner’s right to citizenship had crystallized in 1962, when he was born, or in 1977, when the new statute came into force. Any discrimination faced by Mr. Benner, it claimed, pre-dated the coming into force of the [Charter](#). Therefore, it said, Mr. Benner was not entitled to rely on [s. 15](#) to found his claim.

[53] The Supreme Court of Canada, at para. 52, rejected that view, holding that Mr. Benner’s situation should be characterized not as an “event”, but as an ongoing status:

From the time of his birth, he has been a child, born outside Canada prior to February 15, 1977, of a Canadian mother and a non-Canadian father. This is no less a “status” than being of a particular skin colour or ethnic or religious background: it is an ongoing state of affairs. People in the appellant’s condition

continue to this day to be denied the automatic right to citizenship granted to children of Canadian fathers.

[54] It followed that any discrimination occurred when Mr. Benner applied for and was denied citizenship, not at an earlier date. The Court concluded, at para. 56:

In applying s. 15 to questions of status, or what Driedger, [Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p. 192], calls “being something”, the important point is not the moment at which the individual acquires the status in question, it is the moment at which that status is held against him or disentitles him to a benefit. Here, that moment was when the respondent Registrar considered and rejected the appellant’s application. Since this occurred well after s. 15 came into effect, subjecting the appellant’s treatment by the respondent to Charter scrutiny involves neither retroactive nor retrospective application of the Charter.

[55] The case at bar is, in many ways, similar to Benner. Mr. Grismer says that he suffers discrimination because his Indian status derives from his mother rather than his father. He says that the discrimination is ongoing; his children (who were not even born prior to the coming into force of the Charter) are denied Indian status based on differences between men and women in the pre-1985 law that were preserved in the transition to the current regime.

[56] The defendants argue that the source of discrimination, if any, is Ms. *McIvor*’s loss of Indian status when she married a non-Indian. They say that any discrimination was not on the basis of sex, but on the basis of marriage. Further, they contend that the marriage was an event, not a status; therefore, they argue, any discrimination pre-dated the Charter.

[57] I am unable to accept the defendants’ characterization of the matter for several reasons. First, to describe any discrimination as being based on “marriage” rather than “sex” is arbitrary. It might equally have been said that Mr. Benner suffered discrimination not because of the sex of his Canadian parent, but by virtue of the event of being born abroad. Ms. *McIvor*’s loss of status was not based solely on marriage or on sex, but rather on a combination of the two. The claim in the case at bar is based primarily not on differences in treatment between married and single people (just as the claim in Benner was not based on the difference between people born in Canada and those born abroad), but rather on the differences in treatment between men and women. In that sense, the claim is based on an ongoing status (that of Ms. *McIvor* being a woman) rather than on a discrete event (marriage).

[58] Second, the defendants’ argument focuses exclusively on Ms. *McIvor*’s loss of status prior to the coming into force of the Charter. That loss is not, per se, the foundation for the claim of discrimination. Rather, it is the fact that Ms. *McIvor*’s grandchildren lack status that constitutes the tangible basis for a claim of discrimination. Had they a male Indian grandparent rather than a female one, the current legislation would grant them status.

[59] Finally, and importantly, the defendants ignore the detailed effects of the 1985 statute in suggesting that the alleged discrimination against Ms. *McIvor* and Mr. Grismer arose from pre-[Charter](#) statutory provisions. This becomes clear when one compares the situation of Ms. *McIvor*'s male analogue (or "hypothetical brother") under the old legislation and under the current regime. The situation is summarized in the following table:

Situation under Old Legislation	Situation under 1985 Statute
Hypothetical Brother Status Indian (s. 11(e) of pre-1985 Act) Marries non-Indian Maintains status	Hypothetical Brother Status Indian (s. 11(e) of pre-1985 Act) Marries non-Indian Maintains status
Child born – Child entitled to status	Child born – Child entitled to status
	1985 Act comes into force
– Assume child marries a non-Indian and has children –	
Grandchild of hypothetical brother loses Indian status at age 21 (s. 12(1)(a)(iv) of pre-1985 Act) (Double Mother Rule)	Grandchild of hypothetical brother entitled to Indian status (s. 6(2))

[60] The old legislation treated the hypothetical brother's grandchildren somewhat better than those of Ms. *McIvor*; the hypothetical brother's grandchildren would have enjoyed status up until the age of 21. It is, however, the overlay of the 1985 amendments on the previous legislation that accounts for the bulk of the differential treatment that the plaintiffs complain about. Under the 1985 legislation, the hypothetical brother's grandchildren have Indian status. They are also able to transmit status to any children that they have with persons who have status under [ss. 6\(1\)](#) or [6\(2\)](#). Ms. *McIvor*'s grandchildren, on the other hand, have no claim to Indian status.

[61] Thus, the most important difference in treatment between Ms. *McIvor*'s grandchildren and those of her male analogue was a creation of the 1985 legislation itself, and not of the pre-*Charter* regime.

[62] For all of these reasons, I would reject the defendants' contention that the plaintiffs' claim would require the Court to engage in a prohibited retroactive or retrospective application of the *Charter*. Just as in the *Benner* case, the plaintiffs' claim in this case is one alleging ongoing discrimination.»²⁹

[109] The reasoning of the BCSC and the BCCA on this issue is directly applicable to the action brought by the three plaintiffs in this case. Their action relies in particular on their status or lack thereof and the impossibility of passing it on to their children and grandchildren under the new regime that has been in place since 1985.

[110] Concerning the table in paragraph 59 of the BCCA judgment, it should be pointed out that if the marriage occurred before the 1985 Act, the treatment of persons to whom the Double Mother Rule applied under the 1985 Act is still more favourable than if the marriage occurred after 1985. Children who before lost their status at the age of 21 now obtain 6(1) status for life, not 6(2) status for life.

[111] The AGC cannot claim that this advantage results from the fact that the non-Indian wife benefits from a right vested under the former statute, because the former statute did not allow status acquired through marriage to be passed on to her children with an Indian man past the age of 21, at which point the Double Mother Rule applied.

[112] The idea here is not to rewrite the legislation applicable before 1985 on the basis of the *Canadian Charter*, but rather to make a decision regarding the constitutional validity of rights granted under the 1985 Act.

[113] The AGC's argument regarding the retroactive application of the *Canadian Charter* cannot be accepted.

4. Is there discrimination?

[114] First, we shall outline the general principles applicable in discrimination cases before determining the comparator group and whether there is discrimination against the plaintiffs.

4.1 *General principles*

[115] The right to equality without distinction based on a prohibited or analogous ground is set out in subsection 15(1) of the *Canadian Charter*:

15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in

²⁹ *McIvor v. Canada (Registrar of Indian and Northern Affairs)*, *supra* note 1 at paras. 47–62.

particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.

[116] The Supreme Court has now established a two-part test for determining whether there is a violation of the right to equality: (1) Does the law create a distinction based on an enumerated or analogous ground? (2) Does the distinction create a disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice or stereotyping?³⁰

[117] In a very recent decision rendered on May 28 of this year, the Supreme Court summarized the case law on the issue as follows:

[16] The approach to s. 15 was most recently set out in *Quebec (Attorney General) v. A*, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 61, at paras. 319-47. It clarifies that s. 15(1) of the *Charter* requires a “flexible and contextual inquiry into whether a distinction has the effect of perpetuating arbitrary disadvantage on the claimant because of his or her membership in an enumerated or analogous group”: para. 331 (emphasis added).

[17] This Court has repeatedly confirmed that s. 15 protects substantive equality: *Quebec v. A*, at para. 325; *Withler v. Canada (Attorney General)*, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 396, at para. 2; *R v. Kapp*, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483, at para. 16; *Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia*, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143. It is an approach which recognizes that persistent systemic disadvantages have operated to limit the opportunities available to members of certain groups in society and seeks to prevent conduct that perpetuates those disadvantages. As McIntyre J. observed in *Andrews*, such an approach rests on the idea that not every difference in treatment will necessarily result in inequality and that identical treatment may frequently produce serious inequality: p. 164.

[18] The focus of s. 15 is therefore on laws that draw discriminatory distinctions — that is, distinctions that have the effect of perpetuating arbitrary disadvantage based on an individual’s membership in an enumerated or analogous group: *Andrews*, at pp. 174-75; *Quebec v. A*, at para. 331. The s. 15(1) analysis is accordingly concerned with the social and economic context in which a claim of inequality arises, and with the effects of the challenged law or action on the claimant group: *Quebec v. A*, at para. 331.

[19] The first part of the s. 15 analysis therefore asks whether, on its face or in its impact, a law creates a distinction on the basis of an enumerated or analogous ground. Limiting claims to enumerated or analogous grounds, which “stand as constant markers of suspect decision making or potential discrimination”, screens out those claims “having nothing to do with substantive equality and helps keep the focus on equality for groups that are disadvantaged in the larger social and economic context”: *Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs)*, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203, at para. 8; Lynn Smith and William Black, “The Equality Rights” (2013), 62 S.C.L.R. (2d) 301, at p. 336. Claimants

³⁰ *Withler v. Canada (A.G.)*, *supra* note 22 at para.30.

may frame their claim in terms of one protected ground or several, depending on the conduct at issue and how it interacts with the disadvantage imposed on members of the claimant's group: *Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)*, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, at para. 37.

[20] The second part of the analysis focuses on arbitrary — or discriminatory — disadvantage, that is, whether the impugned law fails to respond to the actual capacities and needs of the members of the group and instead imposes burdens or denies a benefit in a manner that has the effect of reinforcing, perpetuating or exacerbating their disadvantage:

The root of s. 15 is our awareness that certain groups have been historically discriminated against, and that the perpetuation of such discrimination should be curtailed. If the state conduct widens the gap between the historically disadvantaged group and the rest of society rather than narrowing it, then it is discriminatory. [*Quebec v. A*, at para. 332]

[21] To establish a *prima facie* violation of s. 15(1), the claimant must therefore demonstrate that the law at issue has a disproportionate effect on the claimant based on his or her membership in an enumerated or analogous group. At the second stage of the analysis, the specific evidence required will vary depending on the context of the claim, but “evidence that goes to establishing a claimant’s historical position of disadvantage” will be relevant: *Withler*, at para. 38; *Quebec v. A*, at para. 327.³¹

(Emphasis added.)

[118] In this case, the plaintiffs allege that the discriminatory treatment they suffer is based on the enumerated prohibited ground of sex.

[119] As the Supreme Court states, the focus must be substantive and not formal equality. Mere difference or lack of difference is not accepted as justification for differential treatment. It must be determined what the measure truly accomplishes and whether the characteristics on which the differential treatment is based are relevant in the circumstances:

[39] Both the inquiries into perpetuation of disadvantage and stereotyping are directed to ascertaining whether the law violates the requirement of substantive equality. Substantive equality, unlike formal equality, rejects the mere presence or absence of difference as an answer to differential treatment. It insists on going

³¹ *Kahkewistahaw First Nation v. Taypotat*, 2015 SCC 30 at paras. 16–21.

behind the facade of similarities and differences. It asks not only what characteristics the different treatment is predicated upon, but also whether those characteristics are relevant considerations under the circumstances. The focus of the inquiry is on the actual impact of the impugned law, taking full account of social, political, economic and historical factors concerning the group. The result may be to reveal differential treatment as discriminatory because of prejudicial impact or negative stereotyping. Or it may reveal that differential treatment is required in order to ameliorate the actual situation of the claimant group.

[40] It follows that a formal analysis based on comparison between the claimant group and a “similarly situated” group, does not assure a result that captures the wrong to which s. 15(1) is directed — the elimination from the law of measures that impose or perpetuate substantial inequality. What is required is not formal comparison with a selected mirror comparator group, but an approach that looks at the full context, including the situation of the claimant group and whether the impact of the impugned law is to perpetuate disadvantage or negative stereotypes about that group.³²

(Emphasis added.)

[120] Let us now consider how these principles apply to the present case.

4.2 The comparator group selected and the relevant personal characteristics

[121] The plaintiffs, in both their written proceedings and oral arguments, referred to the treatment of persons who are related to them. This element has no relevance in determining whether, in law, there has been a violation of the right to equality.³³ Moreover, it would likely cause confusion if exemptions to the Double Mother Rule obtained by the Bands to which the victims of discrimination belong were taken into account.

[122] The plaintiffs and the other victims of discrimination may compare themselves to the group that is most advantaged under the Act, as long as their personal characteristics relevant to the benefit sought are similar except for the prohibited ground of discrimination, whether the members of the group at issue are related to them or not.

[123] From the excerpt from *Withler* quoted above, it is clear that the characteristics of the comparator group selected need not be strictly identical to those of the persons complaining of discrimination. That judgment, it must be noted, was rendered after that of the BCCA in *Mclvor*.

³² *Withler v. Canada (Attorney General)*, *supra* note 22 at paras. 39 and 40.

³³ This does not mean, however, that Parliament cannot consider the sometimes different effects of the Act on persons who are related (cousins, for example) for reasons of fairness even without there being any question of discrimination. The role of the Court, however, is limited to reviewing the constitutional validity of section 6, without regard to any issues of fairness that may arise.

[124] In *McIvor*, both the BCCA and the trial judge before it identified a comparator group identical in all aspects to Grismer's situation. It nevertheless referred to the characteristic it considered essential, that relating to Indian forebears, and made a very general finding of discrimination. This is apparent in the following paragraphs of its judgment:

[76] It is clear that the claimant under s. 15 is entitled, in the first instance, to choose the group with which he or she wishes to be compared (*Lawat* para. 58). This is partly a function of the nature of the equality inquiry. The right to equality is not a right to be treated as well as one particular comparator group. Rather, it is, *prima facie*, a right to be treated as well as the members of all appropriate comparator groups. It is, therefore, no defence to a s.15 claim that some particular comparator group is treated no better than the group to which the claimant belongs. On the other hand, all that the claimant need show, in order to pass the first stage of analysis of a s. 15 claim, is that there is at least one appropriate comparator group which is afforded better treatment than the one to which he or she belongs.

[77] In this case, Mr. Grismer wishes to compare his group (people born prior to April 17, 1985 of Indian women who were married to non-Indian men) with people born prior to April 17, 1985 of Indian men who were married to non-Indian women. That comparator group was accepted by the trial judge.

[78] On the face of it, the comparator group proposed by Mr. Grismer is the most logical one. It is a group that is in all ways identical to the group to which Mr. Grismer belongs, except for the sex of the parent who has Indian status. By selecting this comparator group, Mr. Grismer isolates the alleged ground of discrimination as the sole variable resulting in differential treatment. That is, generally, an indicator of an appropriate comparator group:

The appropriate comparator group is the one which mirrors the characteristics of the claimant (or claimant group) relevant to the benefit or advantage sought except that the statutory definition includes a personal characteristic that is offensive to the Charter or omits a personal characteristic in a way that is offensive to the Charter. *Hodge v. Canada Minister of Human Resources Development*, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 357, 2004 SCC 65 at para. 23.

[79] Here Mr. Grismer says that the benefit or advantage sought is the ability to transmit Indian status to one's children. The relevant characteristic is Indian ancestry. The personal characteristic that is a requirement of the statute, and which is allegedly offensive to the Charter is that the Indian parent be the father. While it is true that that personal characteristic is not expressly referred to in the current legislation, the plaintiffs argue that in preserving Indian status for those who had it prior to the 1985 amendments, that personal characteristic has effectively been imported into the current legislation.

...

[154] The *Charter* violation that I find to be made out is a much narrower one than was found by the trial judge. The 1985 legislation violates the *Charter* by according Indian status to children

- i) who have only one parent who is Indian (other than by reason of having married an Indian).
- ii) where that parent was born prior to April 17, 1985, and
- iii) where that parent in turn only had one parent who was Indian (other than by reason of having married an Indian).

If their Indian grand-parent is a man, but not if their Indian grandparent is a woman.

...

[161] Sections 6(1)(a) and 6(1)(c) of the *Indian Act* violate the *Charter* to the extent that they grant individuals to whom the Double Mother Rule applied greater rights than they would have had under s. 12(1)(a)(iv) of the former legislation. Accordingly, I would declare ss. 6(1)(a) and 6(1)(c) to be of no force and effect, pursuant to s. 52 of the *Constitution Act, 1982*. I would suspend the declaration for a period of 1 year, to allow Parliament time to amend the legislation to make it constitutional.

...

[165] ... In particular, I find that the infringement of s. 15 would be saved by s.1 but for the advantageous treatment that the 1985 legislation accorded those to whom the Double Mother Rule under previous legislation applied.³⁴

(Emphasis added.)

[125] The selection of the comparator group in this case is conditioned by the fact that, in *Mclvor*, the BCCA considered the favourable treatment of persons with vested rights to be justified. The Court has therefore selected as comparator a group of persons benefiting from improved treatment under the 1985 Act according to the BCCA.

[126] The BCCA provided the following description of the advantageous treatment enjoyed by the comparator group it identified as being in all ways identical to Grismer, which meant that Grismer's children would obtain 6(2) status:

[137] I say this because the 1985 legislation did not merely preserve the rights of the comparator group. As I have previously indicated, members of the comparator group were able, prior to 1985, to confer only limited Indian status on

³⁴ *Mclvor v. Canada (Registrar of Indian and Northern Affairs)*, *supra* note 1 at paras. 76–79, 154, 161 and 165.

their children. Such children (who would have fallen under the Double Mother Rule) were given status as Indians only up to the age of 21. Under the 1985 legislation, persons who fell into the comparator group were given Indian status under s. 6(1). Their children had status under s. 6(2) for life, and the ability to transmit status to their own children as long as they married persons who had at least one Indian parent.³⁵

(Emphasis added.)

[127] This is the result of the fact that Grismer got married after April 17, 1985, as well as the fact that the grandchildren of people to whom the Double Mother Rule applied and who married non-Indian women after 1985 also had 6(2) status.

[128] The fact situation in this case sheds a different light on the scope of the preferential treatment given under the 1985 Act to persons to whom the Double Mother Rule used to apply. It is appropriate, as requested by the plaintiffs, who have presented a table to this effect, to select as a comparator group the more advantaged sub-group of persons to whom the Double Mother Rule applied before 1985 when the parents of children who would have been excluded at the age of 21 got married before 1985.³⁶

[129] All of the children who are members of the comparator group that had to be excluded under the Double Mother Rule – and this includes all children not yet born – lost their Indian status at the age of 21 under the provisions in force immediately before the 1985 Act.³⁷ In other words, before the enactment of the 1985 Act, an Indian father married to a mother who was non-Indian (before the marriage) and whose parents were an Indian man and a non-Indian woman could pass on his status to his children only during the first 21 years of their lives.

[130] Indian children under the age of 21 who were members of the comparator group at the time of the coming into force of the 1985 Act were granted 6(1)(a) status for life because they were either registered or entitled to be registered before the enactment of the statute. Persons over the age of 21 and born before 1985 who belonged to this group yet were still registered by error or otherwise were also recognized as having Indian status for life under the same provision, when this status might have been

³⁵ *Ibid.* at para. 137.

³⁶ The plaintiffs Descheneaux and Tammy Yantha do not allege discrimination in their capacity to transmit their Indian status to their grandchildren. Accordingly, they have not asked the Court to consider as a comparator group persons who were excluded under the Double Mother Rule and who married a non-Indian woman before the age of 21 and before 1985. This judgment therefore does not deal with this issue. It should also be pointed out that most of the people who had to be excluded under the Double Mother Rule probably did not get married until after the age of 21, if they did at all. In such a case, they could not confer Indian status on their non-Indian wives, as they had already lost it before they got married. Persons who married after 1985 obviously could not either. One thing is certain: the possibility of passing on to another generation the advantages conferred by the 1985 Act on persons to whom the Double Mother Rule applied and who got married before 1985 becomes unrealistic at a certain point.

³⁷ Subject to exemptions, as noted above.

questioned by the Registrar in the past. Persons who lost their status under the Double Mother Rule regained their Indian status under 6(1)(c), for life. Finally, persons born after April 17, 1985, of an Indian father who had married a non-Indian woman prior to this date and whose paternal grandparents were an Indian man and a non-Indian woman obtained Indian status under 6(1)(f), for life. The parents and grandparents of these persons therefore obtained the capacity to pass on their improved status.

[131] While there may be a relatively limited number of victims of the Double Mother Rule who actually lost their status and then regained it, the evidence does not reveal the number of other persons who benefited from this treatment that was more advantageous than under the former statute.

[132] As stated in *McIvor*, the plaintiffs may compare themselves to the more advantaged group. *Withler* reiterated that not all of the characteristics of the groups compared are relevant to the benefits sought, specifying further that it is appropriate to determine what the relevant characteristics are in the circumstances so as to better focus the analysis on substantive equality.

[133] Here, the relevant characteristic consists in the Indian forebears necessary to obtain or pass on status. Although the plaintiffs have tried to establish that all of their characteristics corresponded in every respect to those of the comparator group, it is sufficient for them to have their Indian ancestors as a commonality with this better-treated group and to demonstrate that they were not treated as advantageously on the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination.

[134] Thus, if the 1985 Act granted 6(1) status for life to an already privileged group that was not entitled to such status under the former Act, while refusing groups that have historically been victims of discrimination when their genealogical characteristics, other than the sex of their Indian forebears, were the same, it must be concluded that it is discriminatory.

4.3 Plaintiff Descheneaux

[135] Descheneaux argues that he would be entitled to 6(1) status today and could therefore pass it on to his children if his Indian grandmother had been an Indian grandfather instead.

[136] He compares his situation to that of the grandchild of a hypothetical Indian man of the same generation as his grandmother Clémente, to whom the Double Mother Rule should have applied. When this hypothetical Indian man got married, he preserved his status and conferred it on his non-Indian wife. His son, born in the same era as Stéphane Descheneaux's mother, would therefore have had Indian status at birth. When the hypothetical son in turn married a non-Indian woman, she would obtain status. If they had children before April 17, 1985, the date the 1985 Act came into force, these children would, upon their birth, have status but in principle would lose it at the

age of 21 under the Double Mother Rule because their father had married a woman who was non-Indian (before her marriage) and because they were the grandchildren of an Indian man and a woman who was non-Indian (before her marriage).

[137] Before the 1985 Act, Stéphane Descheneaux, grandson of Clémentine O'Bomsawin, did not have status, while the grandchildren of the hypothetical Indian man of the same generation as his grandmother would have had Indian status until the age of 21.

[138] When it came into force, the 1985 Act granted 6(1) status to the grandchildren who were members of the comparator group, whether or not they were registered at the time. Stéphane Descheneaux still did not have status. He acquired 6(2) status upon the enactment of the 2010 Act, while the grandchildren of the comparator group preserved their status under 6(1).

[139] The following tables illustrate the preceding:

Comparator group

Plaintiff Descheneaux

1927 Act

The Indian grandfather preserves his status after his marriage and his non-Indian wife obtains it through the marriage.	The Indian grandmother, Clémentine O'Bomsawin, loses her status upon marrying a non-Indian man in 1935.
The children of the non-Indian grandfather have status at birth.	Her daughter, Hélène Durand, future mother of the plaintiff Descheneaux, is not entitled to status at birth.

1951 Act

The Indian grandfather and his wife preserve their status.	The Indian grandmother, Clémentine O'Bomsawin, is still without status.
The Indian grandfather's son who marries after 1951 and before April 17, 1985, preserves his status and confers it on his non-Indian wife; they have the capacity to pass on their status to their children but only until those children reach the age of 21 (Double Mother Rule).	The daughter of the Indian grandmother, Hélène Durand, is still not entitled to status after her marriage to a non-Indian in 1968.
The grandchildren on the side of the Indian grandfather's son are entitled to status from birth until the age of 21 (Double Mother rule).	The grandson of the Indian grandmother, the plaintiff Descheneaux, born in 1968, is not entitled to status.

1985 Act

The Indian grandfather and his wife preserve their status under 6(1)(a)	The Indian grandmother Clémentine O'Bomsawin, regains status under 6(1)(c).
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The Indian grandfather's son and his wife preserve their status under 6(1)(a) and acquire the capacity to pass on status for life to their current and future children under 6(1)(a), 6(1)(c) or 6(1)(f).	The Indian grandmother's daughter, H��l��ne Durand, obtains status under 6(2); she cannot pass on status to her children because she married a non-Indian.
The grandchildren on the side of the Indian grandfather's son who were born before April 17, 1985, of a marriage that occurred before that date obtain status for life under 6(1)(a) or 6(1)(c) and, if they are born after that date of a marriage that occurred before that date, also obtain status for life under 6(1)(f); they have the capacity to pass on at least 6(2) status to their children.	The Indian grandmother's grandson, the plaintiff Descheneaux, still does not have status.

2010 Act

The Indian grandfather and his wife preserve their status under 6(10)(a).	The Indian grandmother, Cl��mente O'Bomsawin, preserves her status under 6(1)(c).
The Indian grandfather's son and his wife preserve their status under 6(1)(a) and their capacity to pass on status for life to their current and future children under 6(1)(a), 6(1)(c) or 6(1)(f).	The Indian grandmother's daughter, H��l��ne Durand, goes from 6(2) status to 6(1)(c.1) status; she acquires the possibility of passing on at least 6(2) status to her children.
The grandchildren on the side of the Indian grandfather's son born before April 17, 1985, of a marriage entered into before that date preserve status for life under 6(1)(a) or 6(1)(c) and, if they are born after that date of a marriage that occurred before that date, also preserve their status for life under 6(1)(f); they preserve the capacity to pass on at least 6(2) status to their children.	The Indian grandmother's grandson, the plaintiff Descheneaux, born before April 17, 1985, of a marriage that occurred before that date, obtains 6(2) status; he does not have the capacity to pass on any status whatsoever to his children because the mother of his children is non-Indian.
The great-grandchildren on the side of the Indian grandfather's son obtain at least 6(2) status.	The Indian grandmother's great-grandchildren are not entitled to status.

[140] It is obvious that Descheneaux does not receive the same treatment as those who preserve their status because of rights vested under the former Act pursuant to 6(1)(a), because of the sex of his Indian grandmother who lost her status after marrying a non-Indian. This group includes Indians to whom the Double Mother Rule would have applied if not for exemptions obtained by several Bands. These Indians were therefore registered or were entitled to be registered on April 16, 1985. In *McIvor*, however, discrimination related to such vested rights was deemed to be justified, and the Court considers itself bound by this conclusion, as stated above and for the reasons set out below on the issue of justification.

[141] He is also not treated equally, however, when he compares himself to the more limited group to whom the Double Mother Rule applied before the 1985 Act and on

whom the statute conferred an additional advantage beyond the rights vested under the former statute. The table above also refers to the treatment given persons to whom the rule applied when the parents of the children excluded under the rule were married before 1985, i.e., the comparator group selected in this case. It must be recalled that, as in *Mclvor*, Descheneaux is entitled to compare himself to the group receiving the most advantageous treatment.

[142] In substance, the plaintiff Descheneaux's situation and that of the comparator group in respect of their forebears is identical: they have only one Indian parent (other than a non-Indian woman who acquired status through marriage), and this Indian parent had only one Indian parent (other than a non-Indian woman who acquired status through marriage). The member of the comparator group has status under 6(1)(a) because his or her Indian grandparent is male, as is his Indian parent, while Descheneaux has status under 6(2) because his Indian grandparent is female, regardless of the sex of his parent whose Indian mother lost status by marrying,

[143] The sex of the Descheneaux's Indian parent is in fact of no importance. Even if his father and not his mother had been the child of the Indian grandmother who lost her status, the 1985 Act and the 2010 Act would not have allowed his non-Indian spouse to be retroactively considered Indian so as to confer 6(1)(a) status on Descheneaux, because the 1951 Act never applied to her. In this scenario, Descheneaux, his father and his non-Indian mother would not have been registered or entitled to be registered on April 16, 1985.

[144] It should also be noted that, while this is the case for Descheneaux and his mother, it is not necessary for the victim of discrimination to have gotten married before 1985 as the members of the comparator group did. This characteristic is not relevant to the benefit sought.

[145] Moreover, the discrimination identified by the BCCA in *Mclvor*, like that observed in this case, does not mean that the grandchildren belonging to the group suffering discrimination must be born of a marriage.³⁸ This is not a characteristic that is relevant to a finding of discrimination or to the recognition of substantive equality. The lack of relevance of such a distinction is also consistent with the 2010 Act and the neutral scheme it established.

[146] Similarly, as *Mclvor* in fact illustrates (*Mclvor's* grandchildren were born after 1985), the group suffering from discrimination is not limited to persons born during the period during which the Double Mother Rule applied.

³⁸ Grismer married a non-Indian woman in 1999, but their children were born in 1991 and 1993. See the trial judgment in *Mclvor*, *Mclvor v. The Registrar, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada*, *supra* note 8 at para. 97.

[147] The existence of discrimination at the time of the application for registration, however, depends on the exclusion of the grandmother because of her sex and her marriage to a non-Indian, which means that she was married before April 17, 1985.

[148] The advantageous treatment given under the 1985 Act to a group that was already advantaged under the former regime was considered discriminatory by the BCCA in *Mclvor*.

[72] It is evident to me, therefore, that there is merit in Mr. Grismer's claim that the ability to transmit status to his children is a benefit of the law to which s. 15 applies. Ms. *Mclvor's* claim is a more remote one. She does not, as a grandparent, have the same legal duties to support and nurture her grandchildren that a parent has to his or her children.

[73] Given that Mr. Grismer is a plaintiff in this matter, and given that any practical remedy that might be granted could be based on the claim by Mr. Grismer rather than that of Ms. *Mclvor*, it is, strictly speaking, unnecessary to determine whether the ability to confer Indian status on a grandchild is a "benefit of the law" to which s. 15 of the *Charter* applies. In view of the cultural importance of being recognized as an Indian and the requirement to give s. 15 a broad, purposive interpretation, however, I would be inclined to the view that the ability to transmit Indian status to a grandchild is a sufficient "benefit of the law" to come within s. 15 of the *Charter*.

[74] In the analysis that follows, I will concentrate on Mr. Grismer's claim, since it is, in some ways, more straightforward and simpler to describe than that of Ms. *Mclvor*. Except as I will indicate, however, the analysis of Ms. *Mclvor's* claim would be similar. In my view, the claims stand or fall together.

...

[83] It is apparent that the Indian Act treats Mr. Grismer's group less well than the comparator group. Unlike those in the comparator group, Mr. Grismer is unable to transmit Indian status to the children of his marriage to a non-Indian woman.

[84] Interestingly, even if one accepted the defendants' assertion that only people who were benefited by the 1985 amendments can constitute a comparator group, the result would be the same. The defendants argue, in their factum, that no appropriate comparator group obtained, as a result of the 1985 amendment, any benefit superior to that afforded Mr. Grismer:

68. ... [L]ike all children of registrants entitled under s. 6(2), Mr. Grismer's children will not be entitled to registration if he parents with a non-Indian. This is the real benefit that the Respondents seek – registration and the ability to transmit entitlement to registration after two successive generations of parenting with a non-Indian.

69. However, no one obtains this benefit under the impugned legislation. The 1985 Act incorporates a second generation cut-off rule, and no one was reinstated or registered with the ability to circumvent it. The entitlement of Mr. Grismer's hypothetical cousin was only maintained or confirmed ... and not obtained ... under s. 6(1)(a). [Emphasis added]

[85] In my view, this assertion mischaracterizes the effects of the 1985 amendments. As I have already noted, prior to 1985, Mr. Grismer's hypothetical cousin was not entitled to transmit normal Indian status to his children if he married a non-Indian. Any children of the marriage would cease to have Indian status when they attained the age of 21 under s. 12(1)(a)(iv) of the pre-1985 legislation. It is only with the coming into force of the 1985 legislation that such children received (or were reinstated to) full status.

[86] Even, therefore, if I were convinced by the defendants' argument that only those who were afforded enhanced status by the 1985 amendments can constitute a comparator group for the purposes of s. 15 of the Charter, it seems to me that Mr. Grismer would be able to demonstrate differential treatment.

...

[90] The defendants acknowledge that, based on Benner, if Mr. Grismer suffers discrimination as a result of his mother's gender, he has standing to raise a s. 15 claim. They say, however, that the situation that is alleged to prevail in this case is not discrimination against Mr. Grismer based on his mother's gender, but rather discrimination against Mr. Grismer's children based on his mother's gender.

[91] I am unable to accept this argument. As I have already indicated, I am of the view that the ability to transmit Indian status to his children is a benefit to Mr. Grismer himself, and not solely a benefit to his children. He is, therefore, in a situation analogous to that of Mr. Benner.

[92] Similarly, I am of the view that the ability to transmit Indian status to her grandchildren through Mr. Grismer is a benefit to Ms. McIvor. I am, therefore, of the view that she can also demonstrate that the legislation accords her disadvantageous treatment on the basis of sex.

[93] In any event, it seems to me that the inherently multi-generational nature of legislation of the sort involved in this case and in Benner requires a court to take a broad, "purposive approach" to determining issues of discrimination and of standing. The determination of Indian status under the Indian Act requires an examination of three generations (here, Ms. McIvor, Mr. Grismer, and his children); it would not be in keeping with the purpose of s. 15 of the Charter to hold that sex discrimination directed at one of those three generations was inconsequential so long as the disadvantageous treatment accrued only to another of them.

...

[111] The impugned legislation in this case is, in my opinion, discriminatory as that concept is used in s. 15 of the *Charter*. The historical reliance on patrilineal descent to determine Indian status was based on stereotypical views of the role of a woman within a family. It had (in the words of Law) “the effect of perpetuating or promoting the view that [women were] ... less ... worthy of recognition or value as a human being[s] or as a member[s] of Canadian society, equally deserving of concern, respect, and consideration”. The impugned legislation in this case is the echo of historic discrimination. As such, it serves to perpetuate, at least in a small way, the discriminatory attitudes of the past.

[112] The limited disadvantages that women face under the legislation are not preserved in order to, in some way, ameliorate their position, or to assist more disadvantaged groups. None of the distinctions is designed to take into account actual differences in culture, ability, or merit.

...

[117] It follows that the unequal treatment of which the plaintiffs complain is discriminatory, and that the justifications for the discrimination proposed by the defendants are most appropriately considered under s. 1 of the *Charter*. The impugned legislation constitutes a prima facie infringement of s. 15 of the *Charter*. Section 6 of the *Indian Act* must be justified, if at all, under s. 1.

...

[154] The *Charter* violation that I find to be made out is a much narrower one than was found by the trial judge. The 1985 legislation violates the *Charter* by according Indian status to children

- i) who have only one parent who is Indian (other than by reason of having married an Indian).
- ii) where that parent was born prior to April 17, 1985, and
- iii) where that parent in turn only had one parent who was Indian (other than by reason of having married an Indian).

If their Indian grand-parent is a man, but not if their Indian grandparent is a woman.

[155] The legislation would have been constitutional if it had preserved only the status that such children had before 1985. By according them enhanced status, it created new inequalities, and violated the *Charter*.

[156] There are two obvious ways in which the violation of s. 15 might have been avoided. The 1985 legislation could have given status under an equivalent of s. 6(1) to people in Mr. Grismer's situation. Equally, it could have preserved only the

existing rights of those in the comparator group. While these are the obvious ways of avoiding a violation of s. 15, other, more complicated, solutions might also have been found.

...

[161] Sections 6(1)(a) and 6(1)(c) of the *Indian Act* violate the *Charter* to the extent that they grant individuals to whom the Double Mother Rule applied greater rights than they would have had under s. 12(1)(a)(iv) of the former legislation. Accordingly, I would declare ss. 6(1)(a) and 6(1)(c) to be of no force and effect, pursuant to s. 52 of the *Constitution Act, 1982*. I would suspend the declaration for a period of 1 year, to allow Parliament time to amend the legislation to make it constitutional.

...

[165] ... In particular, I find that the infringement of s. 15 would be saved by s.1 but for the advantageous treatment that the 1985 legislation accorded those to whom the Double Mother Rule under previous legislation applied.³⁹

(Emphasis added.)

[149] It is clear that Descheneaux also suffers discriminatory treatment because of his Indian grandparent's sex, even when his situation is compared to the more limited group of persons to whom the Double Mother Rule applied before the enactment of the 1985 Act and to the even more advantaged group selected for comparison in this case.

[150] Despite what the AGC argued, this finding, given the historical and stereotypical nature of the discrimination at issue, i.e., the lesser value assigned to the Indian identity of women and their descendants, in no way depends on the way Descheneaux or his children actually coped with their diminished status or lack thereof. The benefit they were deprived of is related to their inability to pass on status the way those in the comparator group can.

[151] It should be noted that, for the purposes of the comparison and the finding of discrimination, we must disregard persons in the comparator group who obtained status through marriage, as the BCCA did in paragraph 154 of its judgment, quoted above. To do otherwise would not be consistent with an approach focused on substantive rather than formal equality. It would also constitute a failure to find that status acquired through marriage was not full status given the Double Mother Rule. The BCCA expressed itself on this subject as follows:

[141] The defendants have not presented evidence or argument attempting to justify the 1985 legislation on any basis other than that it preserved existing rights. When pressed, they acknowledge that the situation of persons in what I

³⁹ *McIvor v. Canada (Registrar of Indian and Northern Affairs)*, *supra*, note 1 at paras. 72–74, 83–86, 90–93, 111, 112, 117, 154–156, 161 and 165.

have found to be the appropriate comparator group was ameliorated by the 1985 legislation. They say, however, that there is an important difference between the comparator group and Mr. Grismer's group. They note that members of the comparator group have two Indian parents – a father who is of Indian heritage, and a mother who became Indian by virtue of marriage. In contrast, Mr. Grismer has only one parent of Indian heritage – his mother.

[142] I find this distinction unconvincing. It is based on the very sort of discrimination that Mr. Grismer complains of. Further, notwithstanding the Indian status of the comparator group's mothers, the pre-1985 legislation specifically limited the member's ability to transmit status to their children, through the Double Mother Rule.⁴⁰

[152] The Court is of the view that paragraphs 6(1)(a), (c), and (f) and subsection 6(2) of the Act infringe on the plaintiff Descheneaux's right to equality enshrined in the *Canadian Charter* by granting full 6(1) status or 6(1) status beyond the age of 21 to certain persons:

- i) who have only one Indian parent (other than a non-Indian woman who acquired status through marriage), and
- ii) this Indian parent had only one Indian parent (other than a non-Indian woman who acquired status through marriage),

if their Indian grandparent is a man, but not if the Indian grandparent is an Indian woman who lost her status through marriage.

[153] In other words, the Act discriminates against Descheneaux by not allowing him to be registered with a status equivalent to 6(1), thereby preventing him from passing on his status to his children unless he has them with an Indian woman, which is not the case here.

[154] Another way of expressing the discrimination identified by the Court is to say that one of the ways Parliament could have ensured treatment free of sex discrimination against the group Descheneaux belongs to would have been to give status equivalent to that in subsection 6(1) to all persons with a parent whose mother is an Indian woman who lost her status by marrying their non-Indian father and whose father is a non-Indian man.

[155] Now that the Court has established that Descheneaux belongs to a group suffering from sex discrimination, it must now determine whether the same is true for the plaintiffs Susan and Tammy Yantha before addressing the issue of justification.

4.4 Plaintiffs Susan and Tammy Yantha

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* at paras. 141–142.

[156] Although technically speaking, it was argued that Susan and Tammy could compare themselves to persons benefiting from vested rights, their council placed more emphasis on the comparator group of persons to whom the Double Mother Rule applied before 1985.

[157] As stated above, the Court considers itself bound by the BCCA's finding that the discrimination arising from the treatment of persons with vested rights was justified. The analysis is therefore focused on discrimination arising from the special treatment given the comparator group, namely, persons to whom the Double Mother Rule applied before 1985 when the parents of children who would have been excluded at the age of 21 were married before 1985.

[158] Susan Yantha compares her situation to that of the hypothetical illegitimate son of an Indian man born in the same period as her, while Tammy's situation is compared to that of children of a marriage of such an Indian man with a non-Indian mother.

[159] The hypothetical illegitimate son was born of an Indian father and a non-Indian mother, like Susan, but has Indian status from birth under paragraph 11(c) of the 1951 Act – which became 11(1)(c) with the 1956 amendments – as interpreted by the Supreme Court in *Martin v. Chapman*.⁴¹

[160] He preserved his status upon marrying a non-Indian before 1985 and his wife obtained status under the provisions applicable at the time. Their children, however, while they had Indian status at birth, stood to lose it at the age of 21 because of the Double Mother Rule, as described above.

[161] The 1985 Act granted children of the comparator group status under 6(1), but because Susan had only 6(2) status after the coming into force of this statute since she had only one Indian parent and did not marry an Indian, she could not pass that status on to Tammy Yantha, who remains without status.

[162] The 2010 Act had no impact on the two Yantha plaintiffs. The plaintiff Tammy Yantha, whose mother Susan did not have status and therefore did not lose it though marriage, does not meet this condition for the application of the new paragraph 6(1)(c.1). As for the plaintiff Susan Yantha, her father is the Indian parent, which means that she also does not fall within the scope of application of this provision.

[163] The tables that follow illustrate the effect of the different Acts on the status of the plaintiffs Susan and Tammy Yantha and on the comparator group.

Comparator group

Plaintiffs Yantha

1951 Act

⁴¹ *Supra* note 5.

The Indian grandfather has a son out of wedlock with a non-Indian woman.	Clément O'Bomsawin, an Indian man, has a daughter out of wedlock with a non-Indian woman; the daughter is the plaintiff Susan Yantha, born in 1954.
The son born out of wedlock is entitled to Indian status upon birth under paragraph 11(c) (which became 11(1)(c) in 1956).	The plaintiff Susan Yantha is not entitled to status.
The son born out of wedlock preserves his status after marrying a non-Indian woman, and she obtains status through the marriage. Their capacity to pass on their status to their children, however, ceases when the children reach the age of 21 (Double Mother Rule).	The plaintiff Susan Yantha remains without status upon her first marriage to a non-Indian man and her second marriage to a non-Indian man, whether or not these marriages are valid.
The children of the son born out of wedlock is entitled to status from birth until the age of 21 (Double Mother Rule).	The children of the daughter born out of wedlock, Tammy Yantha, born in 1972, and Dennis, born on April 23, 1983, are without status at birth.

1985 Act

The son born out of wedlock and his wife preserve their status under 6(1)(a) and acquire the capacity to pass on the status for life to their current and future children under 6(1)(a), 6(1)(c) or 6(1)(f).	The daughter born out of wedlock, the plaintiff Susan Yantha, obtains status under 6(2) and cannot pass on status to her daughter Tammy Yantha because Tammy's father is non-Indian.
The children of the son born out of wedlock before April 17, 1985, of a marriage that occurred before that date obtain status for life under 6(1)(a) or 6(1)(c) and, if they are born after that date of a marriage that occurred before that date, also obtain status for life under 6(1)(f); they have the capacity to pass on at least 6(2) status to their children.	The child of the daughter born out of wedlock, the plaintiff Tammy Yantha, born before April 17, 1985, of a marriage that occurred before that date, remains without status and cannot pass on status of any kind to her children, and the same is true for Dennis, whether or not the marriages are valid.
The grandchildren of the son born out of wedlock obtain at least 6(2) status at birth.	The granddaughter of the daughter born out of wedlock, Julia Yantha, has no status at birth (2006).

2010 Act

No change.	No change.
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[164] It is clear that, because of Susan's sex, Susan and Tammy Yantha receive differential treatment with regard to their status and registration and the possibility of passing on their status following the 1985 Act, when compared to the group to which the Double Mother Rule applied under the former regime. Ultimately, the 1985 Act further emphasized the lesser value assigned under the former Act to the Indian identity of

women and their descendants compared to that of Indian men and their descendants. This is clearly discrimination that has existed historically and is based on stereotype, which means that it is discrimination under section 15.

[165] Susan Yantha was born in 1954 and was therefore without status at birth because she was an illegitimate female child. The result is that neither Susan nor Tammy could pass on status to their children with non-Indian men. Susan obtained only 6(2) status under the 1985 Act and Tammy has none. In contrast, as stated and shown in the table above, the comparator group benefited upon the coming into force of the 1985 Act from an improved status that is no longer limited to passing on status to children until they reach the age of 21. Thus, children comparable to Tammy in terms of their Indian forebears obtain 6(1) status for life, while she has none.

[166] The question of the validity of the marriage of Tammy's parents, Susan Yantha and Robert Marier, was raised during arguments regarding the Double Mother Rule to dispute the validity of the group to which she compares herself as a comparator group.

[167] In the case of both Susan and Tammy, whether or not Tammy was born in or out of wedlock is not a personal characteristic relevant to the benefit sought, which is the right to be entered in the Register with status that allows her to pass it on to her children.

[168] It is the Indian forebears needed to obtain status that can be passed on to children – with the exclusion of persons who obtained status through marriage – that allow Susan and Tammy to compare themselves to the group to which the Double Mother Rule applies. Susan Yantha's Indian father is sufficient for this purpose. As seen above, not excluding from consideration persons who obtained status through marriage would be tantamount to denying that this case requires a ruling on substantive as opposed to formal equality. Moreover, this is the approach that was applied by the BCCA in *Mclvor*.⁴²

[169] The finding of discrimination in respect of the current conditions for registration and the right to pass on status can only exist in cases where, as in the case of Susan Yantha, the illegitimate daughter of an Indian man and a non-Indian woman was born between September 4, 1951, and April 16, 1985, inclusively. Before September 4, 1951, the illegitimate daughters of an Indian father had status at birth, as has been the case again, since April 17, 1985.

[170] As the table above shows, the 2010 Act in no way remedied the discriminatory situation identified.

[171] The Court is of the view that paragraphs 6(1)(a), (c), and (f) and subsection 6(2) of the Act infringe on the right to equality enshrined in the *Canadian Charter*.

⁴² See note 40 of this judgment and the explanations therein.

1. of Susan Yantha, by making it possible for
 - (i) some male illegitimate children of an Indian man and a non-Indian woman to pass on 6(1) status to their children with a non-Indian woman (who acquired status through marriage),
 - (ii) beyond the children's age of 21 or, in other words, for life,when she is not permitted to do so because she is a illegitimate female child born between September 4, 1951, and April 16, 1985, inclusively;
2. of Tammy Yantha, by granting status equivalent to that in subsection 6(1) to some persons:
 - i) who have only one Indian parent (other than a non-Indian woman who acquired status through marriage), and
 - ii) this Indian parent was born out of wedlock of an Indian father and a non-Indian mother between September 4, 1951, and April 16, 1985, inclusively,if their Indian parent born out of wedlock is a man but not if this Indian parent born out of wedlock is a woman born between September 4, 1951, and April 16, 1985, inclusively.

[172] Another way of expressing the discrimination identified by the Court is to say that one of the ways Parliament could have ensured equal treatment for all illegitimate daughters of Indian fathers compared to the comparator group would have been to confer status equivalent to that in subsection 6(1) on all persons whose mother was born out of wedlock to an Indian man and non-Indian woman between the dates referred to above, and whose father is non-Indian. Granting 6(1) status only to the illegitimate daughter is in fact insufficient because it does not ensure status equivalent to 6(1) for persons in Tammy's situation, which is what would be required for equality to be achieved.

[173] Taking for granted that the only tangible benefit of having 6(1) status as opposed to 6(2) status is the greater possibility of passing that status on to children, giving 6(1) status to Tammy directly would be sufficient to eliminate the discriminatory effect against her mother Susan. Despite her 6(2) status, this illegitimate child of an Indian father and a non-Indian mother would, through a corrective provision to this effect, *de facto* pass on 6(1) status to her children with a non-Indian man and therefore at least 6(2) status to her grandchildren.

5. **Is the discrimination justified?**

[174] Section 1 of the *Canadian Charter* establishes the limits within which Parliament may restrict *Charter* rights and liberties:

1. 1. The *Canadian Charter* of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.

[175] The AGC has the burden of justifying the violation of the plaintiffs' rights under subsection 15(1). It must first demonstrate that the objective of the impugned provision is pressing and substantial and the means chosen are proportional to that objective. An infringing provision is proportional to its objective if:

- the means adopted are rationally connected to the objective;
- the right at issue is infringed minimally;
- there is proportionality between its prejudicial and beneficial effects.

[176] This is essentially the test set out in *Oakes*⁴³ and applied in *Mclvor*. In the proportionality analysis, courts must show a certain amount of deference to Parliament, as proportionality does not require perfection but merely that the limitations on fundamental rights and freedoms be reasonable. Also, when several solutions are possible, a complex regulatory measure is owed great deference.⁴⁴

[177] The infringement on the plaintiffs' rights is prescribed by a legal rule, namely, section 6 of the Act.

5.1 ***Pressing and substantial objective***

[178] In *Mclvor*, the BCCA decided that preserving the rights of persons vested under the applicable legislative provisions prior to the coming into force of the 1985 Act is a pressing and substantial objective. This is how the BCCA expressed itself on this point, referring to the five objectives that Parliament itself had set:

[123] I have already quoted from the speech of the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development in the House of Commons on moving second reading of the legislation. He set out five objectives, or principles, for the legislation:

- (1) Removal of sex discrimination from the *Indian Act*.
- (2) Restoration of Indian status and band membership to those who lost such status as a result of discrimination in the former legislation.

⁴³ [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.

⁴⁴ See *Carter v. Canada (Attorney General)*, *supra* note 19 at para. 102 and the case law referred to in this paragraph.

- (3) Removal of any provisions conferring or removing Indian status as a result of marriage.
- (4) Preservation of all rights acquired by persons under the former legislation.
- (5) Conferral on Indian bands of the right to determine their own membership.

[124] The extensive legislative history presented in this case clearly establishes that these were, indeed, the objectives of the 1985 legislation. It cannot be seriously suggested that the government acted other than in good faith in enacting legislation in pursuit of these objectives.

[125] It is the fourth of the listed objectives, *i.e.*, preservation of existing rights, which is the most important for the purposes of the [s. 1](#) analysis in this case.

[126] I am of the view that the objective of preserving the rights of people who acquired Indian status and band membership under pre-1985 legislation is properly considered to be pressing and substantial. The law generally places significant value on protecting vested rights. This is particularly important in situations where people have made life choices and planned their futures in reliance on their legal status.

[127] In enacting new legislation in 1985, the government cannot, in my view, be criticised for embracing the principle that those who had Indian status under the previous legislative regime ought to be able to retain the benefits of such status going forward. Indeed, such a principle was necessary in order to avoid the disruption and hardship to individuals that would have resulted from depriving them of Indian status.

[128] Because the legislation in this case is criticized as being under-inclusive, however, it is necessary to consider whether the government had a proper objective in refusing to grant Indian status under [s. 6\(1\)](#) to persons in the position of Mr. Grismer. In other words, was there a pressing and substantial objective that was satisfied by preserving the status of the comparator group, while not extending that status to the group to which Mr. Grismer belongs?

[129] In my view, there was such an objective, though the objective is apparent only when one examines the broader provisions and goals of the regime put in place in 1985. The 1985 legislation was passed only after years of consultation and discussion. The legislation resulted in a significant increase in the number of people entitled to Indian status in Canada. There were widespread concerns that the influx might overwhelm the resources available to bands, and that it might serve to dilute the cultural integrity of existing First Nations groups. The goal of the legislation, therefore, was not to expand the right to Indian status *per se*, but rather to create a new, non-discriminatory regime which recognized the importance of Indian ancestry to Indian status.

[130] In fashioning the legislation, the government decided that having a single Indian grandparent should not be sufficient to accord Indian status to an individual. This was in keeping with the views expressed by a number of aboriginal groups. It was also in keeping with the existing legislative regime, which included the Double Mother Rule.

[131] It is in this context that we must examine the transitional provisions of the 1985 legislation. It would have been quite anomalous for the legislation to extend Indian status to Mr. Grismer's children. They did not qualify for status under the old regime, nor would people in their situation (*i.e.*, having only a single Indian grandparent) have status in the future under the new regime.

[132] It is true that one group of persons who have only a single Indian grandparent are entitled to status under the 1985 legislation. That group is comprised of persons who had status prior to April 17, 1985. That anomaly is (subject to what I will say later about the Double Mother Rule) justified by the governmental objective of preserving vested rights. To extend that anomaly to Mr. Grismer would give him equality with the existing anomalous group, but only at the expense of creating yet more anomalies in the legislation.

[133] Given that there is a clear pressing and substantial objective in preserving the status of those who had Indian status prior to 1985, and given that it would be anomalous and not in keeping with the post-1985 regime to extend status to people in Mr. Grismer's situation, I am of the view that the first part of the s. 1 test is satisfied in this case. The legislative regime is premised on a pressing and substantial governmental objective.⁴⁵

(Emphasis added.)

[179] The evidence the AGC has adduced on this issue is essentially that which was filed in the record before the BCCA in *Mclvor*. Regarding the issue of the objective of the 1985 Act, the plaintiffs' evidence adds nothing sufficiently different to give the Court the latitude to reconsider the BCCA's reasoning on the point.

[180] With great respect, the Court nevertheless has reservations with regard to the BCCA's analysis of the existence of a pressing and substantial objective justifying the refusal to grant status identical to that of Indians with vested rights to groups that have historically suffered from discrimination whose personal characteristics relevant to being granted such status are the same, except for the characteristic related to a prohibited ground of discrimination. Here is why.

[181] The specific considerations relating to vested rights, *i.e.* the practical consequences of the failure to respect those rights as described by the BCCA, are undeniable. The issue of why equal treatment was not given to Indian women and their descendants, when they possess the same characteristics in terms of their Indian forebears as those who benefit from the vested rights, poses a problem.

⁴⁵ *Mclvor v. Canada (Registrar of Indian and Northern Affairs)*, *supra* note 1 at paras. 123–133.

[182] First, such a refusal is contrary to the primary objective identified by Parliament itself, namely, the eradication of any discrimination in the Act, and is not necessary to achieve the objective of maintaining the vested rights. The objective of eradicating all provisions conferring or withdrawing Indian status because of a marriage is not at issue. Neither the plaintiffs in *Mclvor* nor those in this case have maintained that this objective is not valid or have asked that their spouses be given status because of their marriage. Their claims are limited to themselves and their capacity to obtain status and pass it on to their descendants. In any event, in terms of substantive equality and the justification, if this issue were ever raised, it would not necessarily receive the same treatment as claims made by Indian women and their descendants.

[183] Moreover, by referring to an objective that Parliament had not itself identified and that became apparent only upon a broader consideration of the provisions and objectives of the 1985 Act, the BCCA exempted the AGC from producing actual evidence of justification, taking as it did in paragraph 129 of its judgment the “concerns” expressed by interested groups as established.

[184] Thus, the concerns of some regarding the dilution of the cultural identity of First Nations could be considered in the context of the justification of an infringement of the right to equality only at the risk of giving weight to stereotypes. Indeed, the trial judge refers instead to evidence that runs contrary to her judgment,⁴⁶ and the BCCA did not point out any error on her part on this issue and makes no reference to specific evidence other than the concerns expressed by interested groups during consultations.

[185] In addition, in *Corbière v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs)*,⁴⁷ the Supreme Court held that it would be inconsistent with an approach seeking to achieve substantive equality to take into account stereotypes that assume that the very persons who were alienated from the First Nations because of the discrimination they suffered – in this case off-reserve members of Indian Bands, including those who had to leave the reserve because of discrimination – are not interested in participating meaningfully in the life of their band or in preserving their cultural identity:

[18] Taking all this into account, it is clear that the [s. 77\(1\)](#) disenfranchisement is discriminatory. It denies off-reserve band members the right to participate fully in band governance on the arbitrary basis of a personal characteristic. It reaches the cultural identity of off-reserve Aboriginals in a stereotypical way. It presumes that Aboriginals living off-reserve are not interested in maintaining meaningful participation in the band or in preserving their cultural identity, and are therefore less deserving members of the band. The effect is clear, as is the message: off-reserve band members are not as deserving as those band members who live on

⁴⁶ See the judgment of the BCSC in *Mclvor, Mclvor v. The Registrar, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada*, *supra* note 8 at paras. 312–314.

⁴⁷ *Corbière v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada)*, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203 at paras. 17 and 18.

reserves. This engages the dignity aspect of the s. 15 analysis and results in the denial of substantive equality.

(Emphasis added.)

[186] Similarly, the concerns for resources that were expressed are problematic, particularly if they are used as sole justification for the fact that appropriate measures were not taken to confer equality on persons suffering from discrimination based on a prohibited ground. Even if duly established, budgetary restrictions alone do not justify an infringement and could very well be greeted with skepticism by the courts.⁴⁸ The BCCA could not refer to these concerns as an element grounding its conclusion that there was a pressing and substantial objective justifying the refusal of equal benefits to a group that has historically been discriminated against, even if it was obvious that granting them these advantages would incur additional costs.⁴⁹ When an advantage is refused on the basis of a prohibited ground, equality often involves additional costs for society. The argument that there are suddenly insufficient resources for everyone once it is necessary to satisfy the requirements of the right to equality may in fact constitute another affront to this right.

[187] Admittedly, if the legislative choice had been to give Grismer the right to status under 6(1)(a), as was done for those who were entitled to be or were already registered, a new anomaly in terms of the neutrality of the established regime would have been created; in other words, it would have made it impossible to preserve the integrity of this part of the new regime as much as possible.

[188] The failure to decide that this new anomaly should be created to bring the group that continued to suffer discrimination when applying to register after April 16, 1985, to the same level as the advantaged group perpetuates the discrimination, making the new regime discriminatory in part. The “anomaly” favouring persons benefiting from vested

⁴⁸ See on this issue the nuanced analysis of Binnie J., who drafted the reasons of the Supreme Court in *Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. N.A.P.E.*, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 381 at paras. 59 et seq., urging the courts in particular to “continue to look with strong scepticism at attempts to justify infringements of Charter rights on the basis of budgetary constraints” because “there are *always* budgetary constraints and there are *always* other pressing government priorities”, while also indicating that the courts cannot close their eyes to the periodic occurrence of financial emergencies (para. 72).

⁴⁹ In this case, the effects of the 1985 Act as well as the different scenarios of the increased numbers of persons entitled to be registered and their budgetary impact, taking for granted that health and postsecondary benefits would be maintained, were examined by the expert Stewart Clatworthy in his amended report D-276 and were the subject of his testimony for the defence at the hearing. The cost aspect could not be considered for all of the scenarios submitted and is subject to a number of reservations. The scenarios considered do not necessarily correspond exactly to what is contemplated in this judgment and are worded as though the pre-1985 statutes should be retroactively amended, which is not the case, as we have seen. This expert also filed another, more recent report under D-277, but the issue of costs was not updated. Furthermore, nothing in the record indicates that Parliament considered a detailed cost analysis before legislating in 1985. It should also be noted that this same expert also testified for the plaintiff on another issue.

rights is an integral part of the new regime. Maintaining the integrity of such a regime cannot be considered an objective justifying discrimination.

[189] Moreover, if an additional “anomaly” is necessary to eradicate discrimination – which is one of the objectives of the 1985 Act – it is at least as justified as the anomaly arising from the objective of maintaining the vested rights.

[190] For all of these reasons, and with the greatest respect, the Court has significant reservations with respect to the reasoning of the BCCA on the existence of a pressing and substantial objective justifying the refusal to treat persons in the situation of *Mclvor*, *Grismer*, and their descendants equally to persons with vested rights.

[191] The reasoning of the BCCA, however, in a case very similar to *Descheneaux’s*, is binding authority from a higher court. Despite its reservations, the Court considers itself bound by its assessment and therefore applies it in this judgment.

[192] It must be reiterated, however, that the remedy granted the plaintiffs would not be different if the Court did not feel itself bound by *Mclvor*.

[193] In the case of the plaintiffs *Yantha*, giving them a status equivalent to 6(1) would also create new anomalies with respect to the neutral part of the new regime. The reasoning of the BCCA in *Mclvor* also applies to them and is equally binding on the Court in their respect.

[194] Here, however, as in *Mclvor*, the alleged violation does not arise solely from vested rights but also from additional rights granted persons to whom the Double Mother Rule applied. For this group, Parliament clearly ignored its objectives – particularly that of preserving vested rights but also that of eliminating discrimination. It also restored status to those who were victims of the Double Mother Rule, when these persons had not suffered from sex discrimination but had in fact received advantageous treatment because of the greater value placed on Indian identity transmitted by male Indians.

[195] By granting them this treatment, Parliament also failed to preserve the integrity of the newly established neutral regime. As the BCCA indicates in *Mclvor*, the treatment of this group is also an anomaly in the context of the new regime. This anomaly is even more significant when we consider the treatment given the specific comparator group selected in this case, i.e., persons to whom the Double Mother Rule applied before 1985, when the parents of children who would have been excluded at the age of 21 were married before 1985.

[196] *Mclvor* addressed this issue at the minimal impairment stage. It could also have been discussed at the pressing and substantial objective stage. Not only was it not demonstrated that there was such an objective justifying the grant of a more extensive right to this group while refusing it to persons in the plaintiffs’ situation, but this legislative choice totally contradicts the objectives of the 1985 Act. Therefore, these

objectives could in no way be used to justify the discrimination arising from the additional rights granted this group in 1985.

5.2 *Proportionality of the chosen methods*

The rational connection between the methods chosen and the pressing and substantial objective

[197] If we accept that the objectives identified are pressing and substantial but only in relation to the preservation of vested rights, there is a rational connection between the measure – granting 6(1) status to persons registered or entitled to be registered while refusing to do the same to persons in the plaintiffs’ position – and these objectives, which are to preserve rights vested under the former statute and to preserve the integrity of the neutral regime established as much as possible. A rational or logical causal connection between the violation and the benefit sought is established. This is what the BCCA found in *Mclvor*, although it expressed a reservation as to the very existence of a pressing and substantial objective related to the additional benefits conferred on the group to which the Double Mother Rule applied.⁵⁰

[198] In the absence of a pressing and substantial objective justifying the grant of additional benefits to the group to which the Double Mother Rule applied while simultaneously refusing them to comparable groups, the 1985 Act also fails this part of the test.

Minimal impairment

[199] The AGC will meet its burden with regard to minimal impairment if it demonstrates a lack of less infringing means to achieve the objective in a real and substantial manner. This stage of the analysis “is meant to ensure that the deprivation of *Charter* rights is confined to what is reasonably necessary to achieve the state’s objective”.⁵¹

[200] The BCCA found that, even when deference is shown to Parliament, which must reach a compromise between various interests, the 1985 Act cannot be considered to minimally impair the rights of Grismer and his group, specifically with respect to the rights it confers on the group to which the Double Mother Rule applied. The BCCA states the following on this issue:

[140] The 1985 legislation put Mr. Grismer and his group at a further disadvantage *vis-à-vis* the comparator group than they were at prior to its enactment. Had the 1985 legislation merely preserved the right of children of persons in the comparator group to Indian status until the age of 21, the government could rely on preservation of vested rights as being neatly tailored to

⁵⁰ *Mclvor v. Canada (Registrar of Indian and Northern Affairs)*, *supra* note 1 at paras. 132–134.

⁵¹ *Carter v. Canada (Attorney General)*, *supra* note 19 at para. 102.

the pressing and substantial objective under s. 1. Such legislation would have minimally impaired Mr. Grismer's right to equality. Instead, the 1985 legislation appears to have given a further advantage to an already advantaged group. I am unable to accept that this result is in keeping with the minimal impairment requirement of the *Oakes* test.

[141] The defendants have not presented evidence or argument attempting to justify the 1985 legislation on any basis other than that it preserved existing rights. When pressed, they acknowledge that the situation of persons in what I have found to be the appropriate comparator group was ameliorated by the 1985 legislation. They say, however, that there is an important difference between the comparator group and Mr. Grismer's group. They note that members of the comparator group have two Indian parents – a father who is of Indian heritage, and a mother who became Indian by virtue of marriage. In contrast, Mr. Grismer has only one parent of Indian heritage – his mother.

[142] I find this distinction unconvincing. It is based on the very sort of discrimination that Mr. Grismer complains of. Further, notwithstanding the Indian status of the comparator group's mothers, the pre-1985 legislation specifically limited the member's ability to transmit status to their children, through the Double Mother Rule.

[143] I find that the 1985 legislation does not minimally impair the equality rights of Mr. Grismer, because it served to widen the existing inequality between his group and members of the comparator group.⁵²

[201] This same reasoning, with which the Court is this time in full agreement and by which it is bound, applies to the situation of the three plaintiffs.

[202] The AGC has of course tried to persuade the Court to distance itself from the BCCA's judgment on the issue of minimal impairment.

[203] Largely on the basis of the same evidence as that presented to the BCCA in *Mclvor*, which was also filed in this case, it argues that it would not have been fair or reasonable to refuse to give more to persons affected by the Double Mother Rule than what might have resulted from the preservation of rights vested under the former legislation. In its written submissions, it maintains that it would not have been reasonable to perpetuate a policy that removed the right to register at the age of 21 in the name of preserving vested rights and that this would have been contrary to the general thrust of the 1985 Act. Here are its precise arguments on this issue:

[TRANSLATION]

106. First, we submit that the DMR resulted in a unique situation in which the strict application of the principle of the "preservation of vested rights" in 1985 would not have been reasonable for the persons directly affected. The

⁵² *Mclvor v. Canada (Registrar of Indian and Northern Affairs)*, *supra* note 1 at paras. 140–143.

government cannot be faulted for refusing in 1985 to perpetuate a policy that removed the right to register from persons at the age of 21. It would have been contrary to the general thrust of Bill C-31.

107. In other words, removing a person's right to be registered after the age of 21 after having spent his or her entire life as a registered Indian is not something that the government could reasonably have done in the name of strictly preserving vested rights. Removing the right to register from an adult, taking away a right on which he or she has relied while growing up, is problematic in itself.

108. If we apply the reasons of the BCCA (on the minimal impairment test) to the facts of this case, it would render the government's justification of the line it drew after re-establishing the right to registration (in this case not going so far as to allow the registration of the great-grandchildren of women who got married) conditional on the perpetuation of a practice that was found untenable in 1985, namely, the DMR.⁵³

(Emphasis added.)

[204] Arguments closely related to those above were submitted before the BCCA in the *McIvor* case⁵⁴ and were not accepted. The Court is also of the view that they should not be accepted in this case.

[205] The first remark to be made is that the general thrust of the 1985 Act was to put an end to sex discrimination, not to emphasize it, and to restore status to persons who had suffered discrimination, not to improve the fate of advantaged groups who had not. The AGC's argument that it would be contrary to the general thrust of the 1985 Act not to grant further recognition to the rights of persons to whom the Double Mother Rule applied is therefore without merit.

[206] The second point to be made concerns the scope of the additional rights conferred by the 1985 Act on this group, which was already better treated than the groups to which the plaintiffs belong. These additional rights benefit not only those who were likely to be or were already excluded by the Double Mother Rule, but also their Indian fathers who married their mothers who were non-Indian (before the marriage) before the 1985 Act came into effect. Because of this additional advantage, these fathers may in fact transmit their status to their children, both those born before the 1985 Act came into effect and those born after, and this status is passed on for life, whereas under the Double Mother Rule they could pass on their status only for the first 21 years of their children's lives. Grandparents also benefit, as they have the increased possibility of transmitting their status to their grandchildren even though their mother and grandmother were non-Indian (before they were married).

⁵³ Notes and authorities of the AGC at paras. 106–108.

⁵⁴ See in particular para. 62 of the written submissions of the AGC submitted on the issue raised by Groberman J. at the hearing, Exhibit P-50.

[207] Third, the AGC's argument that it was necessary to go beyond preserving rights vested under the former statute is tantamount to considering a concern for fairness for an already advantaged group to be a pressing and substantial objective justifying an emphasis on sex discrimination against persons belonging to historically disadvantaged groups. Such an outcome is unacceptable in law.

[208] It is very true, as counsel for the AGC ably argued, that there is something odious about withdrawing Indian status from a person at the age of 21, given how such status is intrinsic to identity. It certainly must be borne in mind, and it is to Parliament's credit that it had the sensitivity to grant persons affected by the Double Mother Rule a status that lasted beyond their vested right to hold it until the age of 21.

[209] It is no less odious, however, to totally refuse to grant such a status, so intimately linked as it is to identity, to a person in the same situation with respect to their Indian forebears as others who have it, and to do so for discriminatory reasons. Such discrimination was ignored by Parliament in the 1985 Act, and this infringement on the fundamental right to equality was deemed to be justified by the BCCA precisely on the basis of the maintenance of vested rights.

[210] The preservation of the integrity of the new neutral regime was also invoked by the BCCA as justification for the infringement, but this integrity is not preserved by recognizing the vested rights, and even less by granting a new, superior benefit.

[211] Taking the additional step of determining that the discrimination arising from the grant of rights beyond vested rights to the already advantaged group to whom the Double Mother Rule applied was justified would be tantamount to finding that Parliament may add insult to injury with impunity.

[212] In short, to the extent that Parliament wished to treat these persons fairly by granting them additional rights in the 1985 Act, it was required to respect the right to equality in so doing, given the enactment of the *Canadian Charter*.

[213] It follows from the foregoing that the differential treatment alleged by the plaintiffs is not limited to what is reasonably necessary to achieve the objectives of the Act, which would have been the case if only the vested rights had been preserved. This is what the BCCA decided in *Mclvor*. Again according to the BCCA, this less infringing option would have made it possible to achieve the pressing and substantial objectives identified by Parliament.

The proportionality between the prejudicial and beneficial effects

[214] Given the preceding, it is not necessary to decide the issue the proportionality of the prejudicial and beneficial effects of the measures at issue. The BCCA, however, did rule on the issue. The Court shall refrain from making any comment on this part of the judgment in *Mclvor*, noting only that this analysis did not modify the conclusion that the AGC had not successfully shown that the discrimination observed in comparison with

the persons to whom the Double Mother Rule applied was justified under section 1 of the *Canadian Charter*.

5.3 The 2010 Act

[215] The evidence also reveals that the 2010 Act sought to bring a solution to the discrimination identified by the BCCA only in the case of persons with situations identical to Grismer's by bringing them to the same level as the group affected by the Double Mother Rule when the parents of children who would have been excluded at the age of 21 under that rule were married after 1985, as was Grismer's case. It did not correct the situation of the plaintiffs compared to that of the comparator group selected in this case, which is the same except the parents of children who would have been excluded at age 21 were married before 1985.

[216] The 2010 Act therefore did not entirely correct the situation of increased discrimination resulting from the 1985 Act. Its objective of correction, which was limited to persons in the same situation as Grismer, does not justify the augmented discrimination caused by the 1985 Act, which continued to exist in the plaintiffs' cases even after the 2010 Act.

5.4 Conclusion on justification

[217] The AGC has not successfully discharged its burden of showing that the impairment is minimal or that there were no less infringing means or, even more fundamentally, that there was a pressing and substantial objective justifying the more marked discriminatory treatment suffered by the plaintiffs since the 1985 Act came into effect.

[218] Given the finding of an unjustified infringement of the plaintiffs' right to equality under section 15 of the *Canadian Charter*, it is not necessary to analyze the plaintiffs' arguments regarding the other potential sources of a right to equality.⁵⁵

6. What is the appropriate remedy?

[219] Paragraphs 6(1)(a), (c) and (f) and subsection 6(2) of the Act violate subsection 15(1) of the *Canadian Charter*, and the AGC has not shown that this discrimination is justified under section 1.

[220] The Court is not bound by the wording of the conclusions for declaratory relief in the plaintiffs' motion, as long as the Court's conclusions do not stray from the issue in

⁵⁵ See paragraphs 189 to 196 of the eighth amended motion and its conclusions.

dispute. According to the case law, the Court may even add to the conclusions sought to bring a more complete solution to the legal debate.⁵⁶

[221] In this case, paragraph 3 of the motion specifically asks the court to grant the plaintiffs the [TRANSLATION] “appropriate remedy”, and one of the conclusions asks that it render any other order it deems just. Moreover, during arguments, the AGC explicitly submitted that a declaration whereby the provisions at issue are constitutionally invalid should be suspended.

[222] For the reasons that follow, however, the Court finds that it would not be appropriate to impose solutions as precise as the ones suggested by the plaintiffs. In their conclusions, they ask the Court to require that new provisions be enacted to allow the plaintiffs to register.

[223] The year now is 2015. The 1985 Act from which the discrimination arises has been in force for a little more than 30 years. The general finding of discrimination in the 2009 judgment of the BCCA in *Mclvor* could have enabled Parliament to make more sweeping corrections than what was accomplished by the measures in the 2010 Act. The discrimination suffered by the plaintiffs arises from the same source as the one identified in that case.

[224] While it may be tempting to impose a remedy immediately, given the specific facts of this case, the Court instead finds that Parliament should once again be given the opportunity to play its role. The following remarks by the BCCA in 2009 on the remedy, however, have become more weighty due to the years that have passed since that judgment and the inclusion of a new group in the 2010 Act:

[155] The legislation would have been constitutional if it had preserved only the status that such children [TRANSLATION: children affected by the Double Mother Rule] had before 1985. By according them enhanced status, it created new equalities, and violated the *Charter*.

[156] There are two obvious ways in which the violation s. 15 might have been avoided. The 1985 legislation could have given status under an equivalent of s. 6(1) to people in Mr. Grismer's situation [TRANSLATION: including his children]. Equally, it could have preserved only the existing rights of those in the comparator group. While these are the obvious ways of avoiding a violation of s. 15, other, more complicated solutions might also have been found.

[158] Contextual factors, including the reliance that people have placed on the existing state of the law, may affect the options currently available to the Federal government in remedying the *Charter* violation. It may be that some of the options that were available in 1985 are no longer practical. On the other hand,

⁵⁶ *Centre québécois du droit de l'environnement v. Junex*, J.E. 2014-850 (C.A.) at para. 28, *Québec (Ville) v. Québec (Curateur public)*, [2001] R.J.Q. 954 (C.A.) at paras. 41–42 and *Syndicat canadien des communications de l'énergie et du papier v. St-Jean*, J.E. 2006-591 (C.A.) at para. 43.

options that would not have been appropriate in 1985 may be justifiable today, under s. 1 of the *Charter*, in order to avoid draconian effects.

[159] I cannot say which legislative choice would have been made in 1985 had the violation of s. 15 been recognized. For that reason, I am reluctant to read new entitlements into s. 6 of the *Indian Act*. I am even more reluctant to read down the entitlement of the comparator group, especially given that it is not represented before this Court.

(Emphasis added.)

[225] In view of these observations, the BCCA chose to suspend the declaration of invalidity for one year, as the Supreme Court suggests be done when the benefits granted in a statute is underinclusive, to allow Parliament to determine whether to extend or cancel the benefits.⁵⁷ This suspension, however, had to be extended twice.

[226] Although the Court considers it highly unlikely that Parliament will choose to cancel the benefits conferred on persons to whom the Double Mother Rule applied, the lawmakers must nevertheless have sufficient room to maneuver when drafting the details of the provisions to remedy the discrimination.

[227] Indeed, it is in a better position than the Court to determine what these details should be and how consistent they are with the new regime in place, especially given the highly technical and complex nature of the Act. For example, there must be a connection between what is stated in this judgment and sections 8 and following of the Act with regard to Band Lists and the membership rules that may be established by a Band that has assumed control of its List, as was the case when paragraph 6(1)(c.1) was added in 2010.

[228] Thus, even if the Court considered it appropriate to circumscribe the legislative measures that should be taken, it would refrain from imposing precise wording and would merely frame the issue in terms of the result that Parliament should seek to comply with the requirements of the fundamental right to equality. Such a conclusion, which would be consistent with the reasons of this judgment, could have read as follows:

DECLARE that paragraphs 6(1)(a), (c) and (f) and subsection 6(2) of the *Indian Act* unjustifiably infringe section 15 of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* and are inoperative insofar as:

(a) they do not allow persons belonging to the following groups:

(i) persons whose only Indian grandparent is a woman who lost her status through marriage, and whose parents are not both Indian; the

⁵⁷ *Schachter v. Canada*, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679 at 715–716.

plaintiff Stéphane Descheaux is one of the persons belonging to this group, and

(ii) persons whose parents are not both Indian and whose mother is a daughter born out of wedlock of an Indian father and a non-Indian mother and without status (i.e., between September 4, 1951, and April 16, 1985, inclusively); the plaintiff Tammy Yantha is one of the persons belonging to this group,

to add their name to the Indian Register with an Indian status equivalent to paragraph 6(1) or that permits transmitting a status equivalent to 6(2) to their children with non-Indian parents; and

(b) as long as they do not grant status equivalent to 6(1) to persons in the situation of the plaintiff Tammy Yantha, they do not allow persons belonging to the following group:

- girls born without status and out of wedlock to Indian fathers and non-Indian mothers, i.e. between September 4, 1951, and April 16, 1985, inclusively, who have one or more children with a non-Indian man; the plaintiff Susan Yantha is one of the persons belonging to this group;

to pass on to their children with a non-Indian man a status equivalent to that under subsection 6(1), which would allow them in turn to transmit status to their children with a non-Indian.

[229] But even this conclusion would not be appropriate. Parliament may in fact choose other avenues than those suggested in this judgment, although the options do appear rather limited. It is also possible that it selects even more inclusive options than those dictated by the imperatives of the right to equality out of a concern for fairness or for some other reason. Indeed, this is what it did in 1985 for persons to whom the Double Mother Rule applied.

[230] It also goes without saying that the issue of the costs that more inclusive provisions would incur is one element among many that Parliament may consider.⁵⁸ Some remarks have already been made, however, regarding the skepticism that the courts may display when faced with such an approach. Moreover, because the factual situation has persisted, as the BCCA points out in the above-quoted excerpt, and because Parliament preferred to extend the 6(1) benefit to another group in 2010 instead of withdrawing it from others, its room to manoeuvre is likely more limited. With respect to costs, it should also be noted that, according to expert Stewart Clatworthy, the logic of section 6 and its “second generation cut off” dictates that, given the current state of affairs, in about 100 years, no new child will be entitled to have his or her name added to the Register in the plaintiffs’ Bands. If there are more people registered under

⁵⁸ See notes 48 and 49 and the explanations therein.

6(1), this evolution will be slightly slower, but because of the nature of the mechanism in subsection 6(1), there will eventually be no more children born with an entitlement to be entered in the Register.⁵⁹ There is no evidence on other Indian Bands specifically, but it should be noted that the same mechanism is at work.

[231] In view of the preceding, it would also not be appropriate for the Court to render orders directly granting status to the plaintiffs. Moreover, such decisions fall under the purview of the Registrar.

[232] A year and a half to decide which measures to take seems reasonable, in light of the current pre-election context and the fact that this is not the first time that Parliament has been asked to analyze the issue and that consultations on this subject are planned. It should be reiterated that the situation has persisted for a little more than 30 years now without a complete solution. And the Court is not taking into consideration discussions on the discrimination arising from the 1951 Act, which took place long before there were even plans for the enactment of the *Canadian Charter*.⁶⁰ The time period takes into account the fact that the issues raised here have been known for several years. Although new consultations are in the works, they must take place promptly.

[233] In determining this suspension, the Court is well aware that the plaintiffs and other persons in their situation will continue to suffer discrimination during the eighteen-month period granted, unless Parliament acts more quickly. This is nevertheless the price that must be paid to respect the fundamental role of the legislative power in our society, a role that the Court cannot usurp.

CONCLUSION

[234] This judgment aims to dispose of the plaintiffs' action.

[235] It does not, however, exempt Parliament from taking the appropriate measures to identify and settle all other discriminatory situations that may arise from the issue identified, whether they are based on sex or another prohibited ground, in accordance with its constitutional obligation to ensure that the laws respect the rights enshrined in the *Canadian Charter*.

[236] This task incumbent on Parliament is complex and commensurate with the general impact of the statutes it enacts. It must take into account the effects of a statute in all the situations to which it will likely apply, and do so in light of the reports, studies and factual situations discussed and raised during the enactment process, and in light of the applicable law, including the principles set out in judicial decisions.

⁵⁹ Exhibits P-20 and P-21, and the testimony of Stewart Clatworthy at the hearing on the application.

⁶⁰ In her additional reasons on the remedy, the trial judge refers to discussions on this subject in the early 1970s: *McIvor v. The Registrar, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada*, *supra* note 8.

[237] Judges hear only one specific dispute and are privy only to what is adduced and argued before them. They are not in the best position to grasp all of the implications of the laws and their potentially discriminatory effects.

[238] In the 2010 Act, Parliament chose to limit the remedy to the parties in *Mclvor* and those in situations strictly identical to theirs. It did not attempt to identify the full measure of the advantages given the privileged group identified in that case.

[239] When Parliament chooses not to consider the broader implications of judicial decisions by limiting their scope to the bare minimum, a certain abdication of legislative power in favour of the judiciary will likely take place. In such cases, it appears that the holders of legislative power prefer to wait for the courts to rule on a case-by-case basis before acting, and for their judgments to gradually force statutory amendments to finally bring them in line with the Constitution.

[240] From the perspective of Canadian citizens, all of whom are potential litigants, the failure to perform this legislative duty and the abdication of power that may result are obviously not desirable.

[241] First, it would compel them to argue their constitutional rights in the judicial arena in many closely related cases and at great cost, instead of benefiting from the broader effects of a policy decision and counting on those who exercise legislative power to ensure that their rights are respected when statutes concerning them are enacted and revised. What is more, limited judicial resources used on disputes that a well-interpreted prior judgment should have settled are squandered instead of being used efficiently, with unfortunate effects for all litigants.

[242] It is clear that, because of the technical nature of the Act, its evolution over time, and its multi-generational effects, the task of ensuring that it has no unjustifiable discriminatory effects is a significant challenge. These are not, however, reasons that justify not taking on that challenge once again.

[243] Parliament should not interpret this judgment as strictly as it did the BCCA's judgment in *Mclvor*. If it wishes to fully play its role instead of giving free reign to legal disputes, it must act differently this time, while also quickly making sufficiently significant corrections to remedy the discrimination identified in this case. One approach does not exclude the other.

[244] Given the plaintiffs' constitutional right to equality, paragraphs 6(1)(a), (c) and (f) and subsection 6(2) of the Act must be declared inoperative. The effect of this judgment will be suspended, however, for a period of eighteen months.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT:

[245] **DECLARES** that paragraphs 6(1)(a),(c) and (f) and subsection 6(2) of the *Indian Act* unjustifiably infringe section 15 of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* and are inoperative;

[246] **SUSPENDS** this declaration of invalidity for a period of eighteen months;

[247] **WITH COSTS**, including expert fees.

CHANTAL MASSE, J.S.C.

Mtre David Schulze
Mtre Marie-Ève Dumont
Dionne Schulze
Mtre Mary Eberts
Counsel for the plaintiffs and interveners

Mtre Nancy Bonsaint
Mtre Dah Yoon Min
Minister of Justice Canada
Counsel for the defendant

Dates of hearing: January 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 14, 27, 28, 29 and 30, 2015, and February 3, 4, 5 and 6, 2015. Additional written notes following the hearing received on February 23 and 27, 2015.

SCHEDULE

Most relevant excerpts from legislation

1. *Indian Act*, R.S.C. 1927, c. 98 (excerpts).
2. *Indian Act*, S.C. 1951, c. 29 (excerpts).
3. *Act to amend the Indian Act*, S.C. 1956, c. 40, s. 3.
4. *Act to amend the Indian Act*, S.C. 1985, c. 27, s. 4.
5. *Act to promote gender equity in Indian registration by responding to the Court of Appeal for British Columbia decision in McIvor v. Canada (Registrar of Indian and Northern Affairs)*, S.C. 2010, c. 18.
6. *Indian Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5, s. 6 (as currently in force).

1. **Indian Act, S.R.C. 1927, c. 98 (excerpts):**

<p>2. En la présente loi, à moins que le contexte ne s'y oppose, l'expression [...]</p> <p>e) «Indien» signifie</p> <p>i) tout individu du sexe masculin et de sang indien réputé appartenir à une bande particulière,</p> <p>ii) tout enfant de cet individu,</p> <p>iii) toute femme qui est ou a été légalement mariée à cet individu;</p> <p>[...]</p> <p>12. Le surintendant général peut, en tout temps, refuser de reconnaître tout enfant illégitime comme membre de la bande, à moins que, du consentement de la bande dont est membre son père ou sa mère, il n'ait eu part, pendant une période de plus de deux ans, aux deniers distribués à cette bande.</p> <p>13. Tout Indien qui a résidé pendant cinq ans consécutifs dans un pays étranger, sans le consentement par écrit du surintendant général ou de son agent, cesse de faire partie de la bande à laquelle il appartenait, et il ne peut faire de nouveau partie de cette même bande ni d'aucune autre bande, à moins que le consentement de cette bande, avec l'approbation du surintendant général ou de son agent, ne soit préalablement obtenu.</p> <p>14. Toute femme indienne qui épouse une autre personne qu'un Indien, ou un Indien non soumis au régime d'un traité, cesse, à tous égards, d'être Indienne, au sens de la présente loi, sauf qu'elle a droit de participer également avec les membres de la bande à laquelle elle appartenait antérieurement, à la distribution</p>	<p>2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,</p> <p>...</p> <p>d) "Indian" means</p> <p>i) any male person of Indian blood reputed to belong to a particular band,</p> <p>ii) any child of such person,</p> <p>iii) any woman who is or was lawfully married to such person;</p> <p>...</p> <p>12. Any illegitimate child may, unless he has, with the consent of the band whereof the father or mother of such child is a member, shared in the distribution moneys of such band for a period exceeding two years, be, at any time, excluded from the membership thereof by the Superintendent General.</p> <p>13. Any Indian who has for five years continuously resided in a foreign country without the consent, in writing, of the Superintendent General or his agent, shall cease to be a member of the band of which he was formerly a member and he shall not again become a member of that band, or of a any other band, unless the consent of such band, with the approval of the Superintendent General or his agent, is first obtained.</p> <p>14. Any Indian woman who marries any person other than an Indian, or a non-treaty Indian, shall cease to be an Indian in every respect within the meaning of this Act, except that she shall be entitled to share equally with the members of the band to which she formerly belonged, in the</p>
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<p>annuelle ou semi-annuelle des annuités, intérêts et rentes de celle-ci; mais, avec l'assentiment du surintendant général, ce revenu peut, en tout temps, être converti en un rachat de dix ans.</p> <p>15. Toute femme indienne qui épouse un Indien d'une autre bande, ou un Indien non soumis aux traités, cesse de faire partie de la bande à laquelle elle appartenait antérieurement, et elle devient membre de la bande ou de la bande irrégulière dont son mari fait partie.</p> <p>2. Si elle épouse un Indien non soumis au régime d'un traité, elle a droit, tout en devenant membre de la bande irrégulière dont son mari fait partie, de participer également avec les membres de la bande à laquelle elle appartenait antérieurement; mais, avec l'assentiment du surintendant général, ce revenu peut, en tout temps, être converti en un rachat de dix ans.»</p>	<p>annual or semi-annual distribution of their annuities, interest moneys and rents; but such income may be commuted to her at any time at ten years' purchase, with the approval of the Superintendent General.</p> <p>15. Any Indian woman who marries an Indian of any other band, or a non-treaty Indian, shall cease to be a member of the band to which she formerly belonged, and shall become a member of the band or irregular band or which her husband is a member.</p> <p>2. If she marries a non-treaty Indian, while becoming a member of the irregular band of which her husband is a member, she shall be entitled to share equally with the members of the band of which she was formerly a member, in the distribution of their moneys; but such income may be commuted to her at any time at ten years' purchase, with the consent of the band.»</p>
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2. *Indian Act, S.C. 1951, c. 29 (extraits):*

<p>«2. (1) Dans la présente loi, l'expression [...] g) «Indien» signifie une personne qui, conformément à la présente loi, est inscrite à titre d'Indien ou a droit de l'être; [...] m) «inscrit» signifie inscrit comme Indien dans le registre des Indiens; n) «registraire» désigne le fonctionnaire du ministère qui est préposé au registre des Indiens; [...] 5. Est maintenu au ministère un registre des Indiens, lequel consiste dans des listes de bande et des listes générales et où doit être consigné le nom de chaque personne ayant droit d'être inscrite comme Indien. 6. Le nom de chaque personne qui est membre d'une bande et a droit d'être inscrite doit être consigné sur la liste de bande pour la bande en question, et le nom de chaque personne qui n'est pas membre d'une bande et a droit d'être inscrite doit apparaître sur une liste générale. 7. (1) Le registraire peut en tout temps ajouter à une liste de bande ou à une liste générale, ou en retrancher, le nom de toute personne qui, d'après les dispositions de la présente loi, a ou n'a pas droit, selon le cas, à l'inclusion de son nom dans cette liste. (2) Le registraire des Indiens doit indiquer la date où chaque nom y a été ajouté ou en a été retranché. 8. Dès l'entrée en vigueur de la présente loi, les listes de bande alors dressées au ministère doivent constituer</p>	<p>2. (1) In this Act, ... (g) "Indian" means a person who pursuant to this Act is registered as an Indian or is entitled to be registered as an Indian; ... (m) "registered" means registered as an Indian in the Indian Register; (n) "Registrar" means the officer of the Department who is in charge of the Indian Register; ... 5. An Indian Register shall be maintained in the Department, which shall consist of Band Lists and General Lists and in which shall be recorded the name of every person who is entitled to be registered as an Indian. 6. The name of every person who is a member of a band and is entitled to be registered shall be entered in the Band List for that band, and the name of every person who is not a member of a band and is entitled to be registered shall be entered in a General List. 7. (1) The Registrar may at any time add to or delete from a Band List or a General List the name of any person who, in accordance with the provisions of this Act, is entitled or not entitled, as the case may be, to have his name included in that List. (2) The Indian Register shall indicate the date on which each name was added thereto or deleted therefrom. 8. Upon the coming into force of this Act, the band lists then in existence in the Department shall constitute the Indian Register, and the applicable lists shall be</p>
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<p>le registre des Indiens et les listes applicables doivent être affichées à un endroit bien en vue dans le bureau du surintendant qui dessert la bande ou les personnes visées par la liste et dans tous les autres endroits où les avis concernant la bande sont ordinairement affichés.</p> <p>9. (1) Dans les six mois de l'affichage d'une liste conformément à l'article huit ou dans les trois mois de l'addition du nom d'une personne à une liste de bande ou à une liste générale ou de son retranchement d'une telle liste, en vertu de l'article sept,</p> <p>a) dans le cas d'une liste de bande, le conseil de la bande, dix électeurs de la bande ou trois électeurs, s'il y en a moins de dix,</p> <p>b) dans le cas d'une portion affichée d'une liste générale, tout adulte dont le nom figure sur cette portion affichée, et</p> <p>c) la personne dont le nom a été inclus dans la liste mentionnée à l'article huit, ou y a été omis, ou dont le nom a été ajouté à une liste de bande ou une liste générale, ou en a été retranché, peuvent, par avis écrit au registraire, renfermant un bref exposé des motifs invoqués à cette fin, protester contre l'inclusion, l'omission, l'addition ou le retranchement, selon le cas, du nom de cette personne.</p> <p>(2) Lorsqu'une protestation est adressée au registraire, en vertu du présent article, il doit faire tenir une enquête sur la question et rendre une décision qui, sous réserve d'un renvoi prévu au paragraphe trois, est définitive et péremptoire.</p> <p>(3) Dans les trois mois de la date d'une décision du registraire aux termes du présent article,</p> <p>a) le conseil de la bande que vise la décision du registraire, ou</p> <p>b) la personne qui a fait la</p>	<p>posted in a conspicuous place in the superintendent's office that serves the band or persons to whom the list relates and in all other places where band notices are ordinarily displayed.</p> <p>9. (1) Within six months after a list has been posted in accordance with section eight or within three months after the name of a person has been added to or deleted from a Band List or a General List pursuant to section seven</p> <p>(a) in the case of a Band List, the council of the band, any ten electors of the band, or any three electors if there are less than ten electors in the band,</p> <p>(b) in the case of a posted portion of a General List, any adult person whose name appears on that posted portion,</p> <p>and</p> <p>(c) the person whose name was included in or omitted from the list referred to in section eight, or whose name was added to or deleted from a Band List or a General List, may, by notice in writing to the Registrar, containing a brief statement of the grounds therefor, protest the inclusion, omission, addition, or deletion, as the case may be, of the name of that person.</p> <p>(2) Where a protest is made to the Registrar under this section he shall cause an investigation to be made into the matter and shall render a decision, and subject to a reference under subsection three, the decision of the Registrar is final and conclusive.</p> <p>(3) Within three months from the date of a decision of the Registrar under this section</p> <p>(a) the council of the band affected by the Registrar's decision, or</p> <p>(b) the person by or in respect of whom the protest was made, may, by notice in writing, request the Registrar to refer the decision to a judge for review, and thereupon the Registrar</p>
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<p>protestation ou à l'égard de qui elle a eu lieu, peut, moyennant un avis par écrit, demander au registraire de soumettre la décision à un juge, pour révision, et dès lors le registraire doit déférer la décision, avec tous les éléments que le registraire a examinés en rendant sa décision, au juge de la cour de comté ou district du comté ou district où la bande est située ou dans lequel réside la personne à l'égard de qui la protestation a été faite, ou de tel autre comté ou district que le Ministre peut désigner, ou, dans la province de Québec, au juge de la cour supérieure du district où la bande est située ou dans lequel réside la personne à l'égard de qui la protestation a été faite, ou de tel autre district que le Ministre peut désigner.</p> <p>(4) Le juge de la cour de comté, de la cour de district ou de la cour supérieure, selon le cas, doit enquêter sur la justesse de la décision du registraire et, à ces fins, peut exercer tous les pouvoirs d'un commissaire en vertu de la Partie I de la Loi des enquêtes. Le juge doit décider si la personne qui a fait l'objet de la protestation a ou n'a pas droit, selon le cas, d'après les dispositions de la présente loi, à l'inscription de son nom au registre des Indiens, et la décision du juge est définitive et péremptoire.</p> <p>10. Lorsque le nom d'une personne du sexe masculin est inclus dans une liste de bande ou une liste générale, ou y est ajouté ou omis, ou en est retranché, les noms de son épouse et de ses enfants mineurs doivent également être inclus, ajoutés, omis ou retranchés, selon le cas.</p> <p>11. Sous réserve de l'article douze, une personne a droit d'être inscrite si</p> <p>a) elle était, le vingt-six mai mil huit cent soixante-quatorze, aux fins de la loi</p>	<p>shall refer the decision, together with all material considered by the Registrar in making his decision, to the judge of the county or district court of the county or district in which the band is situated or in which the person in respect of whom the protest was made resides, or such other county or district as the Minister may designate, or in the Province of Quebec, to the judge of the Superior Court for the district in which the band is situated or in which the person in respect of whom the protest was made resides, or such other district as the Minister may designate.</p> <p>(4) The judge of the county, district or Superior Court, as the case may be, shall inquire into the correctness of the Registrar's decision, and for such purposes may exercise all the powers of a commissioner under Part I of the <i>Inquiries Act</i>; the judge shall decide whether the person in respect of whom the protest was made is, in accordance with the provisions of this Act, entitled or not entitled, as the case may be, to have his name included in the Indian Register, and the decision of the judge is final and conclusive.</p> <p>10. Where the name of a male person is included in, omitted from, added to or deleted from a Band List or a General List, the names of his wife and his minor children shall also be included, omitted, added or deleted, as the case may be.</p> <p>11. Subject to section twelve, a person is entitled to be registered if that person</p> <p>(a) on the twenty-sixth day of May, eighteen hundred and seventy-four, was, for the purposes of An Act providing for the organization of the Department of the Secretary of State of Canada, and for the management of Indian and Ordnance Lands, chapter forty-two of the statutes of 1868, as amended by section six of chapter six of the statutes of 1869, and</p>
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<p>alors intitulée: Acte pourvoyant à l'organisation du Département du Secrétaire d'État du Canada, ainsi qu'à l'administration des Terres des Sauvages et de l'Ordonnance, chapitre quarante-deux des Statuts de 1868, modifiée par l'article six du chapitre six des Statuts de 1869 et par l'article huit du chapitre vingt et un des Statuts de 1874, considérée comme ayant droit à la détention, l'usage ou la jouissance des terres et autres biens immobiliers appartenant aux tribus, bandes ou groupes d'Indiens au Canada, ou affectés à leur usage,</p> <p>b) elle est membre d'une bande</p> <p>(i) à l'usage et au profit communs de laquelle des terres ont été mises de côté ou, depuis le vingt-six mai mil huit cent soixante-quatorze, ont fait l'objet d'un traité les mettant de côté, ou</p> <p>(ii) que le gouverneur en conseil a déclaré une bande aux fins de la présente loi,</p> <p>c) elle est du sexe masculin et descendante directe, dans la ligne masculine, d'une personne du sexe masculin décrite à l'alinéa a) ou b),</p> <p>d) elle est l'enfant légitime</p> <p>(i) d'une personne du sexe masculin décrite à l'alinéa a) ou b), ou</p> <p>(ii) d'une personne décrite à l'alinéa c),</p> <p>(e) elle est l'enfant illégitime d'une personne du sexe féminin décrite à l'alinéa a), b) ou d), à moins que le registraire ne soit convaincu que le père de l'enfant n'était pas un Indien et n'ait déclaré que l'enfant n'a pas le droit d'être inscrit, ou</p> <p>(f) elle est l'épouse ou la veuve d'une personne ayant le droit d'être inscrite aux termes de l'alinéa a), b), c), d) ou e).</p>	<p>section eight of chapter twenty-one of the statutes of 1874, considered to be entitled to hold, use or enjoy the lands and other immovable property belonging to or appropriated to the use of the various tribes, bands or bodies of Indians in Canada,</p> <p>(b) is a member of a band</p> <p>(i) for whose use and benefit, in common, lands have been set apart or since the twenty-sixth day of May, eighteen hundred and seventy-four have been agreed by treaty to be set apart, or</p> <p>(ii) that has been declared by the Governor in Council to be a band for the purposes of this Act,</p> <p>(c) is a male person who is a direct descendant in the male line of a male person described in paragraph (a) or (b),</p> <p>(d) is the legitimate child of</p> <p>(i) a male person described in paragraph (a) or (b),</p> <p>or</p> <p>(ii) a person described in paragraph (c),</p> <p>(e) is the illegitimate child of a female person described in paragraph (a), (b) or (d), unless the Registrar is satisfied that the father of the child was not an Indian and the Registrar has declared that the child is not entitled to be registered, or</p> <p>(f) is the wife or widow of a person who is entitled to be registered by virtue of paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d) or (e).</p> <p>12. (1) The following persons are not entitled to be registered, namely,</p> <p>(a) a person who</p> <p>(i) has received or has been allotted half-breed lands or money scrip,</p> <p>(ii) is a descendant of a person described in sub-paragraph (i),</p> <p>(iii) is enfranchised, or</p> <p>(iv) is a person born of a marriage</p>
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<p>12. (1) Les personnes suivantes n'ont pas le droit d'être inscrites, savoir:</p> <p>a) une personne qui</p> <p>(i) a reçu ou à qui il a été attribué, des terres ou certificats d'argent de métis,</p> <p>(ii) est un descendant d'une personne décrite au sous-alinéa (i),</p> <p>(ii) est émancipée, ou</p> <p>(iii) est née d'un mariage contracté après l'entrée en vigueur de la présente loi et a atteint l'âge de vingt et un ans, dont la mère et la grand-mère paternelle ne sont pas des personnes décrites à l'alinéa a), b) ou d) ou admises à être inscrites en vertu de l'alinéa e) de l'article onze, sauf si, étant une femme, cette personne est l'épouse ou la veuve de quelqu'un décrit à l'article onze, et</p> <p>b) une femme qui a épousé une personne non indienne.</p> <p>(2) Le Ministre peut délivrer à tout Indien auquel la présente loi cesse de s'appliquer, un certificat dans ce sens.</p> <p>13. (1) Sous réserve de l'approbation du Ministre, une personne dont le nom apparaît sur une liste générale peut être admise au sein d'une bande avec le consentement de la bande ou du conseil de la bande.</p> <p>(2) Sous réserve de l'approbation du Ministre, un membre d'une bande peut être admis parmi les membres d'une autre bande avec le consentement de cette dernière ou du conseil de celle-ci.</p> <p>14. Une femme qui est membre d'une bande cesse d'en faire partie si elle épouse une personne qui n'en est pas membre, mais si elle épouse un membre d'une autre bande, elle entre dès lors dans la bande à laquelle</p>	<p>entered into after the coming into force of this Act and has attained the age of twenty-one years, whose mother and whose father's mother are not persons described in paragraph (a), (b), (d), or entitled to be registered by virtue of paragraph (e) of section eleven, unless, being a woman, that person is the wife or widow of a person described in section eleven, and</p> <p>(b) a woman who is married to a person who is not an Indian.</p> <p>(2) the Minister may issue to any Indian to whom this Act ceases to apply, a certificate to that effect.</p> <p>13. (1) Subject to the approval of the Minister, a person whose name appears on a General List may be admitted into membership of a band with the consent of the band or the council of that band.</p> <p>(2) Subject to the approval of the Minister, a member of a band may be admitted into membership of another band with the consent of the latter band or the council of that band.</p> <p>14. A woman who is a member of a band ceases to be a member of that band if she marries a person who is not a member of that band, but if she marries a member of another band, she thereupon becomes a member of the band of which her husband is a member.</p>
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3. *Act to amend the Indian Act, S.C. 1956, c. 40, s. 3:*

<p>«3. (1) L'alinéa e) de l'article 11 de ladite loi est abrogé et remplacé par ce qui suit:</p> <p>«e) elle est l'enfant illégitime d'une personne du sexe féminin décrite à l'alinéa a), b) ou d); ou».</p> <p>(2) L'article 12 de ladite loi est modifié par l'adjonction, immédiatement après le paragraphe (1), du paragraphe suivant:</p> <p>«(1a) L'addition, à une liste de bande, du nom d'un enfant illégitime décrit à l'alinéa e) de l'article 11 peut faire l'objet d'une protestation en tout temps dans les douze mois de l'addition et si, à la suite de la protestation, il est décidé que le père de l'enfant n'était pas un Indien, l'enfant n'a pas le droit d'être inscrit selon l'alinéa e) de l'article 11».</p> <p>(3) Le présent article ne s'applique qu'aux personnes nées après l'entrée en vigueur de la présente loi.»</p>	<p>3. (1) Paragraph (e) of section 11 of the said Act is repealed and the following substituted therefor:</p> <p>(e) is the illegitimate child of a female person described in paragraph (a), (b) or (d); or.</p> <p>(2) Section 12 of the said Act is amended by adding thereto, immediately after subsection (1) thereof, the following subsection:</p> <p>(1a) The addition to a Band List of the name of an illegitimate child described in paragraph (e) of section 11 may be protested at any time within twelve months after the addition, and if upon the protest it is decided that the father of the child was not an Indian, the child is not entitled to be registered under paragraph (e) of section 11.</p> <p>(3) This section applies only to persons born after the coming into force of this Act.</p>
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4. **Act to amend the Indian Act, S.C. 1985, c. 27, s. 4:**

<p>4. Sections 5 to 14 of the said Act are repealed and the following substituted therefor:</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>"Indian Register</i></p> <p>5. (1) There shall be maintained in the Department an Indian Register in which shall be recorded the name of every person who is entitled to be registered as an Indian under this Act.</p> <p>(2) The names in the Indian Register immediately prior to April 17, 1985 shall constitute the Indian Register on April 17, 1985.</p> <p>(3) The Registrar may at any time add to or delete from the Indian Register the name of any person who, in accordance with this Act, is entitled or not entitled, as the case may be, to have his name included in the Indian Register.</p> <p>(4) The Indian Register shall indicate the date on which each name was added thereto or deleted therefrom.</p> <p>(5) The name of a person who is entitled to be registered is not required to be recorded in the Indian Register unless an application for registration is made to the Registrar.</p> <p>6. (1) Subject to section 7, a person is entitled to be registered if</p> <p>(a) that person was registered or entitled to be registered immediately prior to April 17, 1985;</p>	<p>4. Les articles 5 à 14 de la même loi sont abrogés et remplacés par ce qui suit :</p> <p style="text-align: center;">«Registre des Indiens</p> <p>5. (1) Est tenu au ministère un registre des Indiens où est consigné le nom de chaque personne ayant droit d'être inscrite comme Indien en vertu de la présente loi.</p> <p>(2) Les noms figurant au registre des Indiens immédiatement avant le 17 avril 1985 constituent le registre des Indiens au 17 avril 1985.</p> <p>(3) Le registraire peut ajouter au registre des Indiens, ou en retrancher, le nom de la personne qui, aux termes de la présente loi, a ou n'a pas droit, selon le cas, à l'inclusion de son nom dans ce registre.</p> <p>(4) Le registre des Indiens indique la date où chaque nom y a été ajouté ou en a été retranché.</p> <p>(5) Il n'est pas requis que le nom d'une personne qui a droit d'être inscrite soit consigné dans le registre des Indiens, à moins qu'une demande à cette effet soit présentée au registraire.</p> <p>6. (1) Sous réserve de l'article 7, une personne a droit d'être inscrite si elle remplit une des conditions suivantes :</p> <p>a) elle était inscrite ou</p>
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<p>(b) that person is a member of a body of persons that has been declared, by the Governor in Council on or after April 17, 1985 to be a band for the purposes of this Act;</p> <p>(c) the name of that person was omitted or deleted from the Indian Register, or from a band list prior to September 4, 1951, under subparagraph 12(l)(a)(iv), paragraph 12(l)(b) or subsection 12(2) or under subparagraph 12(1)(a)(iii) pursuant to an order made under sub-section 109(2), as each provision read immediately prior to April 17, 1985, or under any former provision of this Act</p>	<p>avait right de l'être immédiatement avant le 17 April 1985;</p> <p>b) elle est membre d'un groupe de personnes déclaré par le gouverneur en conseil après le 16 April 1985 être une bande pour l'application de la présente loi;</p> <p>c) son nom a été omis ou retranché du registre des Indiens ou, avant le 4 septembre 1951, d'une liste de bande, en vertu du sous-alinéa 12(1)a(iv), de l'article 12(1)b) ou du paragraphe 12(2) ou en vertu du sous-alinéa 12(1)a(iii) conformément à une ordonnance prise en vertu du paragraphe 109(2), dans leur version précédant immédiatement</p>
<p>relating to the same subject-matter as any of those provisions;</p> <p>(d) the name of that person was omitted or deleted from the Indian Register, or from a band list prior to September 4, 1951, under subparagraph 12(1)(a)(iii) pursuant to an order made under subsection 109(1), as each provision read immediately prior to April 17, 1985, or under any former provision of this Act relating to the same subject-matter as any of those provisions;</p> <p>(e) the name of that person was omitted or deleted from the Indian Register, or from a band list prior to September 4,1951,</p> <p>(i) under section 13, as it read immediately prior to September 4, 1951, or under any former provision of this</p>	<p>le 17 April 1985, ou en vertu de toute provision antérieure de la présente loi portant sur le même sujet que celui d'une de ces provisions;</p> <p>d) son nom a été omis ou retranché du registre des Indiens ou, avant le 4 septembre1951, d'une liste de bande en vertu du sous-alinéa 12(1)a(iii) conformément à une ordonnance prise en vertu du paragraphe 109(1), dans leur version précédant immédiatement le 17 avril 1985, ou en vertu de toute disposition antérieure de la présente loi portant sur le même sujet que celui d'une de ces dispositions;</p> <p>e) son nom a été omis ou retranché du registre des Indiens ou, avant le 4 septembre 1951, d'une liste de bande :</p>

<p>Act relating to the same subject-matter as that section, or</p> <p>(ii) under section III, as it read immediately prior to July 1, 1920, or under any former provision of this Act relating to the same subject-matter as that section; or</p> <p>(f) that person is a person both of whose parents are or, if no longer living, were at the time of death entitled to be registered under this section.</p> <p>(2) Subject to section 7, a person is entitled to be registered if that person is a person one of whose parents is or, if no longer living, was at the time of death entitled to be registered under subsection (1).</p> <p>(3) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(f) and subsection (2),</p> <p>(a) a person who was no longer living immediately prior to April 17, 1985 but who was at the time of death entitled to be registered shall be deemed to be entitled to be registered under paragraph (1)(a); and</p> <p>(b) a person described in paragraph (1)(c),(d) or (e) who was no longer living on April 17, 1985 shall be deemed to be entitled to be registered under that paragraph.</p>	<p>(i) soit en vertu de l'article 13, dans sa version précédant immédiatement le 4 septembre 1951, ou en vertu de toute provision antérieure de la présente loi portant sur le même sujet que celui de cet section,</p> <p>(ii) soit en vertu de l'article III, dans sa version précédant immédiatement le 1er juillet 1920, ou en vertu de toute disposition antérieure de la présente loi portant sur le même sujet que celui de cet article;</p> <p>f) ses parents ont tous deux droit d'être inscrits en vertu du présent article ou, s'ils sont décédés, avaient ce droit à la date de leur décès.</p> <p>(2) Sous réserve de l'article 7, une personne a droit d'être inscrite si l'un de ses parents a droit d'être inscrit en vertu du paragraphe (1) ou, s'il est décédé, avait ce droit à la date de son décès.</p> <p>(3) Pour l'application de l'article (1) f) et du paragraphe (2) :</p> <p>a) la personne qui est décédée avant le 17 avril 1985 mais qui avait droit d'être inscrite à la date de son décès est réputée avoir droit d'être inscrite en vertu de l'alinéa (1)a);</p> <p>b) la personne visée aux alinéas (1)c), d) ou e) qui est décédée avant le 17 avril 1985 est réputée avoir droit d'être inscrite en vertu de ces alinéas.</p>
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<p>7. (1) The following persons are not entitled to be registered:</p> <p>(a) a person who was registered under paragraph 11 (1)(f), as it read immediately prior to April 17, 1985, or under any former provision of this Act relating to the same subject-matter as that paragraph, and whose name was subsequently omitted or deleted from the Indian Register under this Act; or</p> <p>(b) a person who is the child of a person who was registered or entitled to be registered under paragraph 11 (1)(f), as it read immediately prior to April 17, 1985, or under any former provision of this Act relating to the same subject-matter as that paragraph, and is also the child of a person who is not entitled to be registered.</p> <p>(2) Paragraph (1)(a) does not apply in respect of a female person who was, at any time prior to being registered under paragraph 11 (1) f), entitled to be registered under any other provision of this Act.</p> <p>(3) Paragraph (1)(b) does not apply in respect of the child of a female person who was, at any time prior to being registered under paragraph 11 (1)(f), entitled to be registered under any other provision of this Act.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Band Lists</i></p> <p>8. There shall be maintained in accordance with this Act for each band a Band List in which shall be entered the name of every person who is a member of that band.</p> <p>9. (1) Until such time as a band assumes control of its Band List, the Band</p>	<p>7. (1) Les personnes suivantes n'ont pas droit d'être inscrites :</p> <p>a) celles qui étaient inscrites en vertu de l'alinéa 11 (1)f), dans sa version précédant immédiatement le 17 avril 1985, ou en vertu de toute disposition antérieure de la présente loi portant sur le même sujet que celui de cet alinéa, et dont le nom a ultérieurement été omis ou retranché du registre des Indiens en vertu de la présente loi;</p> <p>b) celles qui sont les enfants d'une personne qui était inscrite ou avait droit de l'être en vertu de l'alinéa 11 (1)f), dans sa version précédant immédiatement le 17 avril 1985, ou en vertu de toute disposition antérieure de la présente loi portant sur le même sujet que celui de cet alinéa, et qui sont également les enfants d'une personne qui n'a pas droit d'être inscrite.</p> <p>(2) L'alinéa (1)a) ne s'applique pas à une personne de sexe féminin qui, avant qu'elle ne soit inscrite en vertu de l'alinéa 11(1)f), avait droit d'être inscrite en vertu de toute autre disposition de la présente loi.</p> <p>(3) L'alinéa (1)b) ne s'applique pas à l'enfant d'une personne de sexe féminin qui, avant qu'elle ne soit inscrite en vertu de l'article 11 (1)f), avait droit d'être inscrite en vertu de toute autre disposition de la présente loi.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Listes de bande</i></p> <p>8. Est tenue conformément à la présente loi la liste de chaque bande où est consigné le nom de chaque personne qui en est membre.</p> <p>9. (1) Jusqu'à ce que la bande assume la responsabilité de sa liste, celle-ci est tenue au ministère par le</p>
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<p>List of that band shall be maintained in the Department by the Registrar.</p>	<p>registraire.</p>
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<p>(2) The names in a Band List of a band immediately prior to April 17, 1985 shall constitute the Band List of that band on April 17, 1985.</p> <p>(3) The Registrar may at any time add to or delete from a Band List maintained in the Department the name of any person who, in accordance with this Act, is entitled or not entitled, as the case may be, to have his name included in that List.</p> <p>(4) A Band List maintained in the Department shall indicate the date on which each name was added thereto or deleted therefrom.</p> <p>(5) The name of a person who is entitled to have his name entered in a Band List maintained in the Department is not required to be entered therein unless an application for entry therein is made to the Registrar.</p> <p>10. (1) A band may assume control of its own membership if it establishes membership rules for itself in writing in accordance with this section and if, after the band has given appropriate notice of its intention to assume control of its own membership, a majority of the electors of the band gives its consent to the band's control of its own membership.</p> <p>(2) A band may, pursuant to the consent of a majority of the electors of the band,</p> <p>(a) after it has given appropriate notice of its intention to do so, establish membership rules for itself; and</p> <p>(b) provide for a mechanism for reviewing decisions on membership.</p> <p>(3) Where the council of a band makes a by-law under paragraph 81(1)(p.4) bringing this subsection into effect in respect of the band, the consents required under subsections (1) and (2) shall</p>	<p>(2) Les noms figurant à une liste d'une bande immédiatement avant le 17 avril 1985 constituent la liste de cette bande au 17 avril 1985.</p> <p>(3) Le registraire peut ajouter à une liste de bande tenue au ministère, ou en retrancher, le nom de la personne qui, aux termes de la présente loi, a ou n'a pas droit, selon le cas, à l'inclusion de son nom dans cette liste.</p> <p>(4) La liste de bande tenue au ministère indique la date où chaque nom y a été ajouté ou en a été retranché.</p> <p>(5) Il n'est pas requis que le nom d'une personne qui a droit à ce que celui-ci soit consigné dans une liste de bande tenue au ministère y soit consigné à moins qu'une demande à cet effet soit présentée au registraire.</p> <p>10. (1) La bande peut décider de l'appartenance à ses effectifs si elle en fixe les règles par écrit conformément au présent article et si, après qu'elle a donné un avis convenable de son intention de décider de cette appartenance, elle y est autorisée par la majorité de ses électeurs.</p> <p>(2) La bande peut, avec l'autorisation de la majorité de ses électeurs :</p> <p>a) après avoir donné un avis convenable de son intention de ce faire, fixer les règles d'appartenance à ses effectifs;</p> <p>b) prévoir une procédure de révision des décisions portant sur l'appartenance à ses effectifs.</p> <p>(3) Lorsque le conseil d'une bande établit un statut administratif en vertu de l'article 81 (1) p.4) mettant en vigueur le présent paragraphe à l'égard d'une bande, l'autorisation requise en vertu des paragraphes (1) et (2) doit être donnée par la majorité des</p>
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<p>be given by a majority of the members of the band who are of the full age of eighteen years.</p> <p>(4) Membership rules established by a band under this section may not deprive any person who had the right to have his</p>	<p>membres de la bande qui ont dix-huit ans révolus.</p> <p>(4) Les règles d'appartenance fixées par une bande en vertu du présent article ne peuvent priver quiconque avait droit à ce</p>
<p>name entered in the Band List for that band, immediately prior to the time the rules were established, of the right to have his name so entered by reason only of a situation that existed or an action that was taken before the rules came into force.</p> <p>(5) For greater certainty, subsection (4) applies in respect of a person who was entitled to have his name entered in the Band List under paragraph 11 (1)(c) immediately before the band assumed control of the Band List if that person does not subsequently cease to be entitled to have his name entered in the Band List.</p> <p>(6) Where the conditions set out in subsection (1) have been met with respect to a band, the council of the band shall forth- with give notice to the Minister in writing that the band is assuming control of its own membership and shall provide the Minister with a copy of the membership rules for the band.</p> <p>(7) On receipt of a notice from the council of a band under subsection (6), the Minister shall, if the conditions set out in subsection (1) have been complied with, forthwith</p> <p>(a) give notice to the band that it has control of its own membership; and</p> <p>(b) direct the Registrar to provide the band with a copy of the Band List</p>	<p>que son nom soit consigné dans la liste de bande immédiatement avant la fixation des règles du droit à ce que son nom y soit consigné en raison uniquement d'un fait ou d'une mesure antérieurs à leur prise d'effet.</p> <p>(5) Il demeure entendu que le paragraphe (4) s'applique à la personne qui avait droit à ce que son nom soit consigné dans la liste de bande en vertu de l'alinéa 11 (1)c) immédiatement avant que celle-ci n'assume la responsabilité de la tenue de sa liste si elle ne cesse pas ultérieurement d'avoir droit à ce que son nom y soit consigné.</p> <p>(6) Une fois remplies les conditions du paragraphe (1), le conseil de la bande, sans délai, avise par écrit le Ministre du fait que celle-ci décide désormais de l'appartenance à ses effectifs et lui transmet le texte des règles d'appartenance.</p> <p>(7) Sur réception de l'avis du conseil de bande prévu au paragraphe (6), le Ministre, sans délai, s'il constate que les conditions prévues au paragraphe (1) sont remplies:</p> <p>a) avise la bande qu'elle décide désormais de l'appartenance à ses effectifs;</p> <p>b) ordonne au registraire de</p>

<p>maintained in the Department.</p> <p>(8) Where a band assumes control of its membership under this section, the membership rules established by the band shall have effect from the day on which notice is given to the Minister under subsection (6), and any additions to or deletions from the Band List of the band by the Registrar on or after that day are of no effect unless they are in accordance with the membership rules established by the band.</p> <p>(9) A band shall maintain its own Band List from the date on which a copy of the Band List is received by the band under paragraph (7)(b), and, subject to section</p>	<p>transmettre à la bande une copie de la liste de bande tenue au ministère.</p> <p>(8) Lorsque la bande décide de l'appartenance à ses effectifs en vertu du présent article, les règles d'appartenance fixées par celle-ci entrent en vigueur à compter de la date où l'avis au Ministre a été donné en vertu du paragraphe (6); les additions ou retranchements de la liste de la bande effectués par le registraire après cette date ne sont valides que s'ils ont été effectués conformément aux règles d'appartenance fixées par la bande.</p> <p>(9) À compter de la réception de l'avis prévu à l'alinéa (7)b), la bande est responsable de la tenue de sa liste. Sous réserve de l'article 13.2, le ministère, à compter de</p>
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<p>13.2, the Department shall have no further responsibility with respect to that Band List from that date.</p> <p>(10) A band may at any time add to or delete from a Band List maintained by it the name of any person who, in accordance with the membership rules of the band, is entitled or not entitled, as the case may be, to have his name included in that list.</p> <p>(11) A Band List maintained by a band shall indicate the date on which each name was added thereto or deleted therefrom.</p> <p>11. (1) Commencing on April 17, 1985, a person is entitled to have his name entered in a Band List maintained in the Department for a band if</p> <p>(a) the name of that person was entered in the Band List for that band, or that person was entitled to have his name entered in the Band List for that band, immediately prior to April 17, 1985;</p> <p>(b) that person is entitled to be registered under paragraph 6(1)(b) as a member of that band;</p> <p>(c) that person is entitled to be registered under paragraph 6(1)(c) and ceased to be a member of that band by reason of the circumstances set out in that paragraph; or</p> <p>(d) that person was born on or after April 17, 1985 and is entitled to be registered under paragraph 6(1)(f) and both parents of that person are entitled to have their names entered in the Band List or, if no longer living, were at the time of death entitled to have their names entered in the Band List.</p> <p>(2) Commencing on the day that is two years after the day that an Act entitled <i>An Act to amend the Indian Act</i>, introduced in</p>	<p>cette date, est dégage de toute responsabilité à l'égard de cette liste.</p> <p>(10) La bande peut ajouter à la liste de bande tenue par elle, ou en retrancher, le nom de la personne qui, aux termes des règles d'appartenance de la bande, a ou n'a pas droit, selon le cas, à l'inclusion de son nom dans la liste.</p> <p>(11) La liste de bande tenue par celle-ci indique la date où chaque nom y a été ajouté ou en a été retranché.</p> <p>11. (1) À compter du 17 avril 1985, une personne a droit à ce que son nom soit consigné dans une liste de bande tenue pour cette dernière au ministère si elle remplit une des conditions suivantes :</p> <p>a) son nom a été consigné dans cette liste, ou elle avait droit à ce qu'il le soit immédiatement avant le 17 avril 1985;</p> <p>b) elle a droit d'être inscrite en vertu de l'alinéa 6(1)b) comme membre de cette bande;</p> <p>c) elle a droit d'être inscrite en vertu de l'alinéa 6(1)c) et a cessé d'être un membre de cette bande en raison des circonstances prévues à cet alinéa;</p> <p>d) elle est née après le 16 avril 1985 et a droit d'être inscrite en vertu de l'alinéa 6(1)f) et ses parents ont tous deux droit à ce que leur nom soit consigné dans la liste de bande ou, s'ils sont décédés, avaient ce droit à la date de leur décès.</p> <p>(2) À compter du jour qui suit de deux ans le jour où la loi intitulée <i>Loi modifiant la Loi sur les Indiens</i>, déposée à la Chambre des communes le 28 février 1985, a reçu la sanction royale ou de la date antérieure choisie en vertu de l'article 13.1, lorsque la bande n'a pas la responsabilité de la tenue de sa liste prévue à la présente loi, une</p>
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<p>the House of Commons on February 28, 1985, is assented to, or on such earlier day as may be agreed to under section 13.1, where a band does not have control of its Band List under this Act, a person is entitled to have his name entered in a Band List maintained in the Department for the band</p>	<p>personne a droit à ce que son nom soit consigné dans la liste de bande tenue au ministère pour cette dernière :</p>
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<p>(a) if that person is entitled to be registered under paragraph 6(1)(d) or (e) and ceased to be a member of that band by reason of the circumstances set out in that paragraph; or</p> <p>(b) if that person is entitled to be registered under paragraph 6(1)(f) or subsection 6(2) and a parent referred to in that provision is entitled to have his name entered in the Band List or, if no longer living, was at the time of death entitled to have his name entered in the Band List.</p> <p>(3) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(d) and subsection (2), a person whose name was omitted or deleted from the Indian Register or a band list in the circumstances set out in paragraph 6(1)(c), (d) or (e) who was no longer living on the first day on which he would otherwise be entitled to have his name entered in the Band List of the band of which he ceased to be a member shall be deemed to be entitled to have his name so entered.</p> <p>(4) Where a band amalgamates with another band or is divided so as to constitute new bands, any person who would otherwise have been entitled to have his name entered in the Band List of that band under this section is entitled to have his name entered in the Band List of the amalgamated band or the new band to which he has the closest family ties, as the case may be.</p> <p>12. Commencing on the day that is two years after the day that an Act entitled <i>An Act to amend the Indian Act</i>, introduced in the House of Commons on February 28, 1985, is assented to, or on such earlier day as may be agreed to under section 13.1, any person who</p> <p>(a) is entitled to be registered under section 6, but is not entitled to have his name entered in the Band List maintained in the Department under</p>	<p>a) soit si elle a droit d'être inscrite en vertu des alinéas 6(1)d) ou e) et qu'elle a cessé d'être un membre de la bande en raison des circonstances prévues à l'un de ces alinéas;</p> <p>b) soit si elle a droit d'être inscrite en vertu de l'alinéa 6(1) f) ou du paragraphe 6(2) et qu'un de ses parents visés à l'une de ces alinéas a droit à ce que son nom soit consigné dans la liste de bande ou, s'il est décédé, avait ce droit à la date de son décès.</p> <p>(3) Pour l'application de l'alinéa (1)d) et du paragraphe (2), la personne dont le nom a été omis ou retranché du registre des Indiens ou d'une liste de bande dans les circonstances prévues aux alinéas 6(1)c), d) ou e) et qui est décédée avant le premier jour où elle a acquis le droit à ce que son nom soit consigné dans la liste de bande dont elle a cessé d'être membre est réputée avoir droit à ce que son nom y soit consigné.</p> <p>(4) Lorsqu'une bande fusionne avec une autre ou qu'elle est divisée pour former de nouvelles bandes, toute personne qui aurait par ailleurs eu droit à ce que son nom soit consigné dans la liste de la bande en vertu du présent article a droit à ce que son nom soit consigné dans la liste de la bande issue de la fusion ou de celle de la nouvelle bande à l'égard de laquelle ses liens familiaux sont les plus étroits.</p> <p>12. À compter du jour qui suit de deux ans le jour où la loi intitulée <i>Loi modifiant la Loi sur les Indiens</i>, déposée à la Chambre des communes le 28 février 1985, a reçu la sanction royale ou de la date antérieure choisie en vertu de l'article 13.1, la personne qui,</p> <p>a) soit a droit d'être inscrite en vertu de l'article 6 sans avoir droit à ce que son nom soit consigné dans une</p>
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<p>section 11, or</p> <p>(b) is a member of another band, is entitled to have his name entered in the Band List maintained in the Department</p>	<p>liste de bande tenue au ministère en vertu de l'article 11,</p> <p>(3.1) Toute personne a droit à ce que son nom soit consigné dans une liste de bande tenue pour celle-ci au ministère si elle a le droit d'être inscrite en vertu de l'alinéa 6(1)c.1) et si sa mère a cessé d'être un membre de la bande en raison des circonstances prévues au sous-alinéa 6(1)c.1)(i).</p>
<p>for a band if the council of the admitting band consents.</p> <p>13. Notwithstanding sections 11 and 12, no person is entitled to have his name entered at the same time in more than one Band List maintained in the Department.</p> <p>13.1 (1) A band may, at any time prior to the day that is two years after the day that an Act entitled <i>An Act to amend the Indian Act</i>, introduced in the House of Commons on February 28, 1985, is assented to, decide to leave the control of its Band List with the Department if a majority of the electors of the band gives its consent to that decision.</p> <p>(2) Where a band decides to leave the control of its Band List with the Department under subsection (1), the council of the band shall forthwith give notice to the Minister in writing to that effect.</p> <p>(3) Notwithstanding a decision under subsection (1), a band may, at any time after that decision is taken, assume control of its Band List under section 10.</p> <p>13.2 (1) A band may, at any time after assuming control of its Band List under section 10, decide to return control of the Band List to the Department if a majority of the electors of the band gives its consent to that decision.</p>	<p>pour cette dernière si le conseil de la bande qui l'admet en son sein y consent.</p> <p>13. Par dérogation aux articles 11 et 12, nul n'a droit à ce que son nom soit consigné en même temps dans plus d'une liste de bande tenue au ministère.</p> <p>13.1 (1) Une bande peut, avant le jour qui suit de deux ans le jour où la loi intitulée <i>Loi modifiant la Loi sur les Indiens</i>, déposée à la Chambre des communes le 28 février 1985, a reçu la sanction royale, décider de laisser la responsabilité de la tenue de sa liste au ministère à condition d'y être autorisée par la majorité de ses électeurs.</p> <p>(2) Si la bande décide de laisser la responsabilité de la tenue de sa liste au ministère en vertu du paragraphe (1), le conseil de la bande, sans délai, avise par écrit le Ministre de la décision.</p> <p>(3) Malgré la décision visée au paragraphe (1), la bande peut, en tout temps après cette décision, assumer la responsabilité de la tenue de sa liste en vertu de l'article 10.</p> <p>13.2 (1) La bande peut, en tout temps après avoir assumé la responsabilité de la tenue de sa liste en vertu de l'article 10, décider d'en remettre la responsabilité au ministère à condition d'y être autorisée par la majorité de ses électeurs.</p>

<p>(2) Where a band decides to return control of its Band List to the Department under subsection (1), the council of the band shall forthwith give notice to the Minister in writing to that effect and shall provide the Minister with a copy of the Band List and a copy of all the membership rules that were established by the band under subsection 10(2) while the band maintained its own Band List.</p> <p>(3) Where a notice is given under subsection (2) in respect of a Band List, the maintenance of that Band List shall be the responsibility of the Department from the date on which the notice is received and from that time the Band List shall be maintained in accordance with the membership rules set out in section 11.</p>	<p>(2) Lorsque la bande décide de remettre la responsabilité de la tenue de sa liste au ministère en vertu du paragraphe (1), le conseil de la bande, sans délai, avise par écrit le Ministre de la décision et lui transmet une copie de la liste et le texte des règles d'appartenance fixées par la bande conformément au paragraphe 10 (2) pendant qu'elle assumait la responsabilité de la tenue de sa liste.</p> <p>(3) Lorsqu'est donné l'avis prévu au paragraphe (2) à l'égard d'une liste de bande, la tenue de cette dernière devient la responsabilité du ministère à compter de la date de réception de l'avis. Elle est tenue, à compter de cette date, conformément aux règles d'appartenance prévues à l'article 11.</p>
<p>13.3 A person is entitled to have his name entered in a Band List maintained in the Department pursuant to section 13.2 if that person was entitled to have his name entered, and his name was entered, in the Band List immediately before a copy of it was provided to the Minister under subsection 13.2(2), whether or not that person is also entitled to have his name entered in the Band List under section II.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Notice of Band Lists</i></p> <p>14. (1) Within one month after the day an Act entitled <i>An Act to amend the Indian Act</i>, introduced in the House of Commons on February 28, 1985, is assented to, the Registrar shall provide the council of each band with a copy of the</p>	<p>13.3 Une personne a droit à ce que son nom soit consigné dans une liste de bande tenue par le ministère en vertu de l'article 13.2 si elle avait droit à ce que son nom soit consigné dans cette liste, et qu'il y a effectivement été consigné, immédiatement avant qu'une copie en soit transmise au Ministre en vertu du paragraphe 13.2(2), que cette personne ait ou non droit à ce que son nom soit consigné dans cette liste en vertu de l'article II.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Affichage des listes de bande</i></p> <p>14. (1) Au plus tard un mois après la date où la loi intitulée <i>Loi modifiant la Loi sur les Indiens</i>, déposée à la Chambre des communes le 28 février 1985, a reçu la sanction royale, le registraire transmet au conseil de</p>

<p>Band List for the band as it stood immediately prior to that day.</p> <p>(2) Where a Band List is maintained by the Department, the Registrar shall, at least once every two months after a copy of the Band List is provided to the council of a band under subsection (1), provide the council of the band with a list of the additions to or deletions from the Band List not included in a list previously provided under this subsection.</p> <p>(3) The council of each band shall, forthwith on receiving a copy of the Band List under subsection (1), or a list of additions to and deletions from its Band List under subsection (2), post the copy or the list, as the case may be, in a conspicuous place on the reserve of the band.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Inquiries</i></p> <p>14.1 The Registrar shall, on inquiry from any person who believes that he or any person he represents is entitled to have his name included in the Indian Register or a Band List maintained in the Department, indicate to the person making the inquiry whether or not that name is included therein.</p>	<p>chaque bande une copie de la liste de la bande dans son état précédant immédiatement cette date.</p> <p>(2) Si la liste de bande est tenue au ministère, le registraire, au moins une fois tous les deux mois après la transmission prévue au paragraphe (1) d'une copie de la liste au conseil de la bande, transmet à ce dernier une liste des additions à la liste et des retranchements de celle-ci non compris dans une liste antérieure transmise en vertu du présent paragraphe.</p> <p>(3) Le conseil de chaque bande, dès qu'il reçoit copie de la liste de bande prévue au paragraphe (1) ou la liste des additions et des retranchements prévue au paragraphe (2), affiche la copie ou la liste, selon le cas, en un lieu bien en évidence dans la réserve de la bande.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Demandes</i></p> <p>14.1 Le registraire, à la demande de toute personne qui croit qu'elle-même ou que la personne qu'elle représente a droit à l'inclusion de son nom dans le registre des Indiens ou une liste de bande tenue au ministère, indique sans délai à l'auteur de la demande si ce nom y est inclus ou non.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Protests</i></p> <p>14.2 (1) A protest may be made in respect of the inclusion or addition of the name of a person in, or the omission or deletion of the name of a person from, the Indian Register, or a Band List maintained in the Department, within three years after the inclusion or addition, or omission or deletion, as the case may be, by notice in writing to the Registrar, containing a brief statement of the grounds</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Protestations</i></p> <p>14.2 (1) Une protestation peut être formulée, par avis écrit au registraire renfermant un bref exposé des motifs invoqués, contre l'inclusion ou l'addition du nom d'une personne dans le registre des Indiens ou une liste de bande tenue au ministère ou contre l'omission ou le retranchement de son nom de ce registre ou d'une telle liste dans les trois ans suivant soit l'inclusion ou l'addition,</p>

<p>therefor.</p> <p>(2) A protest may be made under this section in respect of the Band List of a band by the council of the band, any member of the band or the person in respect of whose name the protest is made or his representative.</p> <p>(3) A protest may be made under this section in respect of the Indian Register by the person in respect of whose name the protest is made or his representative.</p> <p>(4) The onus of establishing the grounds of a protest under this section lies on the person making the protest.</p> <p>(5) Where a protest is made to the Registrar under this section, he shall cause an investigation to be made into the matter and render a decision.</p> <p>(6) For the purposes of this section, the Registrar may receive such evidence on oath, on affidavit or in any other manner, whether or not admissible in a court of law, as in his discretion he sees fit or deems just.</p> <p>(7) Subject to section 14.3, the decision of the Registrar under subsection (5) is final and conclusive.</p> <p>14.3 (1) Within six months after the Registrar renders a decision on a protest under section 14.2,</p> <p>(a) in the case of a protest in respect of the Band List of a band, the council of the band, the person by whom the protest was made, or the person in respect</p>	<p>soit l'omission ou le retranchement.</p> <p>(2) Une protestation peut être formulée en vertu du présent article à l'égard d'une liste de bande par le conseil de cette bande, un membre de celle-ci ou la personne dont le nom fait l'objet de la protestation ou son représentant.</p> <p>(3) Une protestation peut être formulée en vertu du présent article à l'égard du registre des Indiens par la personne dont le nom fait l'objet de la protestation ou son représentant.</p> <p>(4) La personne qui formule la protestation prévue au présent article a la charge d'en prouver le bien-fondé.</p> <p>(5) Lorsqu'une protestation lui est adressée en vertu du présent article, le registraire fait tenir une enquête sur la question et rend une décision.</p> <p>(6) Pour l'application du présent article, le registraire peut recevoir toute preuve présentée sous serment, sous déclaration sous serment ou autrement, si celui-ci, à son appréciation, l'estime indiquée ou équitable, que cette preuve soit ou non admissible devant les cours.</p> <p>(7) Sous réserve de l'article 14.3 la décision du registraire visée au paragraphe (5) est finale et péremptoire.</p> <p>14.3 (1) Dans les six mois suivant la date de la décision du registraire sur une protestation prévue à l'article 14.2 :</p> <p>a) soit, s'il s'agit d'une protestation formulée à l'égard d'une liste de bande, le conseil de la bande, la personne qui a formulé la protestation ou la personne</p>
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<p>of whose name the protest was made or his representative, or</p> <p>(b) in the case of a protest in respect of the Indian Register, the person in respect of whose name the protest was made or his representative,</p> <p>may, by notice in writing, appeal the decision to a court referred to in subsection (5).</p> <p>(2) Where an appeal is taken under this section, the person who takes the appeal shall forthwith provide the Registrar with a copy of the notice of appeal.</p> <p>(3) On receipt of a copy of a notice of appeal under subsection (2), the Registrar shall forthwith file with the court a copy of the decision being appealed together with all documentary evidence considered in arriving at that decision and any recording or transcript of any oral proceedings related thereto that were held before the Registrar.</p> <p>(4) The court may, after hearing an appeal under this section,</p> <p>(a) affirm, vary or reverse the decision of the Registrar; or</p> <p>(b) refer the subject-matter of the appeal back to the Registrar for reconsideration or further investigation.</p> <p>(5) An appeal may be heard under this section</p> <p>(a) in the Province of Prince Edward Island, the Yukon Territory or the Northwest Territories, before the Supreme Court;</p> <p>(b) in the Province of New Brunswick, Manitoba, Saskatchewan or Alberta, before the Court of Queen's Bench;</p> <p>(c) in the Province of Quebec, before the Superior Court for the district in which the band is situated or in which the person who made the protest resides, or for such other district as the Minister may designate; or</p> <p>(d) in any other province, before the county or district court of the county or district in which the band is situated or in which the person who made the protest resides, or of such other county or</p>	<p>dont le nom fait l'objet de la protestation ou son représentant,</p> <p>b) soit, s'il s'agit d'une protestation formulée à l'égard du registre des Indiens, la personne dont le nom a fait l'objet de la protestation ou son représentant,</p> <p>peuvent, par avis écrit, interjeter appel de la décision à la cour visée au paragraphe (5).</p> <p>(2) Lorsqu'il est interjeté appel en vertu du présent article, l'appelant transmet sans délai au registraire une copie de l'avis d'appel.</p> <p>(3) Sur réception de la copie de l'avis d'appel prévu au paragraphe (2), le registraire dépose sans délai à la cour une copie de la décision en appel, toute la preuve documentaire prise en compte pour la décision, ainsi que l'enregistrement ou la transcription des débats devant le registraire.</p> <p>(4) La cour peut, à l'issue de l'audition de l'appel prévu au présent article :</p> <p>a) soit confirmer, modifier ou renverser la décision du registraire;</p> <p>b) soit renvoyer la question en appel au registraire pour réexamen ou nouvelle enquête.</p> <p>(5) L'appel prévu au présent article peut être entendu :</p> <p>a) dans la province de l'Île-du-Prince-Édouard, le territoire du Yukon et les territoires du Nord-Ouest, par la Cour suprême;</p> <p>b) dans la province du Nouveau-Brunswick, du Manitoba, de la Saskatchewan ou d'Alberta, par la Cour du Banc de la Reine;</p> <p>c) dans la province de Québec, par la Cour supérieure du district où la bande est située ou dans lequel réside la personne qui a formulé la protestation, ou de tel autre district désigné par le Ministre;</p>
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<p>district as the Minister may designate.»</p>	<p>d) dans les autres provinces, par un juge de la cour de comté ou de district du comté ou du district où la bande est située ou dans lequel réside la personne qui a formulé la protestation, ou de tel autre comté ou district désigné par le Ministre.</p>
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5. Act to promote gender equity in Indian registration by responding to the Court of Appeal for British Columbia decision in *Mclvor v. Canada (Registrar of Indian and Northern Affairs, S.C. 2010, c. 18)*:

<p>«1. This Act may be cited as the Gender Equity in Indian Registration Act.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">INDIAN ACT</p> <p>2. (1) The portion of subsection 6(1) of the French version of the Indian Act before paragraph (a) is replaced by the following:</p> <p>6. (1) Sous réserve de l'article 7, toute personne a le droit d'être inscrite dans les cas suivants :</p> <p>(2) Paragraph 6(1)(a) of the Act is replaced by the following:</p> <p>(a) that person was registered or entitled to be registered immediately prior to April 17, 1985;</p> <p>(3) Paragraph 6(1)(c) of the Act is replaced by the following:</p> <p>(c) the name of that person was omitted or deleted from the Indian Register, or from a band list prior to September 4, 1951, under subparagraph 12(1)(a)(iv), paragraph 12(1)(b) or subsection 12(2) or under subparagraph 12(1)(a)(iii) pursuant to an order made under subsection 109(2), as each provision read immediately prior to April 17, 1985, or under any former provision of this Act relating to the same subject-matter as any of those provisions;</p> <p>(v.1) that person</p> <p>(i) is a person whose mother's name was, as a result of the mother's marriage, omitted or</p>	<p>1. Loi sur l'équité entre les sexes relativement à l'inscription au registre des Indiens.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">LOI SUR LES INDIENS</p> <p>2. (1) Le passage du paragraphe 6(1) de la version française de la Loi sur les Indiens précédant l'alinéa a) est remplacé par ce qui suit :</p> <p>6. (1) Sous réserve de l'article 7, toute personne a le droit d'être inscrite dans les cas suivants :</p> <p>(2) L'alinéa 6(1)a) de la même loi est remplacé par ce qui suit :</p> <p>a) elle était inscrite ou avait le droit de l'être le 16 avril 1985;</p> <p>(3) L'alinéa 6(1)c) de la même loi est remplacé par ce qui suit:</p> <p>c) son nom a été omis ou retranché du registre des Indiens ou, avant le 4 septembre 1951, d'une liste de bande, en vertu du sous-alinéa 12(1)a)(iv), de l'alinéa 12(1)b) ou du paragraphe 12(2) ou en vertu du sous-alinéa 12(1)a)(iii) conformément à une ordonnance prise en vertu du paragraphe 109(2), dans leur version antérieure au 17 avril 1985, ou en vertu de toute disposition antérieure de la présente loi portant sur le même sujet que celui d'une de ces dispositions;</p> <p>c.1) elle remplit les conditions suivantes :</p> <p>(i) le nom de sa mère a été, en raison du</p>
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<p>deleted from the Indian Register, or from a band list prior to September 4, 1951, under paragraph 12(1)(b) or under subparagraph 12(1)(a)(iii) pursuant to an order made under subsection 109(2), as each provision read immediately prior to April 17, 1985, or under any former provision of this Act relating to the same subject-matter as any of those provisions,</p> <p>(ii) is a person whose other parent is not entitled to be registered or, if no longer living, was not at the time of death entitled to be registered or was not an Indian at that time if the death occurred prior to September 4, 1951,</p> <p>(iii) was born on or after the day on which the marriage referred to in subparagraph (i) occurred and, unless the person's parents married each other prior to April 17, 1985, was born prior to that date, and</p> <p>(iv) had or adopted a child, on or after September 4, 1951, with a person who was not entitled to be registered on the day on which the child was born or adopted;</p> <p>(4) Subsection 6(3) of the Act is amended by striking out "and" at the end of paragraph (a), by adding "and" at the end of paragraph (b) and by adding the following after paragraph (b):</p> <p>(c) a person described in paragraph (1)(c.1) and who was no longer living on the day on which that paragraph comes into force is deemed to be entitled to be registered under that paragraph.</p> <p>3. Section 11 of the Act is amended by adding the following after subsection (3):</p> <p>(3.1) A person is entitled to have the person's name entered in a Band List maintained in the Department for a band if the person is entitled to</p>	<p>mariage de celle-ci, omis ou retranché du registre des Indiens ou, avant le 4 septembre 1951, d'une liste de bande, en vertu de l'alinéa 12(1)b) ou en vertu du sous-alinéa 12(1)a)(iii) conformément à une ordonnance prise en vertu du paragraphe 109(2), dans leur version antérieure au 17 avril 1985, ou en vertu de toute disposition antérieure de la présente loi portant sur le même sujet que celui d'une de ces dispositions,</p> <p>(ii) son autre parent n'a pas le droit d'être inscrit ou, s'il est décédé, soit n'avait pas ce droit à la date de son décès, soit n'était pas un Indien à cette date dans le cas d'un décès survenu avant le 4 septembre 1951,</p> <p>(iii) elle est née à la date du mariage visé au sous-alinéa (i) ou après cette date et, à moins que ses parents se soient mariés avant le 17 avril 1985, est née avant cette dernière date,</p> <p>(iv) elle a eu ou a adopté, le 4 septembre 1951 ou après cette date, un enfant avec une personne qui, lors de la naissance ou de l'adoption, n'avait pas le droit d'être inscrite;</p> <p>(4) Le paragraphe 6(3) de la même loi est modifié par adjonction, après l'alinéa b), de ce qui suit :</p> <p>c) la personne visée à l'alinéa (1)c.1) et qui est décédée avant l'entrée en vigueur de cet alinéa est réputée avoir le droit d'être inscrite en vertu de celui-ci.</p> <p>3. (4) Le paragraphe 6(3) de la même loi est modifié par adjonction, après l'alinéa b), de ce qui suit :</p> <p>(3.1) Toute personne a droit à ce que son nom soit consigné dans une liste de bande tenue pour celle-ci au ministère si elle a le droit</p>
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be registered under paragraph 6(1)(c.1) and the person's mother ceased to be a member of that band by reason of the circumstances set out in subparagraph 6(1)(c.1)(i).

REPORT TO PARLIAMENT

3.1 (1) The Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development shall cause to be laid before each House of Parliament, not later than two years after this Act comes into force, a report on the provisions and implementation of this Act.

(2) Such committee of Parliament as may be designated or established for the purposes of this subsection shall, forthwith after the report of the Minister is tabled under subsection (1), review that report and shall, in the course of that review, undertake a review of any provision of this Act.

RELATED PROVISIONS

4. In sections 5 to 8, "band", "Band List", "council of a band", "registered" and "Registrar" have the same meaning as in subsection 2(1) of the Indian Act.

5. For greater certainty, subject to any deletions made by the Registrar under subsection 5(3) of the Indian Act, any person who was, immediately before the day on which this Act comes into force, registered and entitled to be registered under paragraph 6(1)(a) or (c) of the Indian Act continues to be registered.

6. For greater certainty, for the purposes of paragraph 6(1)(f) and subsection 6(2) of the Indian Act, the Registrar must recognize any entitlements to be registered that existed under paragraph 6(1)(a) or (c) of that Act immediately before the day on which this Act comes into force.

7. For greater certainty, subject to any membership rules established by a band, any

d'être inscrite en vertu de l'alinéa 6(1)c.1) et si sa mère a cessé d'être un membre de la bande en raison des circonstances prévues au sous-alinéa 6(1)c.1)(i).

RAPPORT AU PARLEMENT

3.1 (1) Au plus tard deux ans après la date d'entrée en vigueur de la présente loi, le ministre des Affaires indiennes et du Nord canadien fait déposer devant chaque chambre du Parlement un rapport sur les dispositions de la présente loi et sa mise en œuvre.

(2) Le comité parlementaire désigné ou constitué pour l'application du présent paragraphe examine sans délai le rapport visé au paragraphe (1) après son dépôt. Dans le cadre de l'examen, le comité procède à la révision des dispositions de la présente loi.

DISPOSITIONS CONNEXES

4. Aux articles 5 à 8, « bande », « conseil de bande », « inscrit », « liste de bande » et « registraire » s'entendent au sens du paragraphe 2(1) de la Loi sur les Indiens.

5. Il est entendu que, sous réserve de tout retranchement effectué par le registraire en vertu du paragraphe 5(3) de la Loi sur les Indiens, toute personne qui, à l'entrée en vigueur de la présente loi, était inscrite et avait le droit de l'être en vertu des alinéas 6(1)a) ou c) de la Loi sur les Indiens le demeure.

6. Il est entendu que, pour l'application de l'alinéa 6(1)f) et du paragraphe 6(2) de la Loi sur les Indiens, le registraire est tenu de reconnaître tout droit d'être inscrit qui existait en vertu des alinéas 6(1)a) ou c) de cette loi à l'entrée en vigueur de la présente loi.

7. Il est entendu que, sous réserve des règles d'appartenance fixées par la bande, toute personne qui, à l'entrée en vigueur de la présente loi, avait le droit d'être inscrite en

person who, immediately before the day on which this Act comes into force, was entitled to be registered under paragraph 6(1)(a) or (c) of the Indian Act and had the right to have their name entered in the Band List maintained by that band continues to have that right.

8. For greater certainty, subject to any membership rules established by a band on or after the day on which this Act comes into force, any person who is entitled to be registered under paragraph 6(1)(c.1) of the Indian Act, as enacted by subsection 2(3), and who had, immediately before that day, the right to have their name entered in the Band List maintained by that band continues to have that right.

9. For greater certainty, no person or body has a right to claim or receive any compensation, damages or indemnity from Her Majesty in right of Canada, any employee or agent of Her Majesty, or a council of a band, for anything done or omitted to be done in good faith in the exercise of their powers or the performance of their duties, only because

(a) a person was not registered, or did not have their name entered in a Band List, immediately before the day on which this Act comes into force; and

(b) one of the person's parents is entitled to be registered under paragraph 6(1)(c.1) of the Indian Act, as enacted by subsection 2(3).

COMING INTO FORCE

10. This Act comes into force, or is deemed to have come into force, on a day, on or after April 5, 2010, to be fixed by order of the Governor in Council.

vertu des alinéas 6(1)a) ou c) de la Loi sur les Indiens et avait droit à ce que son nom soit consigné dans la liste de bande tenue par celle-ci conserve le droit à ce que son nom y soit consigné.

8. Il est entendu que, sous réserve des règles d'appartenance fixées par la bande, toute personne qui, à l'entrée en vigueur de la présente loi, avait le droit d'être inscrite en vertu des alinéas 6(1)a) ou c) de la Loi sur les Indiens et avait droit à ce que son nom soit consigné dans la liste de bande tenue par celle-ci conserve le droit à ce que son nom y soit consigné.

9. Il est entendu qu'aucune personne ni aucun organisme ne peut réclamer ou recevoir une compensation, des dommages-intérêts ou une indemnité de l'État, de ses préposés ou mandataires ou d'un conseil de bande en ce qui concerne les faits — actes ou omissions — accomplis de bonne foi dans l'exercice de leurs attributions, du seul fait qu'une personne n'était pas inscrite — ou que le nom d'une personne n'était pas consigné dans une liste de bande — à l'entrée en vigueur de la présente loi et que l'un de ses parents a le droit d'être inscrit en vertu de l'alinéa 6(1)c.1) de la Loi sur les Indiens, édicté par le paragraphe 2(3).

ENTRÉE EN VIGUEUR

10. La présente loi entre en vigueur ou est réputée être entrée en vigueur à la date fixée par décret, laquelle ne peut être antérieure au 5 avril 2010.»

6. Indian Act, S.R.C. (1985), c. I-5, s. 6 (as currently in force):

6. (1) Sous réserve de l'article 7, toute personne a le droit d'être inscrite dans les cas suivants :

a) elle était inscrite ou avait le droit de l'être le 16 avril 1985;

b) elle est membre d'un groupe de personnes déclaré par le gouverneur en conseil après le 16 avril 1985 être une bande pour l'application de la présente loi;

c) son nom a été omis ou retranché du registre des Indiens ou, avant le 4 septembre 1951, d'une liste de bande, en vertu du sous-alinéa 12(1)a)(iv), de l'alinéa 12(1)b) ou du paragraphe 12(2) ou en vertu du sous-alinéa 12(1)a)(iii) conformément à une ordonnance prise en vertu du paragraphe 109(2), dans leur version antérieure au 17 avril 1985, ou en vertu de toute disposition antérieure de la présente loi portant sur le même sujet que celui d'une de ces dispositions;

c.1) elle remplit les conditions suivantes :

(i) le nom de sa mère a été, en raison du mariage de celle-ci, omis ou retranché du registre des Indiens ou, avant le 4 septembre 1951, d'une liste de bande, en vertu de l'alinéa 12(1)b) ou en vertu du sous-alinéa 12(1)a)(iii) conformément à une ordonnance prise en vertu du paragraphe 109(2), dans leur version antérieure au 17 avril 1985, ou en vertu de toute disposition antérieure de la présente loi portant sur le

6. (1) Subject to section 7, a person is entitled to be registered if

(a) that person was registered or entitled to be registered immediately prior to April 17, 1985;

(b) that person is a member of a body of persons that has been declared by the Governor in Council on or after April 17, 1985 to be a band for the purposes of this Act;

(c) the name of that person was omitted or deleted from the Indian Register, or from a band list prior to September 4, 1951, under subparagraph 12(1)(a)(iv), paragraph 12(1)(b) or subsection 12(2) or under subparagraph 12(1)(a)(iii) pursuant to an order made under subsection 109(2), as each provision read immediately prior to April 17, 1985, or under any former provision of this Act relating to the same subject-matter as any of those provisions;

(v.1) that person

(i) is a person whose mother's name was, as a result of the mother's marriage, omitted or deleted from the Indian Register, or from a band list prior to September 4, 1951, under paragraph 12(1)(b) or under subparagraph 12(1)(a)(iii) pursuant to an order made under subsection 109(2), as each provision read immediately prior to April 17, 1985, or under any former provision of this Act relating to the same subject-matter as any of those provisions,

même sujet que celui d'une de ces dispositions,

(ii) son autre parent n'a pas le droit d'être inscrit ou, s'il est décédé, soit n'avait pas ce droit à la date de son décès, soit n'était pas un Indien à cette date dans le cas d'un décès survenu avant le 4 septembre 1951,

(iii) elle est née à la date du mariage visé au sous-alinéa (i) ou après cette date et, à moins que ses parents se soient mariés avant le 17 avril 1985, est née avant cette dernière date,

(iv) elle a eu ou a adopté, le 4 septembre 1951 ou après cette date, un enfant avec une personne qui, lors de la naissance ou de l'adoption, n'avait pas le droit d'être inscrite;

d) son nom a été omis ou retranché du registre des Indiens ou, avant le 4 septembre 1951, d'une liste de bande, en vertu du sous-alinéa 12(1)a(iii) conformément à une ordonnance prise en vertu du paragraphe 109(1), dans leur version antérieure au 17 avril 1985, ou en vertu de toute disposition antérieure de la présente loi portant sur le même sujet que celui d'une de ces dispositions;

e) son nom a été omis ou retranché du registre des Indiens ou, avant le 4 septembre 1951, d'une liste de bande:

(i) soit en vertu de l'article 13, dans sa version antérieure au 4 septembre 1951, ou en vertu de toute disposition antérieure de la présente loi portant sur le même sujet que celui de cet

(ii) is a person whose other parent is not entitled to be registered or, if no longer living, was not at the time of death entitled to be registered or was not an Indian at that time if the death occurred prior to September 4, 1951,

(iii) was born on or after the day on which the marriage referred to in subparagraph (i) occurred and, unless the person's parents married each other prior to April 17, 1985, was born prior to that date, and

(iv) had or adopted a child, on or after September 4, 1951, with a person who was not entitled to be registered on the day on which the child was born or adopted;

(d) the name of that person was omitted or deleted from the Indian Register, or from a band list prior to September 4, 1951, under subparagraph 12(1)(a)(iii) pursuant to an order made under subsection 109(1), as each provision read immediately prior to April 17, 1985, or under any former provision of this Act relating to the same subject-matter as any of those provisions;

(e) the name of that person was omitted or deleted from the Indian Register, or from a band list prior to September 4, 1951,

(i) under section 13, as it read immediately prior to September 4, 1951, or under any former provision of this Act relating to the same subject-matter as that section, or

<p>article,</p> <p>(ii) soit en vertu de l'article 111, dans sa version antérieure au 1er juillet 1920, ou en vertu de toute disposition antérieure de la présente loi portant sur le même sujet que celui de cet article;</p> <p><i>f) ses parents ont tous deux le droit d'être inscrits en vertu du présent article ou, s'ils sont décédés, avaient ce droit à la date de leur décès.</i></p> <p>(2) Sous réserve de l'article 7, une personne a le droit d'être inscrite si l'un de ses parents a le droit d'être inscrit en vertu du paragraphe (1) ou, s'il est décédé, avait ce droit à la date de son décès.</p> <p>(3) Pour l'application de l'alinéa (1)f) et du paragraphe (2) :</p> <p><i>a) la personne qui est décédée avant le 17 avril 1985 mais qui avait le droit d'être inscrite à la date de son décès est réputée avoir le droit d'être inscrite en vertu de l'alinéa (1)a);</i></p> <p><i>b) la personne visée aux alinéas (1)c), d), e) ou f) ou au paragraphe (2) et qui est décédée avant le 17 avril 1985 est réputée avoir le droit d'être inscrite en vertu de ces dispositions;</i></p> <p><i>c) la personne visée à l'alinéa (1)c.1) et qui est décédée avant l'entrée en vigueur de cet alinéa est réputée avoir le droit d'être inscrite en vertu de celui-ci.</i></p>	<p>(ii) under section 111, as it read immediately prior to July 1, 1920, or under any former provision of this Act relating to the same subject-matter as that section; or</p> <p>(f) that person is a person both of whose parents are or, if no longer living, were at the time of death entitled to be registered under this section.</p> <p>(2) Subject to section 7, a person is entitled to be registered if that person is a person one of whose parents is or, if no longer living, was at the time of death entitled to be registered under subsection (1).</p> <p>(3) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(f) and subsection (2),</p> <p>(a) a person who was no longer living immediately prior to April 17, 1985 but who was at the time of death entitled to be registered shall be deemed to be entitled to be registered under paragraph (1)(a);</p> <p>(b) a person described in paragraph (1)(c), (d), (e) or (f) or subsection (2) and who was no longer living on April 17, 1985 shall be deemed to be entitled to be registered under that provision; and</p> <p>(c) a person described in paragraph (1)(c.1) and who was no longer living on the day on which that paragraph comes into force is deemed to be entitled to be registered under that paragraph.</p>
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